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Abstract 
This PhD aims to investigate the development of a character type, referred to in this 
thesis as the ‘administrator’ - the character used by authors as a means to reflect 
through character both the mundane processes of their contemporary soundings, and 
as a means through which to address contemporary discourses of power.  This 
character has historically functioned to alter the course of plots, determine the fates 
of other characters, and dictate the pace of a narrative, yet despite having pervaded 
literature and wider culture over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth century, 
the character of the administrator has evaded detailed academic analysis of how and 
why such characters appear to be both wholly implicated in the plot’s outcome and 
yet are powerless to prevent the outcomes that it heralds.  
The goal of this thesis is, then, to trace and analyse a major aspect of characterisation 
that has seldom been made explicit in literary studies: the importance of the role that 
characterisation plays in the text’s relationship with systematised power.  By using 
the text's principal administrator character, or means of characterising systematised 
power, as a prism through which to view the text, we may attempt to separate those 
aspects of the text which critique contemporary social hierarchies from those aspects 
of the text which reflect, or even affirm them, from the period of the early 
Renaissance through to the beginning of the twentieth century.  
Through an 'archaeology' of such a character type, the thesis shows how 
administrator characters have been used historically to incorporate the author's 
impressions of  new organisational structures and the growing influence of certain 
institutions, from Machiavelli, More and Shakespeare through to the beginnings of 
modernism. The primary texts of this thesis have been selected as those which 
coincide with and appear to address major reconfigurations of collective 
organisation. By tracing the roots of the administrator character trope, as a kind of 
pre-history of our contemporary power relations (both in artistic representation and 
in our own relationships with systematised power), back to their earliest appearances 
in the Early Modern period, this thesis also seeks to contribute to a greater 
understanding of both the historical production of, and forms of subjectivity 
incorporated into, literary texts.   
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This PhD aims to investigate the development of an evolving mode of literary 
delivery which coalesce over time into a character type, referred to in this thesis as 
the ‘administrator’ which has historically functioned to alter the course of plots, 
determine the fates of characters, and dictate the pace of a narrative, yet which 
continues to be regarded as a mere cipher in much literary criticism. Despite having 
pervaded literature and wider culture over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth 
century, the character of the administrator has evaded detailed academic analysis, 
which has hitherto failed to determine from whence it came, from where it derives its 
power, and why such a character appears to be both wholly implicated in the plot’s 
outcome and yet is powerless to prevent the outcomes that it heralds. The genealogy 
of the administrator character indicates that its roots lie within an attempt to evade 
questions addressing the consequences of the systematising of power in modernity – 
such as bureaucracy, institutional corruption, and unaccountability, among others – 
and thus may also hold implications for recent debates in philosophy and political 
theory.  
Among the questions raised by recent theorizations of sovereignty and 
governmentality, the question of how power appears to become simultaneously 
weaker and stronger when proliferated through systems is often overlooked and 
remains, at any rate, under accounted for – in particular, at the level of those 
interactions which Foucault described as ‘little powers, of little institutions situated 
at the lowest level’.1 Power, when systematised, seems weakened in terms of 
individual actualisation and liberty, as the individual becomes disempowered in the 
face of systems and procedures. Simultaneously, however, power seems 
strengthened by systems in the aggregate, as fewer exceptions are made, aberrations 
in procedure are limited, and practices become universally enforced.  
The modern administrator character has its roots, I will argue, in the attempt to 
circumvent these questions, or to account for them by drawing upon other 
                                                          
1 Michel Foucault, Power (Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984) ed. by James D. Faubion (London: Penguin, 
1994), 3 edn, p. 87. 
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discourses, rather than addressing them directly. Initially, in the late sixteenth and 
early seventeenth centuries, Europe collectively experienced a period of uncertainty 
regarding governance, as the future of individual sovereigns came under question, 
borders shifted, and technological advances and social changes eroded previously 
established feudal systems of power. Possibly in response, this era fostered a 
renewed interest in political theory, as the writings of figures such as Machiavelli, 
More, Erasmus, and even King James I entertained ideas which entailed the 
displacement of prior medieval models. 
At the same time, in The Prince and Utopia, Machiavelli and More appear to show 
an awareness of some emergent problems concerning the systematisation of power – 
including issues of bureaucracy, accountability and institutional corruption - but also 
seem to deliberately evade them through the artful application of rhetoric. It is in this 
context that, I argue, the administrator character has its origins, in an attempt to 
account for the means by which power is systematised, and to describe the effect of 
this at a time when no other means of representing such systematisation were readily 
available to an author.   
In light of academic neglect of the administrator character, this thesis seeks to trace 
the development of the administrator character from the outset of the early modern 
period through to the beginning of the twentieth century. In doing so, I have sought 
to present a chronological series of case studies in which the expression of 
systematised power may be examined as it appears in a particular text, and as it is 
revealed in that text’s manner and mode of characterisation. This approach 
highlights, I suggest, hitherto unremarked aspects of the primary texts, and is, I 
argue, a fruitful means by which to begin examining their broader social and 
historical dimensions. 
My motivation for this study is then, first and foremost, an interest in the role which 
characterisation plays in establishing the presence of a deeper infrastructure of 
institutions and systems within a given literary text. Each chapter is broadly 
structured around an initial attempt to identify how the authors accounted for such 
aspects of the phenomena of power and questions of sovereignty through recourse to 
the symbolic and conceptual ‘tools’ available. Furthermore, each chapter then 
attempts to examine how these contribute to the composite of characteristics which 
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represent systematised power as they appear in the texts in the form of administrator 
characters, immediately followed by an attempt to relate these to social and political 
developments within the text’s historical period. Each chapter, in this way, attempts 
to analyse the primary texts with direct reference to their historical context and, in 
turn, to address each time period through the lens, as it were, of the primary text – 
itself a product of, and reflection upon, the ideas, symbolism and preoccupations of 
its time.  
The thesis begins by considering the emergence of the figure of the administrator in 
a certain ‘tone’ of narration, or authorial ‘style’, understood as an aid to the 
rhetorical presentation of polemic, as exemplified in the works of Machiavelli and 
More. This authorial style, it is argued, solidifies over the course of the sixteenth 
century into actual individual characters, as typified by the plays of Shakespeare, in 
which such characters serve both as agents and embodiments of the systems of 
power of their time, whilst still conforming to the practical constraints of stage 
performance, and the palette of contemporary symbolic references.  
The characterisation of Puck in A Midsummer Night's Dream and Ariel in The 
Tempest, for example, incorporates references to the contemporary significance of 
courtship and pomp in the maintenance of power, while the duality of Portia and 
Balthazar in The Merchant of Venice makes reference to institutions of mercantilism 
and the law, whose influence was increasing in Elizabethan England at the time.
2
 
From there, the thesis moves on to the ways in which Goethe’s Faust develops, at 
the beginning of the nineteenth century, a specifically modern use of the 
administrator character to represent the ‘established order’ in a new way, and then on 
to Dostoevsky’s innovative depiction of the administrator character as a 
fundamentally inauthentic figure in ‘The Grand Inquisitor’ story told by Ivan in The 
Brothers Karamazov. Although separated by more than half a century, I suggest 
Faust and ‘The Grand Inquisitor’ are interestingly similar in terms of their references 
to the past and in their concern for the future, but also in terms of their complex 
relationship with institutional and cultural changes taking place at their time of 
composition.  
                                                          
2
 Other plays by Shakespeare, of course, address systematised power through characterisation, for example 
Coriolanus and Measure for Measure. This thesis focuses upon A Midsummer Night's Dream, The Tempest, and 
The Merchant of Venice as these plays span the turn of the century, and thereby offer an interesting comparison 
to Goethe's Faust.     
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Finally, directly foreshadowing the ‘inhumanity’ and increasingly impersonal nature 
of administration to be found depicted in a number of twentieth-century works, the 
characterisation of administration comes in Joseph Conrad’s Heart of Darkness to 
incorporate disembodied entities and is primarily characterised less through singular 
characters than through symbolism and even the structure of the text itself. This 
structural function of the administrator character also has its literary roots in rhetoric, 
which — in line with the development of extended networks of information and 
organisation — crystallises into individual characters, and then dissipates as 
individual characters come to represent dispersed organisations. As examined in 
more detail in the chapters to follow, Machiavelli uses rhetoric to transform a set of 
observations and opinions into a coherent and persuasive argument, as for example 
in the following passage from The Prince: 
Putting aside, then, all the imaginary things that are said about princes, 
and getting down to the truth, let me say that whenever men are 
discussed (and especially princes because they are prominent), there are 
certain qualities that bring them either praise or blame.
3
 
By casting any conflicting commentary on princes as ‘imaginary things’, continually 
posing his statements as if begging the reader’s indulgence (‘let me say’, ‘putting 
aside, then’) and asserting that he is ‘getting down to the truth’, Machiavelli 
effectively relies more on his arguments and his rhetoric (his authorial tone, his 
‘reasonableness’ and ‘disinterested observations’) to enhance his arguments than the 
(supposedly) historical evidence he cites. Similarly, almost four centuries later, 
Conrad, also addressing issues of governance, collective action, and the relationship 
between the individual and the collective, achieves a similar effect through his 
positioning of characters. In Heart of Darkness, as we will see, Conrad, literally, 
situates the character of the Accountant within earshot of the moans of dying 
Congolese, a passage which itself is located at the approximate centre of the 
narrative, and symbolically represents the point at which the weight of the evidence 
that the events in the Congo constitute a massacre becomes undeniable. 
                                                          
3 Niccolo Machavelli, The Prince, ed. by Robert M Adams (London and New York: Norton Critical Editions, 
1988). 
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Heart of Darkness is the most iconic of the many texts in its era in which the rapid 
emergence of new forms of organisation, such as the commercial corporation, 
philanthropy, and new forms of political constitution, can be viewed as a key 
concern. As the final text examined, Heart of Darkness also appears, in this sense, to 
represent a certain ‘tipping point’ where the characterisation of the administrator 
begins, once again, to become a diffuse quality represented primarily through the 
manner in which the narrative is told. Where individual administrator characters are 
depicted, they are, most often, depersonalised ‘ciphers’, intended to reflect a view of 
the world (and the systems of power at work within it), rather than to convey any 
‘deep’ inner life of their own. In this way, the thesis may also be read as offering 
something like a prehistory of the more familiar figure of the administrator as he 
appears, most famously, in Kafka’s modernist nightmares, written during the 1910s 
and 1920s, as well as in, for example, the dystopian science fiction of Zamatyin’s We 
and Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four.  
As the intermediary between social structures and individuals, administrators have, 
in the wake of Kafka, Orwell and others, become, first and foremost, a ubiquitous 
‘caste’ in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, signifying compliance, prescribing 
behaviour, and instantiating a sense of institutional power by indicating external 
forces influencing the events within the narrative beyond the control of the 
protagonist. My research attempts, among other things, to trace the emergence of this 
‘type’, while demonstrating the ways in which it has been transformed since the 
sixteenth century. The thesis thus attempts to analyse the development of this 
characterisation of systematised power — the administrator character — in a fashion 
which follows the tradition of genealogy most influentially set out in Michel 
Foucault’s 1977 essay ‘Nietzsche Genealogy and History’. In this, the aim is to 
comment productively, then, upon the emergence of a specifically modern form of 
identity — the administrator ‘type’ — which comes, gradually, to constitute a 
pervasive heuristic in modern societies. In this way, the thesis seeks to use (literary) 
‘history to dispel the chimeras of the origin’, as Foucault puts it.4 Through 
characterisation (and, subsequently, through literary tradition and the use of literary 
techniques such as rhetoric, symbolism and plot structure), authors, artists and 
                                                          
4 Michel Foucault, Aesthetics (Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984), ed. by James D. Fausion (London: 
Penguin, 1998), II, p. 340. 
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readers enable certain qualities or elements (characteristics, ideologies, principles) to 
be conflated — either consciously, or through general acquiescence to underlying 
institutional norms — in a manner that appears to come together ‘naturally’, and in a 
form, as Foucault states, ‘[w]here the soul pretends unification or the self fabricates a 
coherent identity’.5 Some aspects of such composites may, of course, be unique to 
individual authors, but, more often, it appears that such characterisations are 
incorporated precisely for the purpose of interrogating and examining such existing 
or emergent ‘identities’. The primary texts have, therefore, been chosen specifically 
where this appears to be the case, and in accordance with Foucault’s own 
observation that the ‘isolation of different points of emergence [of identities] does 
not conform to the successive configurations of an identical meaning; rather, they 
result from substitutions, displacements, disguised conquests, and systematic 
reversals’.6 
In order to limit the scope of research to a manageable and cohesive thesis, the study 
concentrates specifically upon the period in which social structures became gradually 
synonymous with administration or bureaucracy, and the concept of the 
‘interchangeable’ functionary became recognisable as a figure whose role 
superseded pure characterisation or immediate influence on the plot. This is a period 
that stretches, as I try to show, from the European Renaissance of the fifteenth and 
sixteenth centuries (in particular, the moment of Renaissance ‘humanism’) to the 
emergence of literary modernism around the end of the nineteenth century, through 
which develops the integral role played by the figure of the administrator in 
representing the rise of a new mentality of étatism.  
In considering its early modern origins, it should be said from the outset, then, that 
the administrator character, as I understand it here, is categorically not, for example, 
the caricature of the bumbling minor official in the mode of La Commedia 
dell’Arte’s Pantaloon.7 Indeed, in keeping with the Commedia dell’Arte, which had 
its beginning in the second half of the sixteenth century, in a period when theatre 
plays were highly stylised, the figure of Pantaloon stands for the exact opposite. 
Pantaloon (or Pantalone in the original Italian) was a satirised version of the greedy 
                                                          
5 Foucault, Aesthetics (Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984), p. 340. 
6 Foucault, Aesthetics (Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984), p. 380. 
7 See R. S. Miola, Shakespeare and Classical Comedy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994). 
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and naive Venetian merchant. Miserly and slow witted, Pantaloon plays the ideal 
counterpart to Harlequin. Unlike the administrator character, who is initially 
attributed power within the narrative through the application of rhetoric, Pantaloon, 
tellingly, in keeping with Commedia dell’Arte more generally, would have delivered 
dialogue which would not have been understood. Within the Commedia, regardless 
of region, il Capitano would have spoken in Spanish, il Dottore in Bolognese, and 
l’Arlecchino in utter gibberish, and Pantaloon would have largely mimed. The focus 
was placed on physical performance rather than on spoken text. Shakespeare’s 
Polonius in Hamlet was clearly influenced by the Pantaloon character, and that 
Polonius is a Pantaloon character, rather than an administrator character, I would 
argue, adds to the agony of choice which is at the heart of Hamlet — a play in which 
this theme is greatly enhanced by the complete absence of effective administrator 
characters as such.  
By contrast, the earlier sections of the thesis, focusing on The Prince, Utopia, and a 
selection of Shakespeare’s other plays, suggest that the depiction of the administrator 
has its earliest roots not in satire (as in Pantaloon), but, rather, in a structural 
imperative to indicate the influence, outside of the immediate narrative, of external 
forces — or institutional power — upon the characters and events of that narrative 
itself. Within these sections, the aim is thus to demonstrate how the earliest examples 
of an author’s inclusion of a character, primarily deployed to indicate the influence 
of powers external to the narrative, are greatly influenced by Renaissance debates 
surrounding rhetoric in particular. In this light, it is important to note that views and 
practices of rhetoric, at the time these sixteenth and early seventeenth century texts 
were written, fell into two broad streams, each of which had been developed since 
the art’s classical inception. The first of these was promoted by those who viewed 
the art of rhetoric as being a means to win an argument as an end in itself, regardless 
of one’s purpose or the soundness of one’s position — a view held both by those 
who affirmed the cynical use of rhetoric to achieve specific ends, and by those who 
rejected the art as, effectively, an extension of mendacity. During the Renaissance, 
this view was often held as being that which was articulated in Plato. The second, 
after the manner of Aristotle’s systematic treatment of argumentation and rhetoric, 
viewed rhetoric as a legitimate subject in its own right. This view held rhetoric to 
have the potential to assist inductive reasoning in such a way as to reveal deeper 
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truths within debated subject matter. It was believed that this latter interpretation was 
broadly adopted by classical Roman culture, although, as Mills has shown, aspects of 
distrust regarding rhetoric were also rediscovered during rhetoric’s re-emergence in 
the European Renaissance.
8
 Rhetoric was, in this way, I argue, used by Shakespeare, 
in particular, to reveal character by having his characters reveal their motives and 
opinions through arguing in favour of their goals, and by allowing the audience to 
view his characters in discourse with other characters, and thus depicting his 
characters adapting their behaviour and arguments in line with their new audience — 
the other characters in the play. 
It is, of course, frequently observed that power, as it is depicted in literary works (as 
elsewhere), is intimately related to knowledge. Indeed, in the wake of new historicist 
readings, from Dollimore and Tennenhouse to Greenblatt, this has become 
something of a truism of Shakespeare criticism particularly. While traditionally the 
discipline of history may have been concerned with ‘events in terms of their most 
unique characteristics, their most acute manifestations’ — such as wars, battles, or 
treaties (the ostensible foci of many of Shakespeare’s plays) — we are, today, more 
likely to view what changes the course of history as, in Foucault’s words, ‘the 
reversal of a relationship of forces, the usurpation of power, the appropriation of a 
vocabulary turned against those who had once used it’.9 And, in fact, power and 
what Foucault here refers to as a ‘vocabulary’ (discourses or systems of knowledge) 
are so closely related that they are depicted as effectively synonymous in much of 
the literature in which the administrator character may be read as playing a 
prominent role. Each is often viewed as, to all intents and purposes, a manifestation 
of the other. Thus, Shakespeare’s Prospero in The Tempest rules his island through 
his arcane knowledge rather than his noble heritage, just as the source of the 
powerlessness of Joseph K in The Trial is his inability to navigate seemingly 
arbitrary rules, and the Party in Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four seeks to maintain 
power by redefining the nature of knowledge itself (‘two and two could have been 
three as easily as five, if that were what was needed'’; ‘Everyone knows what is in 
Room 101’).10 In the administrator character, it is, then, above all this relationship 
                                                          
8
 Catherine Mills, 'Aspects of Distrust of Rhetoric ' (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Birmingham, 1980). 
9 Foucault, Aesthetics (Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984), p. 382. 
10 George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four (London: Penguin, 1989), pp. 271-72. Emphasis mine. 
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between power and knowledge which is depicted through the systems — the 
administrations — which arise as a consequence of this relationship.  
As far as I am aware, there is no specific study that has examined the particular 
mode of characterisation with which this thesis is concerned. Ben Kafka, in his 
recent The Demon of Writing (2012), has studied ‘paperwork’s symbolic function — 
its function of telling us about the world and what to do or what not to do to it’, as a 
means of approaching the historical development of different ideas of bureaucracy.
11
 
Similarly, Thomas Richards in The Imperial Archive (1993) has, for example, 
discussed the degree to which empire, in particular, is ‘partly a fabrication’, arguing 
that ‘narratives of the late nineteenth century are full of fantasies about an empire 
united not by force but by information’, representing a deeper underlying conception 
of ‘empire as an immense administrative challenge’.12 Richards speculates how 
interesting it would have been to further examine the ‘relation of information and 
imperialism’, as ‘problems of knowledge and information can be found everywhere 
in imperial fiction’,13 while Kafka suggests that any given ‘theory that purports to 
explain the techniques of knowledge must take these fantasies [of power and 
powerlessness] into account’.14 The scope of such projects, however, is defined as 
beyond both Kafka’s and Richards’ respective areas of focus.  
This thesis takes a different approach, arguing that a tracing of the concepts and 
ideas which fed into the characterisation of systematised power may grant insights 
into the historical production of, and even the subjectively experiential aspects 
embedded in, literary texts. As social and cultural constructs, texts may accurately 
reflect, subvert, and even perhaps inspire, the development of centralised systems of 
governance. By assessing the artistic expression of the ambitions, reservations and 
ambivalences experienced both in the face of, and within the mechanics of, the rise 
of new administrative bodies in modernity, a greater awareness of the workings of 
the text may be gained. The ultimate aim of this thesis, if not exactly ‘to use the text 
as a basis for the reconstruction of an ideology’, is thus, in part at least, to use the 
chosen texts to make apparent the influence of a carefully crafted and evolving 
                                                          
11 Ben Kafka, The Demon of Writing (New York: Zone Books, 2012), p. 108. 
12 Thomas Richards, Knowledge and the Fantasy of Empire (London: Verso, 1993), p. 1. 
13 Richards, Knowledge and the Fantasy of Empire, p. 9. 
14 Kafka, The Demon of Writing, p. 144. 
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manner of literary delivery (referred to within this thesis as administrator character 
and as a 'trope' in the loosest sense -- as a 'figure of speech' in which the 
administrator character is the 'figure') within our contemporary power relations, and 
to trace the roots of this trope back to their inception. By so doing, it seeks to gain a 
greater understanding of how culture and power relations manifest themselves and 
intertwine. 
The systematisation of power in terms of the texts studied, and within the remit of 
this thesis, incorporates both the discipline of power exercised through the 
application of knowledge, and the acquiring of knowledge through the application of 
power. This process — the transference of power into a systematic process, and the 
endowing of a system with power — inevitably requires language (‘vocabulary’ in 
Foucault’s terms) and some reference to shared symbols. Because of this, literature, 
it appears, may have a particular ability to reference, critique, explore, and give an 
‘experiential’ fictional form to such systems. Indeed, it may be suggested that 
literature is an ideal medium for the representation of how power, knowledge, and 
administrations manifest themselves in modern societies, since the role language 
plays in administration may be directly echoed or mimicked within the text itself. It 
is, as such, that this thesis suggests that literature, of all media prior to the twentieth 
century, has been perhaps uniquely equipped to examine systematised power — an 
examination that is most effective when forms of characterisation are incorporated. It 
is the possible genealogy of this process — the emergence of ‘the administrator 
character’ — that is sought within this thesis. 
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The Prince and Utopia and the foundations of the administrator character 
‘Nothing makes a prince so esteemed as great exercises and setting a fine example | 
which in our cities I may rather wish for than hope after’ 
 
Utopia and The Prince are rhetorical exercises which sought to mediate the 
relationship between the individual and the state. This chapter will attempt to 
demonstrate how early modern European adaptations of classical rhetoric played a 
central role in the literary examination of administrative systems. The growth of 
commerce, technological advances and colonial exploration (to name but three of the 
major forces at work during this era) demanded intellectual accounts which could 
provide a conceptual framework through which to view and respond to systems of 
administration. Scholars did so by returning to and adapting classical accounts, 
emphasising systems of administration as the means by which to both describe and 
adapt to these changes. By approaching The Prince and Utopia as rhetorical devices, 
used to increase credibility and establish authority, and situating them within the 
history of such accounts that aimed to provide arguments which accounted for the 
influence of existing institutions and to explain their intricacies, I will thus seek to 
demonstrate how Machiavelli and More exemplify the ways in which writers of the 
period established a manner of description that would come to be embodied, by later 
authors, in individual administrator characters. 
 
Using the administrator 'trope' (loosely used here to refer to this rhetorically 
informed, power oriented, literary delivery with a sense of sublimated personal) as a 
prism through which to view the texts, two broad categories of readings emerge of 
both Thomas More’s Utopia and Machiavelli’s The Prince: immediate contemporary 
readings which read the texts as polemical incitements (albeit less so in the case of 
The Prince due to a significant lag between the time of the text’s penning and its 
wider circulation), and retrospective readings that interpret the texts as manifestos. 
Machiavelli and More, as part of the progression of their arguments, create the 
impression of a machinery of state capable of imposing central control, and portray 
the character of the administrator as a conduit to unspecified forces — which, despite 
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acknowledging influences outside the text’s remit, are never explicitly defined. 
Immediate readings of The Prince and Utopia, as well as historical archives, indicate 
that they entered into (and were interpreted within) an open intellectual debate 
concerning the uses and applications of rhetoric which incorporated spectacle and 
pageantry as the ‘rhetoric’ of governance. Placed within this context, the texts’ 
subject matter suggests an integral element of ambiguity as to the intended reading 
of the text, which indicates an intention to serve as polemical incitements. When 
read, however, without the context of the art of rhetoric, as in most later readings, 
The Prince and Utopia appear to be proposing doctrines; an effect in part due to the 
influence of modern ideas about what administration is and the ways in which its 
present manifestations have been retrospectively layered onto the text by modern 
readers. Hence, for example, the readings of these works as ‘a great humanitarian’s 
exertions’ (More) and as ‘diabolical’ in ‘character’ (Machiavelli), offered by Leo 
Strauss and Adam Ulam, respectively.
15
 In fact, Machiavelli and More’s 
administrators are never explicitly described as a single character or as having a 
specific set of characteristics, but appear to have a predictive quality when these self-
same texts are read without an explicit awareness of the specific historical role this 
‘character’ (or, if one will, ‘flavour’) originally played within the structure of the 
text. While no depiction of any specific mode of governance forms the pre-history of 
the administrator trope, these texts support the proposition that the rhetoric used to 
carry the reader along with the force of the author’s argument works to create the 
impression of a set of characteristics possessed by the author, and which are 
presented as active within the societies they describe. It is these implicit assumptions 
which greatly influence how the machinery of subsequent governance is portrayed, 
with considerable consequences for the depiction of administrator characters in 
particular.  
 
‘A truthful and pleasant work of the best state of a common wealth | the opportunity 
of understanding in the shortest time’: Reading Utopia and The Prince as 
contributions to debate  
                                                          
15
 Leo Strauss, Thoughts on Machiavelli (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1978), Adam Ulam, 
'Socialism and Utopia', Daedalus, 94.2 (1965), pp. 382-400. 
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Readings of Utopia and The Prince which neglect their political context and 
contemporary debates around rhetoric become increasingly dislocated, until both 
texts are primarily assessed in the manner of manifestos. Biographical information 
suggests that More and Machiavelli’s conception of their ‘reader’ would have been 
very different, but that the intended nature of their reading appears to have been 
similar in tone. Whereas More intended his work for publication, going so far as to 
recruit Erasmus as an editor, Machiavelli’s intention was to be read (at least initially) 
by Lorenzo de’ Medici.16 Whereas More sought to enter into intellectual debates 
concerning governance, Machiavelli appears to have been seeking patronage by 
advertising his services as an experienced diplomat, historian and rhetorician. 
Despite the apparent difference in the authors’ presumed audience, both texts are, 
however, orientated around the goal of representing an argument, and, in order to 
maintain their argument’s integrity, the authors used the techniques of rhetoric to 
imply abilities and processes on behalf of ‘authority’ (whether that of the state, the 
Church, or a Prince). These implied abilities were, given actual state infrastructures 
at the time, highly improbable (to say the least) and perhaps impossible (even with 
today’s technology and resources). Nonetheless, the liberties taken by these two 
authors appear to have shaped subsequent literary representations of the ‘role’ of 
power and of its administrators, to the point of altering public debates concerning the 
nature of governance, and altering perceptions around the capacity and potential of 
governmental influence.  
 
To begin with More’s text, while Thomas Cromwell, writing within the same half 
decade as Utopia and The Prince, was described by Pilkington as ‘the man who was 
the first true civil servant, as we should recognise the term’,17 I will argue that it was, 
in fact, More (along with Machiavelli) who had the greater long-term influence on 
political science and on emergent discourses of governance. In his study of the 
British Civil Service, Pilkington argues that:  
 
The Civil Service as we understand it today could only really begin 
with the Reformation’s disestablishment of so many churchmen 
                                                          
16 For more, see J. H. Hexter, More's Utopia: The Biography of an Idea, The History of Ideas Series (Oxford: 
Princeton University Press, 1952), V, p. 43. 
17 Colin Pinkington, The Civil Service in Britain Today (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999), p. 10. 
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[which] required the creation of an entirely new tier of lay 
bureaucrats and administrators, and the dissolution of the 
monasteries and the break with Rome meant that whole new areas 
of competence and organisation were put into the hands of the 
royal administrators as they took over land and property belonging 




It was upon the basis of Henry VII’s reforms that his son, Henry VIII, thus licensed a 
secular bureaucracy directed to: 
 
... masterminding the dissolution of the monasteries and the 
sequestration of church property to the benefit of the royal purse. 
His [Cromwell's] success and sheer administrative ability gave him 
the authority ... [to] reorganis[e] the entire royal administration and 





In this context, Cromwell, according to Roper, makes explicit what the citizens 
within Utopia portray implicitly — the ability to obfuscate the practical limitations 
of central power in order to maintain the illusion of control. This is apparent in the 
advice, for example, that he gives to Chelsea on deportment within the King’s 
service: 
The advice offered by Sir Thomas More to Crumwell was given in 
a very solemn tone ... you shall, in you council-giving to his grace, 
ever tell him what he ought to do, but never what he is able to do. 
So shall you show yourself a true faithful servant, and a right wise 
and worthy counsellor? For if a lino [lion] knew his own strength, 
hard were it for any man to rule him.
20
  
                                                          
18 Pinkington, The Civil Service in Britain Today, p. 10.  
19 William Roper and Samuel Weller Singer, The Life of Thomas More (London: Press of C. Whittingham for R. 
Triphook, 1822), p. 55. 
20 William Roper and Singer, The Life of Thomas More, p. 102. 
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Cromwell's description significantly echoes here the economic relations of Utopia as 
read by Samuel Bostaph: 
... the picture painted is one of a highly regimented society with its 
production, consumption and leisure activities meticulously 
planned. No basis for the planning is presented, other than the 
assertions of the narrator as to what is considered necessary and 
desirable. The method of planning goes unmentioned, but 
apparently is the fiat of the elected rulers of the General Council of 
the island and the senates of the cities.
21
 
When read as a principally humanist work rather than a political one, the 
‘unmentioned’ aspects of Utopia do not, then, suggest a desire to remain a ‘faithful 
servant’ (by facilitating an illusion of omnipotence). Instead, the text’s lack of 
‘method’ forces the reader to contemplate the conditions under which such 
behaviour would continue despite the influence of overt authority. The turmoil which 
forms the context for Utopia ceases to appear to be the motivation for the author, and 
functions more as a source of inspiration or as a continual metaphor. The political 
references on this reading form part of the rhetoric of Utopia that works towards a 
broader goal of providing a ‘spiritual’ exercise for the reader by placing familiar 
moral quandaries within an alien context. This implication of moral and personal 
disinterest and ambiguity of motive is open to misinterpretation and appropriation; 
however, it is these aspects which appear to have been employed by later authors 
precisely as attributes of their individual administrator characters.  
 
Machiavelli’s writing emerged within an equally tumultuous political era. The 
Medici family’s rule was effectively an aristocracy purporting republicanism, within 
which Machiavelli had served as a government secretary, one of the amici (friends 
and supporters of the Medici) who acted as a tier of administrators. Machiavelli 
worked within this system from 1498 to 1512 until Lorenzo de’ Medici fired him on 
suspicion of sedition and as a supporter of governo largo (a broad, less oligopolistic 
republican government). In 1513, Il Principe (The Prince) was written in what 
                                                          
21 Niccolo Machiavelli, ''Letter to the Signoria' ', in Legazioni, 1502), pp. 260-68. Samuel Bostaph, 'Utopia from 
an Economist's Perspective', in The Thomas More Studies Conference (University of Dallas, 2005). 
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Machiavelli portrays (in his letter dated 10 December 1513, to Francesco Vettori) as 
a state of reflective repose: ‘When evening comes [...] I enter into the ancient courts 
of ancient men [...] they in their humanity answer me, and for four hours I feel no 
boredom.’22 Machiavelli actively promotes this work as a proffering of tribute, 
describing it as ‘discussing the definition of a princedom, the categories of 
princedoms, how they are acquired, how they are retained, and why they are lost’. 
Machiavelli is equally clear about the intended audience for The Prince and its 
intended effect - ‘It ought to be welcomed by a prince, and especially by a new 
prince; therefore I am dedicating it to His Magnificence Giuliano’ - revealing the 
extent to which Machiavelli perceived every aspect of his text — and, indeed, every 
interaction — to be subject to rhetorical analysis.23  
 
Both The Prince and Utopia were written using humanist rhetoric as a means of 
interpreting and analysing the world. If one accepts rhetoric, as it is considered by 
these authors, to be a tool to understand those concepts which cannot be established 
logically or empirically, such as authority or power, rather than as just a formal 
system of oratory (as it tends to be understood today), The Prince and Utopia would 
then constitute a way of seeing and being within the world that would become 
ubiquitous cultural references for future depictions of power, society, and of 
administrator characters. It is this, in part at least, that the following sections will 
attempt to show.  
 
‘[The King] foresaw [wealth] wouldn’t support the king in battle against his own 
people | Of being feared or loved ... a wise prince should establish himself on that 
which is in his own control’: The Prince and Utopia as rhetorical arguments 
The humanist interpretation of classical rhetoric was more important for The Prince 
and Utopia than classical rhetoric per se. Early Modern Europe, c. 1450–1550, saw 
many previously decentralised feudal regimes coalesce. Italy, however, still 
                                                          
22 Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, ed. by Quentin Skinner and Russell Price (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003), p. 128. All quotes taken from this edition unless otherwise noted. This edition was translated by 
Adams, whose 1992 interpretation emphasises Machiavelli's fluid linking of ideas over a strict transposing of 
punctuation.   
23 Machavelli, The Prince, p. 128. 
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contained multiple provinces without a clear, unifying figurehead. Subsequently, as 
the demand for alternative systems of governance and administration grew, there was 
a renewed interest in the classics. Lucius Mestrius Plutarch’s Lives is often credited 
with stimulating a renewed interest in classical Greek and Roman culture. This 
rediscovery is most clearly evident in the scholarship and new approaches towards 
education in which the emphasis shifted from theology to the humanities. The 
inspiration for this ‘renaissance’, however, may be interpreted as being rooted within 
the emergence of centralised monarchies as the demand for inspirational political 
and administrative systems arose. Humanist interpretations of classical rhetoric — 
integral to both Aristotle’s and Plato’s theories of social order — were incorporated 
into propositional systems of governance, but act as more than propositions within 
Utopia and The Prince.
24
 Instead, within Utopia and The Prince, the principles of 
rhetoric permeate the text as if they were unifying principles, a world view which, I 
argue, would dramatically influence the later characterisation of administrators as an 
actual character type.  
 
Raphael’s famous painting The School of Athens, painted c. 1509–10, shows Plato 
gesturing towards the heavens, indicating the need to refer to the realm of absolute 
forms in all instances, while Aristotle is depicted as extending his arm, indicating the 
golden mean.
25
 This illustration may be viewed as a depiction of the popular 
conception of Plato and Aristotle according to Renaissance scholarship, rather than 
as an accurate depiction of the actual complexities of their thought. That Raphael 
depicts the two central figures holding each other’s gaze, engaged in debate, 
emphasises how these authors were being read in a kind of symbiotic tension, and 
possibly suggests that their teachings are to be taken ‘in equal measure’. The 
Renaissance view of rhetoric was one that may be seen as similarly twofold: as an art 
                                                          
24 'Propositional governance' refers here to political philosophies advocating governance based upon axioms or 
statements, such as a bill of rights. Such systems may be seen as opposed to modes of governance founded, for 
example, upon supposedly inherent qualities, such as Theocracy or Monarchy. Technocracies, Monopolies and 
Tyrannies would also be examples of non-propositional modes of governance.   
25 The School of Athens Stanza della Segnatura (Vaticano). Comparisons of Raphael's preliminary drawings, 
combined with physical examinations of the fresco in 1996, suggest significant changes were made prior to 
completion of the fresco in 1510, and after completion of the fresco in 1511, which possibly radically altered it. 
These changes could not have been made by Raphael, which suggests that the influence of the image was great 
enough to justify making revisions. 
  23 
 
which may enhance understanding and advocate truth (which was widely attributed 
to Aristotle, due to his defence of the art) and as an abuse of truth which may 
obfuscate and misconstrue (which was held to be Plato’s view).26 Each view, 
however, held that an awareness of the rhetorical arts, either to ward against its 
influence, or to avail of its utility, was a central aspect of any humanist 
education. Whereas Aristotle and Plato both emphasise that the moral purpose in life 
is the achievement of an authentic happiness, or eudemonia, the Renaissance placed 
a greater emphasis on applying the principles of the ancient and classical texts to 
contemporary ends. Such texts were thus read as holding valuable lessons for secular 
application, the most practicable of which was classical rhetoric.  
 
Rhetoric as it was originally envisioned by classical civilisations fulfilled a role akin 
to logic, and was intended to establish truths. As such, rhetoric achieved a new 
importance as the methods advocated by Classicists as being capable of discerning, 
for example, the proper form a government should take, were contextualised within 
works such as The Prince and Utopia. Machiavelli and More both depict acquiring 
and using authority as equitable with ‘winning an argument’, and therefore see that 
process as subject to the methodologies of a rhetorical exercise. Classical rhetoric 
was perceived as a compelling epistemology through which to analyse and describe 
politics, and by incorporating formal rhetorical techniques, Machiavelli and More 
both illustrate and interrogate existing methods of governance in a provocative 
manner. The ‘advice’ of Utopia and The Prince is presented within a political 
context which is never fully described, in which actions appear to have outcomes 
that are never fully accounted for, and in which precise details are rare and often 
uninformative. This invests the texts with a sense of authority and implies that the 
author’s arguments are informed with a greater level of understanding than that 
which is explicitly stated within the text.  
 
Machiavelli describes how the influence of one man, a Prince, may be viewed as 
vital for the founding of a republic, and argues that ‘it is necessary for a single man 
                                                          
26 Plato portrays Socrates as arguing that 'the rhetorician need not know the truth about things; he has only to 
discover some way of persuading the ignorant'. See Plato, Gorgias. trans. by E. M. Cope (London: Forgotten 
Books, 2008), p. 22. Aristotle argued that if rhetoric could be abused, this is true of 'all good things except virtue'. 
See Aristotle, The Art of Rhetoric. trans. by H. C. Lawson-Tancred (London: Penguin, 1991), p. 2. 
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to be the one who gives it shape, and from whose mind any such organisation 
derives’.27 The influence that these individuals may have is attributed by 
Machiavelli, in part at least, to the skilled application of rhetoric: 
 
... Francesco dressed himself in his most illustrious garments, 
covering them with his white bishop’s rochet, and confronting the 
armed citizens, he stopped them with his presence and his words, 
something that was noted and praised throughout the city for many 
days afterwards [...] there is no more effective or necessary remedy 
for restraining a multitude than the presence of a single man who 




Thomas More’s Utopia is just as informed by rhetoric, as can be seen from its 
various references to legal practice, a discipline through which humanist 
interpretations of classical rhetoric directly influenced the governance and 
management of English society. The practice of ‘mooting’, the ‘formulation and 
debate of a hypothetical case or set of circumstances’, was, for example, the primary 
means by which practitioners of law developed and distinguished themselves.
29
 Sir 
Thomas Elyot found in mooting ‘an exercise wherein is a manner, a shadow, or 
figure of the ancient rhetoric [...] a case is appointed to be mooted by certain young 
men, containing some doubtful controversy [...] wherein they do much approach 
unto Rhetoric’.30 In this way, hypothetical exercises moved from the study of read 
propositions through to disputations, with the highest levels of development 
recognised in the delivery of lectures or the presiding over deputations and providing 
summations while sitting on the bench at moots.
31
 That the practice of ‘mooting’ was 
an integral practice of More’s own thought is tragically evident in the outcome of 
More’s trial for treason, which took place on 1 July 1535. The trial was held in 
                                                          
27 Niccolo Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy. trans. by Julia Conaway Bondanella and Peter Bondanella, 2 edn 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 41. 
28 Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy, p. 133. 
29  Wilfrid R. Prest, The Inns of Court under Elizabeth I and the Early Stuarts 1590-1640 (London: Longman, 
1972), p. 116. 
30 Thomas Elyot, The Book Named the Governor, ed. by S. E. Lemberg (London: Dent, 1962), p. 38. 
31 J. H. Baker, The Legal Profession and the Common Law: Historical Essays (London: Hambledon Press, 1986), 
p. 9. 
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response to what Henry VIII saw as repeated snubs by More to take the oath 
prescribed in the 1534 Act of Succession, which demarcated only those children 
born of Anne Boleyn as legitimate. More’s refusal appears to have been on the 
grounds that such an oath carried an implicit denial of the validity of Henry’s first 
marriage. 
Subsequently, More was accused of four counts of treason, all of which More 
denied, and against which he conducted his own defence. Firstly, it was alleged that 
he had maliciously refused on the 7th of May in that year to accept the King’s 
supremacy over the Church in England. More countered by insisting that, as silence 
in English legal prescient constitutes consent, he had not refused. Secondly, More 
was accused of writing treasonous letters to Fisher concerning King Henry. More 
argued that none of these letters contained any direct references to the state. Thirdly, 
it was alleged that More had attempted to raise sedition by describing the Act of 
Supremacy as a ‘two-edged sword’ (that is, a law which if flouted would result in 
one’s physical end, and if obeyed would mean one’s spiritual sanction). More 
admitted as much, with the caveat that he had said if the statute was like a two-edged 
sword, then it would be possible that the statute could be reversed by a later Papal 
ruling. Finally, More was accused of denying Parliament’s power to declare that 
King Henry was the head of the Church in England. This charge was based entirely 
on a single conversation, between Sir Thomas More and Solicitor General Richard 
Rich, which had, by all accounts, taken place on 12 June whilst More was 
incarcerated. Visiting More’s cell, Rich engaged More in a conversation in which 
More, allegedly, explicitly denied Parliament’s authority to make Henry the head of 
the Church. More’s defence, again, rested upon the power of the hypothetical, 
appealing to the deep tradition of ‘mooting’ in English Law: 
And yet, if I had so done indeed, my lords, as Master Rich has 
sworn, seeing it was spoken only in familiar, private conversation, 
without affirming anything, but only putting forth cases without 
other unpleasant circumstances, it cannot justly be taken to be 




                                                          
32 William Roper and Singer, The Life of Thomas More, p. 43. 
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The judges ruled that More had passed beyond the hypothetical into the malicious 
intent required for a verdict of being held guilty under the Treason Act. He was 




That mooting was such a constant in More’s life and works suggests that Utopia may 
thus be read as a literary application of this principle. The rational disinterest 
employed by More, fostered by the practice of ‘putting the point’, echoes 
Machiavelli’s analytical and pragmatic style, as both authors cater to the interests of 
their intended readership and to the tenor of their peers’ social discourse. Rational 
disinterest and pragmatism are, of course, traits commonly utilised by subsequent 
authors in their depiction of administrator characters, but before More and 
Machiavelli (and their subsequent caricatures), it is important to note, these attributes 
were by no means synonymous with political emissaries. 
 
‘They rejoice and vaunt themselves, if they vanquished and oppress their enemies by 
craft and deceit | [a prince]... must endeavour only to avoid hatred’: Reading 
coercion and spectacle as the ‘rhetoric’ of state within Utopia and The Prince 
 
Machiavelli and More both equate the rhetoric required to dominate an argument 
with the ability to rule. Both authors explicitly describe the perception of power as 
being synonymous with holding power. Both authors utilise rhetorical techniques to 
empower their descriptions with an air of authority, and, where Machiavelli actively 
advises on the types of spectacle a Prince may employ for the best effect and uses his 
own rhetoric to flatter his reader, More subversively illustrates how powerful 
rhetoric is as a means to avoid addressing practical considerations. This is not a 
failure on the part of the authors to provide detailed guidance on the establishment of 
state infrastructure (a very modern conception); rather, it is a conscious choice to 
further demonstrate the power of rhetoric and its applicability to governance. The 
texts are infused with rhetoric, and the idea of rhetoric as the means to imply 
authority and insight (which both authors exploit) is instrumental in the emergence 
                                                          
33 J. Duncan and M. Derrett, 'The Trial of Sir Thomas More', English Historical Review, LXXIX.CCXII (1964), 
pp. 449-77. 
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of the later administrator trope. To put it another way: The Prince and Utopia both 
substitute rhetoric for the actual capacity of a system of administration that would be 
recognisable, as such, to a modern reader. 
 
An awareness of this trope, or its retrospective influences upon the reading of these 
texts, does not depend upon adopting a position within the debates surrounding 
different conceptions of rhetoric (and this thesis does not aim to enter into the 
academic and critical debates concerning rhetoric more generally). Instead, by 
adopting Greenblatt’s concept of ‘self-fashioning’ in its broadest sense, these texts 
may be read as historically determined and determining modes of cultural 
production, whereby both texts may be said to portray the centrality of rhetoric 
within the political process.
34
 Argumentation, in which propositions are analysed as 
much for their deftness as for their rigour, becomes a cultural reference point that 
functions as an analogy for self-fashioning (in Greenblatt’s sense), and which 
implies that power and the portrayal of power are synonymous, and that the 
techniques of rhetoric could be applied to many aspects of life, including the 
wielding of power. The re-readings to which these texts have been subject, and 
which they have inspired, appear broadly to have assumed that the administrative 
systems implied as active within The Prince and Utopia would require individual 
agents who rationalised their actions by displacing any personal culpability onto the 
administration. This assumption appears, then, to have influenced subsequent 
authors up to and including Foucault: 
 
… [T]he successes of history belongs to those who are capable of 
seizing these rules, to replace those who had used them, to disguise 
themselves so as to pervert them, invert their meaning, and redirect 
them against those who had initially imposed them; controlling this 
complex mechanism, they will make it function so as to overcome the 




                                                          
34 For more on the perceived importance of rhetoric within the court see:  The English Works of Sir Thomas 
More, ed. by W. E. Campbell and A. W. Reed (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1931), I, 19. 
35 Foucault, Power (Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984) p. 151. 
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As depictions of society’s governance ultimately come to influence the mode of 
governance, some present day readings have thus approached these texts as if they 
were intended to be read as viable methods of governance, while the historical and 
biographical evidence suggests they were intended as polemical intellectual 
exercises. Indeed, this tendency is itself a tribute to the authors’ success in implying 
traits and characteristics which are never explicitly described.  
 
It is significant that More actively favours impact over practicality, as evidenced in 
his depiction of Utopian education. Raphael Hythloday, the central figure in Utopia, 
asserts that Utopians ‘in music, dialectic, arithmetic, and geometry […] have found 
out just about the same things as our great men of the past’ yet ‘have not discovered 
even one of those elaborate rules about restrictions, amplifications, and suppositions 
which our own schoolboys study in the Small Logicals’ — Peter of Spain’s textbook 
of logic.
36
 More directly references here Martianus Capella’s definition (first 
outlined in the fifth century) of the seven ‘Liberal Arts’.37 These were divided into 
two parts: the trivium of grammar, logic and rhetoric; and the quadrivium of 
arithmetic, geometry, music and astronomy. Whilst providing a bedrock of the 
Scholastic educational tradition, More’s apparent reservations in the manner with 
which they were combined with ‘Second Intentions’ express a concern that came to 
typify the humanist movement, which promoted a secular interpretation of the 
classics.
38
 The Spanish humanist philosopher Juan Luis Vives, for example, 
described the treatment of logic in university curriculum as acting ‘like a Trojan 
horse, from which has come the ruin and conflagration of all the liberal arts’.39 
More’s description of the view of education within Utopia remains true to the 
‘liberal arts’ conception as serving to prepare an individual for public life. In Utopia, 
                                                          
36 Peter of Spain Tractatus, ed. by L. M. de Rijk (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1973). 
37 Capella’s major work was written perhaps about AD 400 and certainly before AD 439. Its overall title is not 
known. Manuscripts give the title De nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii to the first two books and entitle the 
remaining seven De arte grammatica, De arte dialectica, De arte rhetorica, De geometrica, De arithmetica, De 
astrologia, and De harmonia. 
38 Second Intentions concern the capacity for abstraction by which, for example "a man" or "a Daisy" becomes 
"men" or "a flower", where individual or multiple instances become grouped within a class or set united by 
common qualities. 
39 Juan Luis Vives was a noted Spanish humanist philosopher born in Valencia who fled the Inquisition to study 
in Paris and settled in Bruges in 1512, two years after the publication of Utopia. For more see James D. Tracy, 
Erasmus of the Low Countries (London: University of California Press, 1996), p. 63. 
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as education is freely available to all, social boundaries are by implication blurred — 
meaning all citizens are involved in public life, in so far as education is depicted as 
open to all, including women and, presumably, slaves. Significantly for the 
conception of the role of administration (and the infrastructure, which is implied but 
never specified as being at work within Utopia), no description is given of any 
system of monitoring, verification, funding, accommodation or accreditation for the 
education which is presented as being so abundant that all citizens had daily access. 
In this passage, More seems to be challenging what he appears to perceive to be a 
Scholastic orthodoxy in education, referencing Peter of Spain’s Summulae 
logicales ('Small Logistics') which contained a section devoted to Categories. 
Hythloday describes ‘those rules [...] which here our children in every place do 
learn’. Here Raphael is referring, presumably, to Belgium, the city of Antwerp, then 
part of the Duchy of Brabant, rather than England.
40
 Even more provocative is 
Raphael’s description of how Utopians ‘were never yet able to find out the Second 
Intentions, insomuch that none of them all could ever see man himself in common’.41 
This single sentence may contain the most radical proposition in Utopia. Such a 
proposition dismisses the fundamental classical roots of logic.
42
 Even more 
provocatively, this sentence could be read as More proposing that the root of the 
Utopians’s capacity for fairness, equity and parity may lie in their inability to see 
others as part of a social group or class, and their ability to only ever view others as 
individuals. Were such Second Intentions, or abstractions, impossible, it would be 
impossible to view events as one part of a ‘type’ of instances; and instead, they 
would be viewed as unique instances, each requiring an individualised response and 
specific consideration. This passage also has implications for the way the text itself 
is framed, by complicating the word ‘Utopia’ itself. The most popular interpretation 
of ‘Utopia’ is ‘no place’ and is founded upon the presumption that the word is a 
doggerel amalgamation of the Greek words ou (οὐ, 'not') and topos (τόπος, 'place' 
from tópos koinós, and in the common place topoi). Close examination of the words 
                                                          
40 Tracy, Erasmus of the Low Countries, p. 63. 
41
 Thomas More, Utopia. trans. by Robert M. Adams, ed. by Robert M. Adams, 2 edn (London and New York: 
Norton Critical Editions, 1992), p. 82. All quotes taken from this edition unless otherwise noted. This is, of 
course, the same translator of The Prince used in this thesis. This seems helpful as the emphasis of this chapter is 
to compare the author's ideas and manner of delivery. 
42 In particular Plato's theory of ideal forms or Aristotle's theory of types and teleology. 
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complicates this interpretation, however. Utopia was written in Latin, and More, in 
the addendum, promotes reading the title in Latin: ‘Wherfore not Utopie, but rather 
rightely my name is Eutopie, a place of felicitie’ [sic]. In Latin 'Eu' indicates a 
positive, or affirmative, as in 'good' and 'topos' was used to refer to the context 
of classical Greek rhetoric where it means a standardised method of constructing or 
treating an argument, as in 'topic', 'line of argument' or 'commonplace'. Topoi, in 
classical rhetoric, were the sources from which arguments were constructed, through 
which the relationships among ideas were delineated, as in 'places to locate an object 
or concept' — or, in other words, 'a category' as in 'good Second Intentions', as 
topoi may include such ideals as justice, nation or beauty. More would have 
presumably been aware of both connotations, and could reasonably have intended 
that both interpretations be read into the name. It is noticeable, however, that many 
current interpretations have neglected the Latinised translation of the title, which is 
more in keeping with the interpretation of the text suggested in this thesis as ‘a good 
argument’. When combining the Latin and Greek translations, in the manner by 
which the traditional 'no place' translation is reached, contra positioning the 
translations (which is an equally valid translation as the former) results in ‘counter 
argument’.43 Given the intimate link between systematic education and governmental 
administration, it appears More wishes the reader to conclude that the 
administration(s) of Utopia were not systematised, but organic — and, by 
implication, that administration itself, and the presumed qualities required by 
individual administrators, are inevitable: ‘natural’ aspects of the established order 
(the 'way things are meant to be') rather than aspects of a fundamentally arbitrary 
system, which is itself just one of many alternatives. By attempting to challenge 
prevailing ideas by depicting Utopian education as so extremely different than the 
Grammar School system, More facilitated the entrenching of ‘naturally occurring’ 
characteristics embodied in the nameless individuals presumably administrating 
Utopian society — and, through the text’s influence, instilling these notions into 
subsequent literature.  
                                                          
43 Ernst Robert Curtius, European Literature and Latin Middle Ages. trans. by Willard R. Trask (New York: 
Pantheon Books, 1953), p. 80. 
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Utopia places restrictions upon any individual travelling without ‘taking a letter from 
the prince’, on pain of severe punishment.44 The implication is that it is possible to 
verify these letters as genuine, that a record of these letters exists, and that forgery 
would be either extremely difficult or that the allocation of these letters is tightly 
controlled. Such a system would require a central administration to which Raphael 
does not refer, unless the entirety of the citizenship is implicated in its enforcement. 
On Raphael’s account, Utopian taxation is literally obscene (‘off scene’, in the sense 
that it is never referred to), other than that the population ‘obey all laws which 
control the distribution of vital goods, such as are the very substance of pleasure’, 
never taking into account famine, public works, rent-seeking behaviour or 
monopoly. Utopia also appears to be perfectly mapped: the ‘island of Utopia is in the 
middle just 200 miles broad [...] environed with land to the compass of about five 
hundred miles [...] There are 54 cities in the island, all large and well-built [...] The 
nearest lie at least 24 miles distance from one another [...] The jurisdiction of every 
city extends at least twenty miles’. Such mapping would presumably require 
extensive central planning and administration, yet no such administration is 
described or implied. More only indicates that such processes are in place; other such 
implications of state power, and the possibility of its perfect application, are integral 
to the reasoning to be found within both More and Machiavelli’s texts. Whether 
through More’s liberties with geographical constraints and natural resources, or 
Machiavelli’s assumption of perfect knowledge and commitment on behalf of a 
Prince, the authority this implication conveys to ‘their’ roles as administrators 
provides a basis for subsequent depictions of administrator characters, as we will see.  
 
Like More in some respects, Machiavelli also neglects or evades fully exploring the 
logical implications of his arguments in favour of rhetorical impact. Machiavelli 
appears to address civil disobedience, but upon closer examination, his advice is a 
cursory illustration of civil disobedience rather than the ‘special note’ he proclaims it 
to be. Indeed, Machiavelli fails to provide any practical advice on the means by 
which to implement the ‘imitation’ he advises. Machiavelli describes how ‘the duke 
took over the Romagna as “civil disobedience had manifested as a direct result of a 
lack of abuses of power [...] he found it had been controlled by impotent masters, 
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who instead of ruling their subjects had plundered them, and had given them more 
reason for strife than unity”’.45 Yet Machiavelli’s prescription is simply a 
continuation of positive law, but more skilfully wielded: 
 
To establish peace and reduce the land to obedience, he decided good 
government was needed, and he named [...] a cruel and vigorous man, to 




Machiavelli similarly describes how order was restored using positive law without 
illustrating the ways in which the duke’s proxy Messer Remirro de Orco’s methods 
of control differ from those of the prior rulers, only describing how in ‘short order 
this man pacified and unified the whole district, winning thereby great renown’. 
Once ‘the duke decided such excessive authority was no longer necessary’, 
Machiavelli describes how the duke had Orco ‘placed on the pubic square [...] in two 
pieces, with a piece of wood beside him and a bloody knife’.47 Machiavelli focuses 
upon the intent of the duke, describing his reasoning as having ‘decided such 
excessive authority was no longer necessary’, that the duke ‘feared it might become 
odious’ and that this reasoning was ‘worthy of special note, and of imitation by 
others’.48 However, Machiavelli does not elaborate how the duke gained the 
information required to gage the level of dissatisfaction of the Romagna citizens (in 
north central Italy) with Orco, considering that between 10 December and 31 
December, Cesare, intent on the conquest of Sinigaglia, travelled with his entire 
army. Furthermore, Cesare, facing a shortage of provisions, was required to purchase 
30,000 bushels of wheat from Venice. Orco, who had been summoned from Pesaro 
by Cesare, arrived on 22 December and was arrested and charged with fraudulently 
selling the wheat for his personal profit.
49
 The duke’s stated reasons for Orco’s 
execution, and Machiavelli’s explanation are therefore at odds, and the veracity of 
Machiavelli’s claims are cast further in doubt by his diplomatic report of 26 
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47 Machavelli, The Prince, p. 21. 
48 Machavelli, The Prince, p. 21. 
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December which stated that ‘nobody is sure of the reason for his death’.50 Thus is 
illustrated the point that both Machiavelli and More skirt over practical issues in 
order to construct their arguments. ‘Nobody’ implies that both citizens and 
Machiavelli’s fellow diplomats were ignorant of the reason for Orco’s death, in so 
far as, at the time, this knowledge would have had no way of being spread. It is 
highly unlikely, therefore, that Cesare would have possessed the foresight or 
constant stream of information which would have been required to exploit Cesare in 
the manner in which Machiavelli suggests. By implication we may infer that 
Machiavelli’s insight, a key component in his self-promotion of how useful a servant 
he would make should he be reinstated as a diplomat, is a rhetorical construction 
rather than any reflection of an actual capacity.  
 
Machiavelli uses Orco’s execution to argue that positive power had been redeemed 
in the eyes of the population by the construction of a cosmetic ‘civil court in the 
middle of the province, with an excellent judge and a representative from each city’, 
and  that by dissemination of the knowledge that ‘whatever cruelty had occurred had 
come, not from him, but from the brutal character of the minister’.51 Who would 
enact the revisionist account of the rule (as coming from the ‘brutal character of the 
minister’), or who would establish the court and the judges, is left unspecified, but 
functionaries and implementers are implied, and required. Machiavelli therefore 
asserts that law only resides in the application of power (in that the only law is 
positive law) and all civil disobedience and civil action/rebellion arises out of a 
failure to properly implement positive law, as opposed to affronts to natural law, or 
abuses by institutions or of tradition. In this way, Machiavelli directly contradicts 
Cicero’s (via Marco’s) assertion of a natural law in the most literal sense: 
 
I will, therefore, cite a few of the legal maxims that bear on this 
branch of laws. ‘Let all authorities be just, and let them be honestly 
obeyed by the people without hesitation. Let the magistrate restrain 
disobedience and sedition in citizens, by fine, imprisonment, and 
corporal chastisement. If there be an equal or greater power, and 
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the people think the adjudication unjust, let them lawfully appeal 
thereto. If the magistrate shall have decided, and past sentence 
illegally, let there be a public appeal in a higher Court respecting 
the penalty and fine imposed.’52 
 
Whereas Cicero’s account of rhetoric depicts a mode of civil interaction in which all 
true interactions are a natural phenomena, any breaches of which would result 
inevitably in discord, both Machiavelli’s and More’s rhetorical arguments require the 
reader to assume that the underlying infrastructures of social dynamics are the result 
of the skilful application of the principles advocated. Greenblatt argues that More, in 
contrast to Machiavelli, depicts what is on the surface a cooperative society.
53
 The 
Utopian sharing of resources and the camaraderie of the citizenry prevent the need 
for the cultivation of private property, and status is dissolved in strict uniformity. 
However, by never directly explaining how these occur, More does two things: 
firstly, he implies that the answer to achieving such a state lies within the practices 
he does outline in detail (thereby strengthening the satirical and rhetorical aspects of 
the text); secondly, More evades admitting his own (ubiquitous) ignorance of how 
the opposite state of affairs (of destitution, poverty and privilege) arose within 
England (especially as the traditional role of the king had been as a central leader in 
war and purveyor of social patronage rather than as an agent of economic 
redistribution). Occurrences where Machiavelli and More would be expected (in line 
with the logical flow of the narrative’s arguments) to provide instructions on how to 
systematically implement the underlying principles alluded to are, primarily due the 
skilful construction of the texts, evaded. Both authors continually guide the subject 
matter from arguments of instruction to arguments of demonstration of underlying 
principles, and it is in the application of these principles that the establishment of an 
administrative caste is implicitly required, yet remains, at this stage, undefined. This 
illusion of authority and competence, and the evasive techniques used to account for 
them, is however adopted by subsequent characterisations of administrators.  
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As the argument of The Prince develops, Machiavelli begins to directly equate 
power with rhetoric. Machiavelli describes a Prince as needing to know ‘how to act 
like a beast’ and references Chiron the centaur.54 From this, Machiavelli draws the 
conclusion that a Prince must ‘imitate both the fox and the lion’.55 It is worth 
comparing, at this point, the account of political authority to be found in Cicero to 
which these words appear to be a direct response. Cicero argues (in O Duties 
I.13.41) that ‘fraud seems to belong to the cunning fox, force to lion’ and that both 
are bestial and ‘wrong’. While he evidently rejects such a position, Machiavelli’s 
description of a virtuous Prince in fact echoes Cicero’s description of rhetoric rather 
than his description of a ruler. Skinner reads Cicero as directly equating ‘rhetoric, the 
art of persuading, and politics, the art of ruling a city’, and has argued that 
bibliographical evidence strongly suggests the works of Cicero had a formative 
influence on Machiavelli.
56
 Whereas Cicero describes the two types of conflict, 
debate and force, in terms for which ‘the former is the proper concern of a man, but 
the latter of beasts’,57 and defines rhetoric as existing only within debate (and hence 
properly human), Machiavelli sees rhetoric as a discipline which applies equally to 
the realm of politics and thus to questions of ‘force’. Indeed, when taken in the 
context of Cicero’s description that ‘no cruelty can be expedient; for cruelty is most 
abhorrent to human nature, whose lead we ought to follow’, Machiavelli’s assertion 
that a Prince ‘must not mind incurring the charge of cruelty for the purpose of 
keeping his subjects united and confident’ is striking.58 It is the skill in the 
deployment of cruelty, as with the skill in the deployment of cohesive or 
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manipulative argumentation, which is at the root of the persistent ambiguity 
concerning the ethical implications of The Prince.  
In the Discourses on Livy — despite apparently reaching inconsistent conclusions to 
those of The Prince — Machiavelli’s unstated major premise remains: that power 
enacted is synonymous with power perceived. Machiavelli approves Romulus’ 
murder of his relatives as being good for wider society - ‘reprehensible actions may 
be excused by their effects, and that when the effect is good, as it was in the case of 
Romulus, it always excuses the action’59 - by equating a strong society with a strong 
ruler: ‘a wise mind will never censure any one for taking any action, however 
extraordinary, which may be of service in the organising of a kingdom or the 
constituting of a republic’.60 Machiavelli thus concludes that autocracy is a moral 
imperative, in that the ‘sagacious legislator of a republic, therefore, whose object is 
to promote the public good, and not his private interests […] should concentrate all 
authority in himself’.61 It is for this reason that Skinner describes The Prince and 
the Discourses on Livy as sharing a common tradition of moral practice, with The 
Prince advising on Princely conduct and the Discourses on Livy providing a 
narrative for citizenry.
62
 Machiavelli, as the author of both texts, is thus situated 
between the Prince and the citizen: an apologist to the citizen, and an advocate to the 
Prince. Yet in each scenario, Machiavelli is the representative of a mode of conduct 
which purports to originate from disinterested analysis, despite the inherent 
investment Machiavelli himself has in the adoption of his ideas, for, via this 
acceptance, he may achieve a return to a role within Florentine politics. This inherent 
investment, along with the fundamentally polemical nature of the text, appears — 
when viewed from a vantage point in which the state has become the primary mode 
of collective governance — as a manifestation of the very discourses Machiavelli 
helped to inspire.  
Later readings of More and Machiavelli occur via (and apply) the very discourses of 
governance these texts contributed to creating in the first place. Discussing the 
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integral ambiguity of The Prince, Berlin, for example, describes how these ‘two 
incompatible moral worlds [...] in the minds of his readers’ are responsible for the 
‘desperate efforts to interpret his [Machiavelli’s] doctrines away’,63 repeating the 
multitude of labels which have been attached to Machiavelli (‘diabolist’, ‘shallow’, 
‘patriot’, ‘mouth piece of truths’, ‘crypto-republican satirist’, ‘political technologist 
free from moral implications’), and concludes that this points to the ‘truth’ that ‘not 
all ultimate values are necessarily compatible with one another’.64 The ‘ultimate 
values’ which Machiavelli allows to ‘incompatibly’ exist, and the absence of the will 
or expedience to express his ‘mind more broadly’, are however, I would suggest, a 
result of readers retrospectively projecting later concepts of administration, and more 
modern conceptualisations of the role of administrators, on to Machiavelli’s 
narrative, such that the root origins of this character of the administrator cease to be 
apparent. These values and truths are dependent upon the stylistic representations 
which convey the texts’ Princedom and Utopia, and which have become equated 
with the administrative character through subsequent authors. Utopia and The Prince 
employ the discipline of rhetoric to advocate pragmatic and humanist ideals, and it 
was this that strongly influenced future interpretations of authority, power, and the 
state, and in particular, how these concepts came to be expressed through 
characterisation. 
 
‘Show the sun with a lantern | if it be diligently read and considered by you, you will 
learn my extreme desire that you should attain... greatness’: Adoptions and 
subversions 
The Prince and Utopia have been subject to multiple interpretations and 
appropriations, further distancing the common perceptions of these works from what 
historical research would suggest could have been the intentions of the authors. Yet, 
far from diminishing the influence of these texts, their contentious nature has 
bestowed these texts with a resonance far beyond the remit of their original subject 
matter. The influence (if not the image) of the conspiratorial servant and the 
disinterested advocate is most strongly delineated in The Prince and Utopia, setting 
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in place the modality of future depictions of institutional power by providing a 
common point of reference. 
In this way, it was the effective influence of The Prince, rather than Machiavelli’s 
political thought proper, that altered the tenor of subsequent political theory. Born 
around 1544, the diplomat Botero manipulates Machiavelli’s text to provide a foil 
with which to argue in favour of a Christian foundation for states, and so to trumpet 
the ideas of Thomas Aquinas. However, Botero’s theories of justice depended 
wholly upon the demands of political prudence as being crucial to all government, 
and then defined the essence of prudence as being that ‘in the decisions made by 
princes, interest will always override every other argument’. As such, for Botero, a 
prince must be guided primarily by ‘reason of state’, and thus actions ‘cannot be 
considered in the light of ordinary reason’.65 Botero considerably influenced his 
peers, and Duke Maximilian of Bavaria, for instance, discussed The Reason of State 
with advisors. Machiavelli’s The Prince provided a ‘character’, a ‘straw man’ target, 
for Botero to represent a particular concept of the state, and his ideas were taken 
literally, even when nominally disputed; they were taken as advice rather than as 
provocative statements. Machiavelli’s main contributions to political theory (his 
concept of the lion–fox, his emphasis upon spectacle, and his transposition of 
heuristics into the political arena) were, it seems, only partly original. The morality 
of The Prince, given undue emphasis at its point of reception, is more cohesively 
read as a continuation of the guidance given by Xenophon in his Cyrpaedia.
66
 In 
fact, first and foremost, The Prince, when read in a manner which incorporates an 
awareness of its intended audience and Machiavelli’s entire body of work and 
biography, appears to have been intended to enter into debates concerning the 
relation of morality to power, the nature of power in relation to the individual will, 
and the role of spectacle in maintaining authority. The capacity to create spectacle, in 
practical terms, entails a system of facilitators and orchestrators — the 
administrators. The seamless manner in which Machiavelli accounts for this 
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assistance as a given cements the place of the administrator in future 
conceptualisations of the state. Once the premise that the perception of power is 
required in order to maintain power is accepted, the trope of the administrator 
character gains a practical function. Literary representation bestows these qualities 
upon the functionaries of governance, thus furthering the illusion of power’s 
omnipotence.  
The Prince was not, however, immediately received. The significant lag before it 
proliferated, and the implications this wait has for the text’s interpretation, is an 
effect made all the more palpable when read in conjunction with Utopia. 
Machiavelli’s arguments, which imply his support for moral determinism — in that 
the morality of the ruler determines the well being of his/her subjects — are echoed 
in the writings of Erasmus, whose Education of a Christian Prince, which argued for 
leaders to act as moral exemplars, was immediately well received and widely 
acclaimed. Machiavelli’s moral conceit is that a Prince may achieve material power 
as a consequence of self-actualisation, and that all external influences are the 
vicissitudes of fortune — a fortune which may be won over by further guile and 
individual assertion. Fortuna and virtu become mutually affective forces, both 
generated by the Prince and by external forces (as in the case of the virtu of another 
Prince). Machiavelli’s reductive argument grants the Prince self-determination: luck, 
privilege, favour and power are the product of virtu, whilst conspiracy, treachery and 
disobedience are the result of Fortuna. Machiavelli’s descriptions may be read as an 
apology for tyranny only in so far as its apology extends to the degree to which a 
Prince may directly affect the circumstances of the state, creating the illusion of an 
impossible level of omnipotence and competence considering the Prince’s practical 
restraints. Such restrictions, of knowledge, economic resources, retribution and 
coercion, would effectively prevent any actual ‘Prince’ from being capable of 
following Machiavelli’s advice.  
The writings of Machiavelli and More are both, then, more acts of rhetoric than 
manifestos. As such, once removed from the intellectual debates with which their 
works were intended to interact, they become, like the administrator characters that 
follow, prisms through which critics are able to view their own circumstances. To 
Rousseau, for example, Machiavelli was ironically condemning the amoral state 
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administration he encountered, and he went so far as to call The Prince a ‘satire’67 — 
reconciling the narrative tone with ‘the Machiavelli’ of the Discourses on Livy (in 
which Machiavelli proposes republican principles, and apparently anticipates 
Rousseau’s own ideas on Natural morality: ‘[that] we cannot thus change at will is 
due [...] to [...] the natural bent of our characters’).68 This, for Rousseau, marked 
Machiavelli’s aim as being —in the later words of Gramsci — under ‘the pretext of 
advising kings [... to give] excellent advice to the people, Machiavelli’s Prince is the 
handbook of republicans’.69 Yet, while Gramsci declared The Prince ‘an 
anthropomorphic symbol’ of the hegemony of the ‘collective will’, Mussolini was 
able to use Machiavelli’s works as the focus of a thesis heavily indebted to Ercole’s 
examination of Machiavelli’s vocabulary and manipulation of terms.70  
The Prince and Utopia both provide a faithful depiction of, and effective metaphor 
for, the state’s requirement for an administrative caste to facilitate the self-
perpetuating concept of a unified state, and the practical undertakings performed 
upon the authority of this entity. Machiavelli’s and More’s use of rhetoric, intended 
to maintain the argument’s force by circumventing questions of application or 
logistics, would unwittingly inspire, and perhaps contribute to, what Foucault 
described as ‘an extremely different type of rationality from that of the conception of 
Machiavelli’, the aim of which was ‘not to reinforce the power of the prince’, but ‘to 
reinforce the state itself’.71 Machiavelli as the delineator of an implied state 
apparatus empowers the describer, and the described role, of the Prince’s agent as 
synonymous with the state itself and as the effective conduit of the forces he implies 
as underpinning the text’s content.  
 
Machiavelli’s use of the concept of ‘the state’ supports a reading of his texts as 
individually constructed arguments crafted in accordance with the customs of 
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rhetoric, and as such, suggests that his treatment of ‘the state’ may be correlated to 
his treatment of the administrator. Many commentators have experienced problems 
in interpreting his writings due to apparently conflicting assertions in his individual 
works. Yet this apparent conflict may be accounted for if his works are viewed as 
independent, each representing a rhetorical argument. (This means that they need to 
be read differently to those more modern standards by which a political thinker's 
body of work is usually judged: as consistently delineating, honing and defending a 
line of reasoning.) Machiavelli never explicitly defines a single conception of the 
state in his works, and, in his various writings, the state reoccurs primarily as a topic 
to be addressed in the course of his arguments. In The Prince, Machiavelli argues for 
the primacy of the state’s interest above conventional morality, and suggests a Prince 
‘should not be too worried about incurring blame for any vice without which he 
would find it hard to save his state’,72 and that ‘there’s such a difference between the 
way we really live and the way we ought to live that the man who neglects the real to 
study the ideal will learn how to accomplish his ruin, not his salvation’.73 This 
concept situates the state as being deserving of preservation to the extent of 
justifying immoral actions.  
However, Machiavelli presents a similar argument in the Discourses on Livy, which 
places the very existence of a state above its system of governance or any single 
prince, placing kingdoms and republics on a par. Hence, Machiavelli writes, ‘nor 
will a wise man ever reproach anyone for some illegal action that he might have 
undertaken to organise a kingdom or to constitute a republic’, and suggests that for 
any immoral deed performed in the service of the state, ‘while the act accuses him, 
the result excuses him’.74 
It is not inconsistent therefore to read Machiavelli as fundamentally republican, and 
to argue that the arguments Machiavelli presents within The Prince ultimately 
further those sentiments displayed in the Discourses on Livy. In the latter, 
Machiavelli suggests that the nature of governance is a ‘cycle’75 which will move 
from a Prince to a republic in due course, and that this process is aided by having 
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efficient princes (‘rarely does it happen that a republic or a kingdom is organised 
well from the beginning ... unless it is organised by one man alone’).76 Significantly, 
however, this reading would, perhaps, not be one Machiavelli himself would 
propose. Machiavelli writes in his introduction to the Discourses on Livy that in 
presenting it to Niccolo Buondelmonti and Cosimo Rucallai he had ‘deviated from 
the common custom of writers who usually address their works to some prince, and 
blinded by ambition and avarice, praise him for all his virtuous qualities’.77 Contrast 
this introduction with that of The Prince, in which Machiavelli suggests that 
Lorenozo ‘recognise my most earnest desire that you may achieve that summit of 
grandeur to which your happy destiny and your other capacities predestine you’.78 
This is immediately followed by an appeal for a return to favour, and a position in 
the Medici government: ‘And if from that summit Your Magnificence will 
occasionally glance down at these humble places, you will recognise how unjustly I 
suffer the bitter and sustained malignity of fortune.’79 Machiavelli appears therefore 
to use the concept of ‘the state’ as a variable to be depicted in keeping with each of 
his text’s arguments — (presumably) to illustrate his potential value as a civil 
servant in The Prince, and the value of historical study in his Discourses on Livy. 
The state is therefore treated in the same manner Machiavelli treats administrators — 
as a way of shoring up his wider assertions.  
More appears to have intended his Utopia to achieve the same ends  but did so more 
overtly, and this clearer apparent intention may account for the differing treatment 
the two works received. The influence of Thomas More upon Shakespeare is typical 
of the manner in which Utopia has served more as source material than as an 
intellectual interlocutor for subsequent authors. The beginning of Anthony Munday’s 
Sir Thomas More (written between 1592 and 1595) contained revisions by 
Shakespeare (about three pages of Munday’s play provide the only surviving 
examples of his handwriting) in which Thomas More answers the grievances of 
rioters by claiming that foreigners spread disease through their foods.
 
One of the 
rioters, John Lincoln, a broker, says, ‘“[t]hey bring in strange roots, which is merely 
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to the undoing of poor prentices [apprentices …] These bastards of dung [...] have 
infected us, and it is our infection will make the city shake, which partly comes 
through the eating of turnips.”’80 
Shakespeare’s trivialisation of the complaints of the rioters appears to have been 
included in order to overcome the objections of the text’s potential censor, the 
Master of Revels, who was concerned about the possibility of the political motives 
of the rioters being portrayed sympathetically. With oratory and persuasion, More 
asserts that uprisings in defiance of the law offend the king, and therefore, through 
his representative, God himself.  
… O desperate as you are,” More says, “wash your foul minds with 
tears, and those same hands that you like rebels lift against the 
peace lift up for peace. And your unreverent knees, make them 
your feet. … [sic] 
The character of More remonstrates and restores order, casting him as a wise and 
worthy public servant, but he does not refuse to implement power. Within Jacobean 
theatre tropes (including those of Shakespeare), character is often used as a 
microcosm of power with the capacity to generate spectacles, create 
misunderstanding, and spread propaganda. Shakespeare depicts More as overcoming 
the very real economic complaints of the tradesmen with an appeal to natural order.  
Significantly, Shakespeare’s reduction of More’s work and character as a source of 
imagery and as a cultural reference point is more or less identical to his treatment of 
Machiavelli. His contemporary Marlowe’s Jew of Malta begins with a request to 
imagine the spirit of an Italian who had died in 1527: 
 think Machiavel is dead, 
Yet was his soul but flown beyond the Alps 
[...] To some perhaps my name is odious; 
But such as love me, guard me from their tongues, 
And let them know that I am Machiavel.
81
  
                                                          
80 Martin Holmes, 'Evil May-Day, 1517: 'The Story of a Riot'', History Today, 22.7-12 (1965), pp. 642-50 (p. 7). 
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Watson argues that ‘Machiavel’, when used as a descriptive term for a devious 
manipulator, arose simultaneously as Machiavelli’s name entered common parlance, 
citing Marlowe’s Jew of Malta and Shakespeare’s Henry VI (in York’s reference to 
Alencon as ‘that notorious Machiavel’) as evidence.82 As such, he argues for a 
distinction between the character of the Machiavel, and the actual person and canon 
of Machiavelli.
83
 Yet it is largely irrelevant whether or not Shakespeare had an 
intimate knowledge of Machiavelli’s writing, in so far as Shakespeare uses both 
Machiavelli and More as culturally recognisable icons amidst his own attempts to 
address social and political issues. Thus, for Shakespeare, it is More’s advocacy and 
Machiavelli’s amoral pragmatism which are of note — the ‘style’ of Utopia and The 
Prince rather than the substance.  
More’s purported intention for Utopia was to serve as a thought experiment, and 
Machiavelli’s purported purpose for The Prince was as a handbook. A closer 
reading, one which incorporates the means by which the arguments within the texts 
are constructed, reveals a shared endeavour to study how contingent entities 
(traditions, institutions, corporations) ‘arise’ out of more fundamental entities — 
individual citizens, individual values, and moral impulses — and yet how both 
remain distinct, and capable of influencing each other (for instance, how a law may 
change moral attitudes, and morality influence changes in the law). Both Machiavelli 
and More provide accounts of the individual subject existing in relationship with 
society’s emergent supraindividual entities — the perspective of a Prince viewing 
the institution of the Church, or a citizen within Utopia viewing a visiting diplomat, 
for instance — whilst maintaining an objective distance which allows the reader to 
assess formative motivations, experiences and incentives. Subsequently, the 
necessities of the role are continued within Jacobean theatre, as themes of 
governance and individuality are taken up and explored within drama — and 
therefore come to incorporate the role and prototypical character of the administrator 
in a far more concrete and individualized form.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
81 The Jew of Malta ed. by H. S. Bennett (New York: Gordian Press, 1966), p. 62. 
82 George Watson, 'Machiavel and Machiavelli', The Sewanee Review, 84.4 (1976), pp. 630-48. 
83 Greenblatt, Renaissance Self Fashioning, p. 32. 
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Utopia and The Prince have become universal touchstones for political and social 
theory. Re-readings which effectively bring the rules of another mode of discourse to 
bare upon a rhetorical argument, and which interpret, for example, Machiavelli’s 
propositions within a moral context, incorporate, however, the presumption that 
there are alternatives to spectacle and self-fashioning, and are effectively a 
retrospective imposition of later administrative systems and institutions upon the 
text. Machiavelli stated in his Discourses on Livy (1.xi) that no one ‘could give 
unusual laws to his people without recourse to God, for otherwise such laws would 
not have been accepted’.84 Machiavelli does not directly state this case in The 
Prince, allowing instead his exemplar, Moses, to imply it. In fact, Machiavelli 
evades questions of a ‘right’ to rule (be that moral authority, inherited title, or a 
democratic mandate) by clearly suggesting that the ability to rule is justification 
enough. Thomas M. Greene’s reading of Machiavelli’s text describes this as ‘a 
disturbing gap between example and precept’, to the extent that Machiavelli’s 
narrative avoids moral concerns even as he addresses subjects traditionally 
embedded with morality, such as leadership, legality and justice. Precisely because 
he writes under the pretence of offering a disinterested manual of governance, 
Machiavelli strengthens the effectiveness of his ‘exhortation’ to Lorenzo to ‘take up 
this task’ of making Italy ‘noble again’.85 Machiavelli also skirts around issues of 
practical implementation of the Prince’s authority outside of displays of power and 
spectacle. In a very real sense, The Prince is a guide to maintaining the illusions of 
dominance and competence. As such, the presence of a structure or machinery to 
proliferate laws, co-ordinate the logistical demands of state intervention, or to 
facilitate the Prince’s wishes, is taken for granted in two ways. Firstly, the feudal 
aspects of Machiavelli’s immediate social structure, which incorporated the amici, 
entailed that the individual perceived to hold the most privilege would receive tribute 
in return for patronage and, as a direct consequence, would have at his disposal the 
amici’s own servants and clients to enforce his will. Secondly, subsequent readings 
of The Prince have assumed (in Machiavelli’s assumption of the determinative 
abilities of a ruler) that the practical means by which power proliferates and is 
generated (through discourse, bio-power, the monopolisation of violence and of the 
                                                          
84 Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy, p. 52. 
85 Machiavelli, The Prince. And, Rousseau, The Social Contract and Discourses.p.72 
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means of production and the compendium of property rights and the enforceability of 
contract law) must have a means of actualisation to such an extent that the 
manifestation of power becomes mistaken for its means. The Prince is therefore read 
as a handbook of tyranny, or a manual for the implementation of power (which is 
only achievable through the recruitment or co-option of institutions or the creation of 
organisations), rather than as a manual for its attainment and retention (a very 
different notion altogether). 
Conclusions 
In Renaissance Self-Fashioning, Greenblatt describes More’s ‘constant recourse in 
his writing to the hypothetical’ as indicating a ‘dream of cancellation of identity 
itself, an end to all improvisation, an escape from narrative’; More becomes the 
fashioner of his own life, a life ‘composed, made up’ yet which is simultaneously 
‘the source of much that is delightful, inventive, and energetic’ in More’s writing.86 
Greenblatt seems to view this emphasis upon the hypothetical as a manifestation of 
an internalising of an alienated state in More, whilst Edward Berry reads More’s 
employment of the hypothetical ‘as self-realization’.87 Both of these readings — 
alienation verses realisation — posit the hypothesis that More intended to position 
his readers to be receptive, to fulfil the role of judge or jury, of his hypothetical 
scenarios. If one reads More’s Utopia as an exercise, however, it may be read as a 
form of collaborative ‘moot’ in which the reader is invited to actively engage in the 
hypothetical Utopia, and More may be seen as fulfilling the role of ‘the positor’. 
More may be read, in this way, as setting the scene, describing the key players, 
outlining the scenarios, and laying out the evidence (the Utopian society) in a 
manner akin to a ‘moot’ point.  
More’s influence, as with Machiavelli’s within The Prince, is felt overtly by the 
reader in every line. The reader of both texts is made to feel directly addressed and 
implicated within the themes and issues raised. Both More and Machiavelli fulfil the 
role of ‘go between’ for the reader and the deeper conceptual ideals the texts aspire 
to. As previously argued, this mode of writing may be read as effectively an 
extension or continuation of the humanist application of classical rhetoric (as is the 
                                                          
86 Greenblatt, Renaissance Self Fashioning, p. 32. 
87 Edward Berry, 'Thomas More and the Legal Imagination', Studies in Philology, 106.3 (2009), pp. 316-40. 
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practice of the ‘moot’), which increasingly became the accepted language of the 
emerging institutions of the administrations of the ‘establishment’. Both More’s and 
Machiavelli’s texts achieve this effect in an exemplary fashion, to the extent that 
these texts come to constitute a collective reference point for the later portrayal of 
characters which serve as a conduit between forces outside the direct remit of the 
plot, but which the author wants to represent as influencing the narrative. This mode 
of characterisation, under specific circumstances and in response to specific 
influences, becomes that of the specific individual administrator character.  
Machiavelli and More used the Renaissance’s pseudo-classical rhetoric as a frame of 
reference and a tool — Machiavelli to interrogate political incentives, and More to 
analyse customs and behaviour. The consequence of this use of rhetoric was that the 
authors’ own opinions were hidden behind layers of provocation and inference. The 
influence of these two works for future political theory and practice spanned the 
whole of Europe, and eventually, much of the rest of the world. Consequently, 
disinterest and ambiguity became accepted as the surface attributes of those 
individuals in literary works who are both the agent of a higher authority and whose 
motives and veracity are uncertain. Both Machiavelli and More, and the characters 
they portray, have vested interests in their interpretation of the state being accepted 
and could expect to benefit greatly from the patronage of the powerful, and from the 
status an adoption of their ideas would potentially bring. The influence of both The 
Prince and Utopia in this regard was increased rather than diminished by the 
multiple misinterpretations and appropriations of these texts. Thus, the impression of 
a caste of individuals whose perspective upon the world does not distinguish 
between argumentation and fact, effectively viewing agency and patronage as 
synonymous, was created. That it became universally accepted that More and 
Machiavelli wrote to advance their own agendas (an effect compounded by the level 
of disagreement as to just what these were) captured the fine line between whether 
power is something conferred or something acquired through dependence. This 
ambiguity raised the question in political theory as to where real power lies — in the 
master, who is dependent upon the servants, or the servants upon which the master 
depends? In the schema presented by Machiavelli and More, rulers acquire their 
power through acquiescence and tacit acceptance, and thus depend upon their 
administrators. It also raised awareness that it is in the interest of rulers to have their 
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administrators appear to be as competent and empowered as possible. Even 
Machiavelli himself couches this proposition in a manner which appeals to a 
prospective ruler, arguing that by empowering one’s servants it is possible to defer 
blame upon them for unpopular actions. In this way, More and Machiavelli 
influenced the very syntax of the cultural debate concerning the power dynamics of 
Europe’s institutions - a syntax which permeates the work of future authors and 
forms the foundations for future literary depictions of administrator characters.  
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Shakespeare and the characterisation of the administrative voice  
‘A feast of language [...] if to do were as easy as to know what were good to do’ 
 
This chapter examines three of the characters Shakespeare uses to mediate external 
influences upon events depicted in the text – Puck, Ariel and Balthazar – and 
examines how Shakespeare incorporates external influences into the fabric of the 
play. Using the administrator character, I want to argue, Shakespeare both takes up 
the techniques of earlier Renaissance authors (exemplified by Machiavelli and More) 
and develops them in a variety of innovative ways. Shakespeare expanded the range 
of the administrative voice by embodying it in characters who overtly, and 
knowingly, incorporate differing interpretations of power relations. Shakespeare 
weaves these interpretations into the fabric of his characters, as in those conceptions 
of natural law and pagan tradition examined through the character of Puck in A 
Midsummer Night’s Dream, or reason and the will to power explored via Ariel in 
The Tempest. This is not to presume that Shakespeare was necessarily uncritical of 
dominant interpretations and conceptions of power. It is certainly the case that 
Shakespeare incorporates in his administrator characters the power of the wider  
'reality' of the drama and interrogates these interpretations through the different 
characters’ interactions. His administrator characters thereby frequently have both 
their authenticity (in relation to the power they uncritically purport to represent) and 
potency questioned in the plays.  
Through the use of fantastical settings, Shakespeare seems to be attempting, in a 
number of his most famous plays, to make the ubiquitous social relations of a 
contemporary Renaissance audience unfamiliar, so providing a means of 
interrogating these relationships. Love’s Labour’s Lost (c.1594–96), A Midsummer 
Night’s Dream (c.1594–96), The Merchant of Venice (c.1596–97), and The Tempest 
(c.1610) share the distinction (rare within Shakespeare’s works) of appearing to lack 
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a ‘source’ text.88 Unlike many of Shakespeare’s plays, these are not artistic ‘re-
tellings’ or ‘literary turns’ in the classical tradition, where the merit is to be found in 
the art of rewriting rather than the novelty of invention (as is the case in, for 
example, Macbeth and Hamlet).
89
 Instead, these plays are unified by the theme of 
social relations, imaginatively transformed to place Tudor preoccupations 
concerning art and power within alternative settings.  
The administrative ‘voice’ of rhetoric, applied to justify methodologies of 
governance, was exemplified, for the early modern period, in the works of 
Machiavelli and More, as we have seen, which allowed ‘through legitimation the 
existing social order... [to be] ‘naturalised’, thus appearing to have the unalterable 
character of natural law’.90 Arguably, this rhetoric is also adopted by Shakespeare, 
who, in the words of Tennenhouse, ‘uses his drama to authorise political authority in 
such a way that political authority as he represents it, in turn authorises art’.91 Read 
in this way, his texts thus become a means both to express a kind of artistic 
autonomy and to secure patronage.
92
 At the same time, however, the concept of a 
                                                          
88 All of these plays were published simultaneously in the first known folio: William Shakespeare, 'Mr. William 
Shakespeares Comedies, Histories, & Tragedies', ed. by J. Smithweeke, et al. (London: Printed at the charges of 
W. Jaggard, 1623).  
89 It is proposed that Shakespeare's immediate source for his story in MacBeth  is Raphael Holinshed's Chronicles 
of England, Scotland, and Ireland (1577). See Josephine Nicoll Allardyce, Holinshed's Chronicle as Used in 
Shakespeare's Plays (London and New York: Dutton, 1963). Regarding Hamlet, it is proposed that the immediate 
source is Saxo Grammaticus, 'History of the Danes', in Saxo Grammaticus and the Life of Hamlet, trans. by de 
Belleforest, ed. by William F. Hansen (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1570), pp. 81-2. This text was 
adapted into a play by Thomas Kyd into the Ur-Hamlet. 
90 Dollimore’s account of such ‘legitimation’ is comparable to both an Althusserian conception of ideology and 
the process of Mythology as outlined by Barthes. See Jonathan Dollimore, ‘Shakespeare, cultural materialism 
and the new historicism’, in Jonathan Dollimore, Radical Tragedy (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004). See also 
Political Shakespeare, ed. by Jonathan Dollimore and Alan Sinfield, 2 edn (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 2005), p. 7.  
91 Leonard Tennenhouse, 'Strategies of State and Political Plays', in Political Shakespeare, ed. by Alan Sinfield 
Jonathan Dollimore (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005), pp. 109-28 (p. 111).  
92 “...Cupid all arm'd: a certain aim he took | At a fair vestal throned by the west...” II.i of A Midsummer Night’s 
Dream is thought to refer directly to Elizabeth. Incidentally, Love’s Labour’s Lost was played before Elizabeth 
during the Christmas holidays on December 26, 1597. It is fair to suggest, therefore, that both plays were written 
with a direct consideration of how they would play before the Queen, and that this consideration will have 
affected the portrayal of both power and the means by which it is administrated. State papers record that 
Shakespeare played before the Queen in December, 1594, at the Royal Palace at Greenwich and subsequently 
received patronage through the Lord Chamberlain (to become known as the ‘Lord Chamberlain’s Men’ prior to 
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self-perpetuating, central administration was informed by theatrical characterisations 
of the authorities’ proxies themselves.93 In this chapter, I will attempt to show how 
rhetoric is thus used in Shakespeare’s texts to frame interpersonal power relations, 
and hence reflect upon the wider context of the world external to the text.  
It is in this regard that, for example, A Midsummer Night’s Dream may be read as 
presenting a kind of ‘manifesto’ for the role of status and institutions as, possibly, 
the inspiration for the play’s themes, with enough subversive elements (particularly 
concerning the dependence of power upon perception) to expose the fragility of royal 
power. Within each of the units of action in the play which raise these themes, Puck 
intervenes to impose Oberon’s authority. Dramatically, it is therefore Puck’s actions, 
and his interpretations of the will of Oberon, that drive the play’s action. By acting 
on Oberon’s behalf and acting as an intermediary between the mortal court and the 
fairy woods, Puck effectively endows Oberon with the attributes of royalty and 
natural law.  
Similarly, in The Tempest, the source of Prospero’s power alternates between his use 
of rhetoric and his deployment of Ariel, to such an extent that they appear to become 
different manifestations of the same force.
94
 By representing the effect of the system 
                                                                                                                                                                    
becoming ‘The King’s Men’). For more on Shakespeare’s patrons, see Henry Brown, Shakespeare's Patrons 
(Charleston: BiblioBazaar, 2009).  
93 Traditionally, Offices were sold as a means of accruing influence and status, resulting in sticky taxes 
incommensurate with inflation or with levels of wealth. The leaders of English villages and towns between 1388 
and 1598 accepted responsibility for ‘deserving’ poor people, who might be offered Christian charity via private 
and, if necessary, collectively administrated assistance. Poverty was objectively mild in the century (due to the 
plague) but the numbers of poor increased during economic and demographic changes in later centuries due to an 
increasing population. Attempts by Queen Elizabeth to increase the size of English bureaucracy, small by 
continental standards, was defeated by the judges in the Cavendish Case in 1587 (for more, see G. W. Bernard, 
'The Fall of Wolsey Reconsidered', The Journal of British Studies, 35.3 (1993), pp. 277-310 (p. 277). The 
Parliamentary motion to increase the number of legal offices was defeated. By 1594 to 1596, religious and 
political turmoil required Parliamentary legislation allocating the power to raise compulsory welfare taxes to 
local authorities, further decentralizing the government. The power of local nobility collectively far outweighed 
that of the central power of Westminster, via the structures of common law and monopoly taxation. As such, after 
the revolution, the King needed to maintain the support of the House of Commons by not challenging their local 
authority. For more, see Marjorie K. McIntosh, 'Local Responses to the Poor in Late Medieval and Tudor 
England', Continuity and Change, 3 (1988), pp. 209–45 (p. 209). Also see W. C. Richardson, 'Tudor Chamber 
Administration 1485-1547', Columbia Law Review, 53.7 (1953), pp. 1029-32 (p. 1029).  
94Ariel acts as an extension of amplificatio, which Vickers notes are ‘misunderstood in the modern sense of a 
decoration not functional to the overall aim...[T]he ornaments were associated with amplificatio, not in the 
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of subject and monarch upon the play, Prospero and Ariel reflect the role played by 
pomp and pageantry in the authority of the monarchy. Recently, The Tempest has 
been recognised as a play that, as Brown puts it, ‘bears the trace of the contemporary 
British investment in colonial expansion’ to the extent that critics have argued that 
The Tempest is ‘not simply a reflection of colonialist practices but an intervention in 
an ambivalent and even contradictory discourse’.95 Certainly, during the 1600s, there 
was a distinct divergence between the ideal and the reality of colonialism, and the 
practical constraints upon aristocratic power. The administrator characters play a key 
role in ameliorating this ambivalent portrayal’s effects on the project of Empire. 
Critical interpretations of Prospero have shifted, in this regard, from readings of the 
1950s, which emphasised his capacity for rejuvenation and social flexibility (as with 
Kermode’s seminal introduction to the 1954 Arden edition),96 to post-1960s criticism 
which examines the power relations of the play as part of a wider colonial paradigm. 
Significantly, this latter interpretation has also opened the text to readings concerned 
with the role of other entities and agents within the play, and how these are subverted 
by, and subvert, Prospero’s influence. Such entities and agents have even included 
artistic, as well as epistemological, forms such as various analyses of the 
                                                                                                                                                                    
medieval sense of expanding discourse but in the classical-Renaissance sense of making it more intense and 
effective’, Brian Vickers, ‘Rhetoric and Poetics’, in Brian Vickers, 'The Cambridge History of Renaissance 
Philosophy', in The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy, ed. by Charles Schmitt and Quentin Skinner 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1954) (p. 743).  
95 See Paul Brown, 'This Thing of Darkness I Acknowledge Mine': The Tempest and the Discourse of 
Colonialism ', in Political Shakespeare, ed. by Jonathan Dollimore and Alan Sinfield (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2005), pp. 48-71 (p. 48). Strong parallels have been drawn, and are evident, in Prospero’s final 
speech and Medea’s speech in Metamorphoses. The plot also contains similar anti-dogmatic themes to Erasmus’s 
Naufragium (see: Erasmus, The Erasmus reader, ed: Erika Rummel, University of Toronto Press, 2003, p.239) 
which clearly spoke to contemporary audiences, inspiring another shipwreck drama which Gil Vicete presented 
at the court of Dom Joao II in 1529 (see: M. Newitt, A History of Portuguese Overseas Expansion 1400 – 1668, 
Routledge, 2005, p.94); Peter Martyr’s narrative De Orbe Novo decades cum Legatione Babylonica, 1516, uses 
similar New World imagery with similar Spanish nomenclature (see: P. D’Anghiera, C. Lacona, E. George, 
Columbus’ first voyage, Bolchazy-Carducci Publishers, 2005). The first North American colony (1580) was 
named Verginia, after ‘the Virgin Queen’, Queen Elizabeth I, granted Sir Walter Raleigh permission to establish 
colonies in North America. The implied absolutism of this name contrasts with the realities of the project, as the 
first two attempts failed, with the third attempt only succeeding seven years later. Even so, the first child born of 
the colony was named ‘Virginia Dare’. See Marc Ferro, Colonization: A Global History (London and New York: 
Routledge 1997), p. 45.  
96 William Shakespeare, The Tempest, ed. by Frank Kermode (London and New York: The Arden Shakespeare 
Methuen, 1954).  






 found within the play, in readings which 
owe much to the phenomenon that Vickers has referred to as treating the play as an 
‘allegory for colonialism’.99 However, both radical readings of the play (focusing 
upon subversion and resistance) and more conservative readings have neglected to 
address the question of how exactly characters implement an external authority’s 
will. In fact, Ariel and Prospero’s relationship is one which suggests, in particular, 
Plowden’s (1571) description of the King as having ‘two bodies, viz, a body natural, 
and a body politic | His body natural (if it be considered in itself) is a body moral [...] 
his body politic is a body that cannot be seen or handled, consisting of policy and 
government [...] and the management of the public weal’.100 The figure of the 
administrator plays a vital role in the mediation of such two ‘bodies’ here. 
In The Merchant of Venice, law is equated with religion, which the populace accepts 
due to the manner of its execution. Balthazar becomes the administrating 
representative of this external sense of law – law as higher truth – a sense of law that 
Balthazar is knowingly responsible for referencing. The trick that Portia successfully 
plays is not so much her disguise, nor does it lie in winning the battle of wits with 
Shylock. Portia’s achievement is in convincing the Court precisely that Balthazar is 
the agent of a higher law, and that it is the Court which is responsible for 
endeavouring to enforce it. Machiavelli described how ecclesiastical principalities 
‘are maintained without either (ability or by fortune), for they are sustained by 
                                                          
97 For an overview see Catherine M. Dunn, 'The Function of Music in Shakespeare's Romances', Shakespeare 
Quarterly, 20.4 (1969), pp. 391-405.  
98 For an overview see R. Levin, 'Anatomical Geography in 'the Tempset' ', Notes and Queries, 11.4 (1964), pp. 
235-38.  
99 Brian Vickers, Appropriating Shakespeare: Contemporary Critical Quarrels (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1993). Vickers argues that texts must be read within their ‘proper’ place, in which theory may be applied 
within context, but not by transposing or telegraphing motivations or interpretations beyond those contemporary 
of intention and reception. Hamlin, 1994, summarises analysis aiming ‘to locate the play explicitly within the 
complicated network of ideas, preconceptions, goals, schemes, rhetoric, and propaganda that constitutes colonial 
discourse’ as ignoring the ‘genuinely curious’ tone of much of the source material. William Hamlin, 'Men of 
Inde: Renaissance Ethnography and the Tempest', Shakespeare Studies 22 (1994), pp. 15-44 (p. 14). The role of 
the administrator, as a spontaneous response to governance, is as authentic as this ‘genuinely curious’ element. I 
agree Shakespeare’s work may hold a dominant ‘articulatory principle’ which may be read, as Greer (1986) 
describes, ‘so influential that is has come to seem utterly conventional’. Germaine Greer, Shakespeare: A Very 
Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 138.  
100 Edmund Plowden, 'Les Comentaries on Reports De Edmunde Plowden (1571)', in The King's Two Bodies, ed. 
by Ernst Kantorowicz (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), pp. 7-24 (p. 371).  
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ancient religious customs, which are of such power and of such quality, that they 
keep their princes in power in whatever manner they proceed and live’. These 
principalities are ‘upheld by higher causes, which the human mind cannot attain’, 
writes Machiavelli, and continues, ‘I will abstain from speaking of them; for being 
exalted and maintained by God, it would be the work of a presumptuous and foolish 
man to discuss them.’101 In line with this, Shakespeare’s depiction and use of the 
administrator both reveals and affirms that the display of power is a means to 
acquiring power itself. This is so, arguably, in a manner reminiscent of Greenblatt’s 
analysis of public executions, which is itself indebted to Foucault:  
[T]he fear was to some degree pleasurable to the onlookers, whether, as 
Hobbes argued, because they delighted in not being themselves the victims or, 
as official spokes men claimed, because the horror was produced by a higher 
order whose interests it served. In either case, the experience, it was assumed, 
would make the viewers more obedient subjects.
102
  
Greenblatt’s analysis may be read alongside Shakespeare’s depiction of the state, 
once proper attention is paid to the role of the administrator here. This is because the 
administrator character’s very presence serves, in this sense, as an overt 
representative of the power relations of the wider political context and their impact 
upon the text. Within Shakespeare’s plays, the state acknowledges the expediency of 
the law. By serving as a conduit for the influence of events and systems 
underpinning the action of the state, the administrators may thus be read as allowing 
the plays to simultaneously ‘confirm the Machiavellian hypothesis that princely 
power originates in force and fraud even as they draw their audience toward an 
acceptance of that power’.103  
Throughout the Shakespearean plays considered in this chapter, characters who 
dictate meaning are synonymous with high status, just as their intermediaries are 
synonymous with characters who interpret meaning. The characters of Sir Nathaniel 
and Holofernes – a curate (the ‘curatus’, or carer) and schoolmaster – serve the role 
of commenting on and analysing the letters of the characters in Love’s Labour’s 
                                                          
101 Machiavelli, The Prince, p. 39.  
102 Stephen Greenblatt, Shakespearean Negotiations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 194.  
103Greenblatt, Shakespearean Negotiations, p. 65.  
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Lost, encouraging the audience to adopt a reading which presumes a self-aware 
nature to the play in the manner of a play within the play, and emphasising the layers 
of meaning within every phrase (‘I will look again on the intellect of the letter’ IV. 2. 
117). Puck interprets Oberon’s wishes, and is the character who facilitates the 
encounter between the mechanicals, the lovers and the fairies, and it is Puck who 
closes the play with a direct plea for the audience to remember that the play was a 
fiction should they have not enjoyed it, again indicating the transient nature of 
certainty. In this way, Ariel (who embodies the rhetoric of Prospero) also stands in 
diametric opposition to Caliban in The Tempest (who wilfully rejects the rhetorical 
education Prospero offers) and is the means by which Prospero stalls the survivors of 
the tempest with an illusion of a banquet, and allows Ariel to lead them to Prospero 
and to the truth of his past (III. 3; V. 1). Finally, it is Portia in The Merchant of 
Venice who leads the suitors to be challenged in the attempt to find true value within 
her father’s trail of the chests, and who deceives the Court in order to reveal the truth 
hidden within Shylock’s contract (IV. 1). The role of the administrator in the 
interpretation and implementation of the wishes of the plays’ main protagonists 
forms, in this way, the core of the over-arching representation of rhetoric and 
contested meaning within the texts. 
It is crucial, then, that value within these plays appears to shift in increments from 
Platonic values, dependent upon transcendental worth, and embodied in such 
concepts as lineage, genius and beauty, as denoted within Love Labour’s Lost, to an 
Aristotelian representation of value as the teleological achievement of value via 
cultivation of circumstance. Within these four Shakespearean plays, much of the 
drama thus arises out of the reassessment of an existing conception of value, and is 
often depicted as becoming increasingly pragmatic, as a matter of necessity for the 
plot to reach a conclusion. At the time of these texts's composition, views and 
practices of rhetoric fell into two broad streams. One popular conception was that of 
rhetorical arts as being a means to win an argument as an end in itself, regardless of 
one’s purpose or the soundness of one’s position – a view held by both those who 
affirmed the cynical used of rhetoric to specific ends, and by those who rejected the 
art as almost an extension of mendacity. As was seen in chapter one of this thesis, 
the latter was taken to be Plato’s view. The second, in the manner of Aristotle’s 
systematic treatment of argumentation and rhetoric, viewed rhetoric as a legitimate 
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subject in its own right, which held the potential to assist inductive reasoning to 
reveal deeper truths within debated subject matter. This latter interpretation was 
broadly adopted by classical Roman culture; although, as Mills has shown, aspects 
of distrust regarding rhetoric were also rediscovered during rhetoric’s re-emergence 
in the European Renaissance.
104
 In Shakespeare’s case, rhetoric was used to reveal 
character. Shakespeare does this in three primary ways: by having his characters 
reveal their motives and opinions when arguing in favour of their goals; by allowing 
the audience to view his characters in discourse with other characters; and by 
depicting his characters adapting their behaviour and arguments in line with the other 
characters in the play.  
Love’s Labour’s Lost, A Midsummer Night’s Dream and The Tempest 
Love’s Labour’s Lost has strongly humanist themes, comedy, and may be viewed as 
revolving around what Kirsty Cochrane describes as a form of ‘speech ethics’. This 
is Cochrane’s term for the Renaissance humanist ideal that speech maintains civil 
life,
105
 the quest for public acclaim and social status. Rhetoric during the 
Renaissance was not perceived as distinct from the arts, politics, philosophy or even 
ethics.
106
 In this sense, the concept of speech ethics pervades Shakespeare’s 
literature, itself an exemplary representative of the role rhetoric plays in sixteenth-
century European culture, in which, according to Renaissance sensibilities, human 
interaction (speech, in particular) should conform to courtly procedure and the rules 
of rhetoric in order to maintain civil society. This theme is explored in a number of 
humanist academic plays: the writings of Erasmus, and the work of Jonson, as well 
as the political theory of Machiavelli and More. The administrator, as the means by 
which authors indicate the influence of forces beyond the confines of the narrative, 
thus has a particularly important function within these texts. As with speech ethics, 
where a character’s speech is the means by which the character’s inner narrative is 
revealed to the audience and, at the same time, the means by which the audience is 
                                                          
104 Mills, 'Aspects of Distrust of Rhetoric '. 
105 ‘Speech ethics’ refers to ‘the way in which a man speaks affects his relation with others: he is judged by his 
speech to the exclusion of almost any other consideration. His speech becomes his self, in an absolute fashion; 
and through it, civil life in society is seen to be created'. See Kirsty Cochrane, 'Sixteenth Century Theories of 
Effective Speech and Rhetoric and Their Manifestation in English Renaissance Drama', (PhD thesis University of 
Cambridge, 1970), p. 1.  
106 Vickers, 'The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy'  (p. 715). 
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assured by the depiction of the maintenance of the fabric of civil society, the 
administrator indicates the influence of forces beyond the narrative – primarily, at 
this stage of the administrator character’s own development, through rhetoric. Miller 
argues that the situation of Love’s Labour’s Lost was a fiction based upon 
Elizabeth’s edict of 1561 to Archbishop Matthew Parker, given on one of her 
Summer Progressions through England, forbidding ‘all resort of women to the 
lodgings of Cathedrals or Colleges’. Therefore, the play may be read as a study (via 
the interactions of the characters), as Miller notes, of the ‘close relationship and 
interlocking leadership of the ecclesiastical and educational institutions [that] 
account for the Church and universities being brought together’ during this period – 
a representation, that is, of the friction between the Church as educator and the 
Church as the leader of the congregation in the sixteenth century. Read as such, the 
play, as a whole, may thus be seen as examining larger social relationships between 
institutions, and the influence of individual actions upon these institutions.
107
  
Moving from the interpersonal to the interplay between institutions and the 
interpersonal, A Midsummer Night’s Dream (‘Ere the leviathan can swim a league’ 
II. 1) anticipates a central theme within Hobbes’ Leviathan, of how one person may 
act on behalf of another. In Hobbes’s words: ‘A Person, is he, whose words or 
actions are considered, either as his own, or as representing the words or actions of 
any other man, or any other thing to whom they are attributed, whether Truly or by 
Fiction.’108 This tension is explored in the depiction of Puck, and the ambiguity 
regarding Puck’s motivations: whether he acts on behalf of Oberon, out of self-
interest, or on behalf of a greater meta-order that he himself is unaware of, in his 
attempts to reunite Oberon and Titania and unite the lovers. By contrast, The 
Tempest interrogates contemporary myths surrounding colonialism and aristocracy, 
so exploring the relationship between nature and artifice. In this, it shares a concern 
with, for example, Montaigne who posits that ‘In those (Indigenous Americans) are 
the true and most profitable virtues, and natural properties most lively and vigorous, 
which in these we have bastardized, applying them to the pleasure of our corrupted 
                                                          
107 See R. L. Miller, 'Oaths Forsworn in Love's Labour's Lost', The Oxfordian, 9 (2006), pp. 35-49.  
108 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. by Aloysius Martinich and Brian Battiste, 2 edn (Plymouth: Broadview Press, 
2005), p. 120.  
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taste’.109 This entails, then, an account of the means by which property becomes both 
a physical and social extension of status, and, subsequently, power. Finally, it is 
within The Merchant of Venice that the administrative character’s capacity to act as a 
prism for the wider ideological context of the text is most apparent when seen as part 
of a series of plays exploring the tension between the individual and the state. In the 
depiction of Portia, in particular, the failure of the humanist paradigm (in which the 
human is locatable within the individual empowered with learning and skill) is 
depicted as an ideological conceit, sacrificed pragmatically on the path to personal 
gratification.  
Humanist rhetoric, as a device to iterate meaning (and, through its iteration, to adopt 
and propagate), is rooted in what H.F. Plett terms ‘the use of rhetoric as an 
interdisciplinary, intercultural discipline of the humanities’.110 This is an idea 
classically addressed in Aristotle’s Poetics, where he emphasises the manner of the 
tale’s telling, rather than its content: 
Concerning Thought, we may assume what is said in the Rhetoric [...] 
incidents should speak for themselves without verbal exposition; while the 




This notion arguably motivates the ‘variations on a theme’ in Shakespeare’s texts: 
the ‘utopia’, the ‘manual to rule’ text, the ‘tragic prince’, the ‘corrupt tyrant’, the 
‘star crossed lovers’ (to suggest a few). The content here – the matter, if not the 
narrative – provides a foundation for rhetorical flourishes. Rainolde (1563) described 
the Aristotelian essence of eloquence as the ability to ‘copiouslie dilate any matter or 
sentence, by pleasantness and sweetness of [...] wittie and ingenious oration’, which, 
                                                          
109 Montaigne’s Essays, trans; john Florio, cit: Frank Kermode’s intro. to William Shakespeare, The Tempest, ed. 
by Frank Kermode (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1988), p. 7.  
110 H. F. Plett, Rhetoric and Renaissance Culture (Berlin: Libary of Congress, 2004), p. 7.  
111 Aristotle, The Poetics, ed. by S. H. Butcher, 4th Edn (London: Macmillan, 1925), p. 71. Baldwin outlines the 
rhetorical training in English schools and universities, including Rhetorica ad Herennium, Cicero’s Topica, 
Quintilian’s Institutio Oraitia, Erasmus’ De Copia, and Susenbrotus’ epitome of schemes and tropes. For more, 
see T. W. Baldwin, William Shakespeare's Small Latine and Less Greek (Illinois: University of Illinois Rare 
Book and Special Collections Library, 1944), II, in University of Illinois Press Rare Book and Special 
Collections Library (University of Illinois ). See also George Puttenham, The Art of English Poesie, Cambridge, 
1936 intended  
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when used for the betterment of mankind, was an ‘absolute excellencie’, and ‘a thing 
of all most noble and excellent’.112 Shakespeare, when he moves beyond these story 
formats, uses archetypes to illustrate and embody the themes and ideas explored 
within the play. To this extent, concepts take precedence over traditional theatrical 
aesthetic and material concerns.
113
 Shakespeare’s use of character allows him to 
maintain the dramatic tension without resorting to plot devices, in a manner 
reminiscent of Aristotle’s famous assertion in the Poetics: 
[P]oetry tends to express the universal [...] how a person of a certain type will 
on occasion speak or act, according to the law of probability or necessity; and 




It is, I would claim, in this fashion that Love’s Labour’s Lost examines the power of 
rhetoric to convey the humanist ideal and essential (Aristotelian) virtue.
115
 In this 
sense, it may also be seen as part of a trilogy with A Midsummer Night’s Dream and 
The Tempest, despite the decade and a half which apparently separated their 
composition. These three plays share, at any rate, an equal concern with the 
conveyance of the humanist goal, yet each places differing emphases upon the 
sphere of influence of rhetoric, and upon the extent of its ramifications. Love’s 
Labour’s Lost concentrates upon the internal and the intimate, A Midsummer Night’s 
Dream focuses upon the overlap between these intimate conspiracies and the state, 
while The Tempest foregrounds the wider social structures, such as colonialism, 
monarchy, cultural ideology, and class relations, and how these are affected and, in 
turn, affect the internal consciousness of the characters. Where Love's Labour's Lost 
                                                          
112 Richard Rainolde, The Foundation of Rhetoric (Menston: Scholar Press, 1972), pp. 160, 62, 267.  
113 Robert Uphas, suggests a similar reading of Shakespeare's relationship with Aristotelian / Theophrastus 
suggesting that the characters of Pericles, Cerimon and Gower act as archetypes, for patience, charity and the 
story-teller respectively. See T. Curtright, 'Falseness Cannot Come from Thee', Literary Imagination, 11 (2009), 
pp. 99-110 (pp. 99 - 110).  
114Aristotle encompasses probability within this comment as well as universality. Aristotle, The Poetics, p. 71.  
115 In 1528 Baldassar Castiglione printed a conduct book describing the ideal courtier as being able ‘to avoid 
affectation, to speak and act discreetly and opportunely, to aim at honour and praise in martial exercises, war, and 
public contests’; Il libro del cortegiano (The Book of the Courtier) later translated and printed in English by 
Hoby in 1561: Baldassarre Castiglione (conte), The Book of the Courtier, Trans: , Leonard Eckstein Opdycke C. 
Scribner's Sons, 1903. For more on the character of the Pedant, see Sidney Logan Sondergard, 'Pedagogy and the 
Sign of the Pedant in Tudor England', Studies in Philology, 91.3 (1994), 270-82.  
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focuses upon personal interaction and occurs in closed spaces, A Midsummer Night's 
Dream is a comedy-drama study of manners, and The Tempest spans oceans, 
cultures, and generations. As an extension of the text’s rhetoric, characterisation 
expands correspondingly. It is enough for the characters in Love’s Labour’s Lost to 
have the bearing of the courtier in order to convey the theme of the humanist ideal, 
but in-depth characterisation is required to represent traditions of noblesse oblige.
116
 
Subsequently, A Midsummer Night’s Dream, The Merchant of Venice, and The 




In A Midsummer Night’s Dream, characterisation may be read as facilitating the 
play’s meta-rhetorical theme, placing in question the validity of rhetoric per se, and 
examining the potential influence of court dynamics and intrigue upon the state. 
Puck is central to A Midsummer Night’s Dream’s ‘philosophical’ thrust: the interplay 
between localised communities, how their interrelations are affected by forces 
beyond the control of any one group or individual (no matter their social status), and 
the inability of established ideals of humanism to address them. Puck’s fay nature, as 
with Marlowe’s Mephistopheles in Doctor Faustus, may be read, in this light, as 
reflecting the ‘supernatural’ status which the emergent forces of modernity held at 
the turn from the sixteenth to seventeenth century. Prior to Shakespeare’s retelling, 
Puck was described as a ‘hobgoblin’ with a fickle, ambiguous morality.118 In A 
                                                          
116 Love’s Labour’s Lost’s treatment of the relationship between language and civil life has many similarities 
with the ‘academic comedies’. Holofernes and Sir Nathaniel appear to mirror Pedantius and Dromodtus of the 
Cambridge play Pedantius – Edward Fosett, Pedantus, Produced at Trinity College Cambrige in 1581. See also: 
Aristophanes The Clouds (for Classical context, see the portrayal of Socrates);Edward Forsett: Pedantius, ed. by 
Edward Forest, J. W. Binns, and Marvin Spevack (Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1989), II, p. 104.  
117 For more on the use of archetypical characters and the humanist rhetorical tradition of which Erasmus and 
Wilson were standard bearers, see T. Campion, Observations in the Art of English Poesie, (1602) in Smith’s 
Elizabethan Critical Essays, II, 327. See also Daniel’s counter to Campion, A Defence of Rhyme, (libd., II, 372) ; 
and W. Guazzo, The Civil Conversation, owned by Gabriel Harvey (located in the British Museum. Harvey 
heavily annotated this text, with particular emphasis on manners and discourse and Book IV); Harvey dated this 
copy 1582 on P.115. The earliest usage of ‘humanist’ is noted by the O.E.D as ‘a public or private teacher of 
classical literature’ – cited: Baldwin, William Shakespeare's Small Latine and Less Greek, p. 478. For more on 
Shakespeare’s humanist education see A. P. Duhamel, 'The Function of Rhetoric as Effective Expression', 
Journal of the History of Ideas, 10.3 (1949), pp. 344-56 (p. 355). Also Ricardo J. Quinones, 'The Renaissance 
Discovery of Time', Renaissance Quarterly, 27.1 (1974), pp. 7–28 (p. 55). 
118 Reginald Scot, the Discoverie of Witchcraft 1584, ed. by Montague Summers (London: John Rodker, 1930), 
p. 89.  
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Midsummer Night’s Dream, however, Puck, even while taking delight in confusion 
and his understanding of the fairies, is, above all, an obedient emissary for Oberon’s 
will. The Shakespearean Puck is therefore dependant on the Shakespearean Oberon 
in what appears to have been a radically new way. Oberon represents the majesty of 
monarchy, just as the mechanicals represent an idealised artisanal class. The 
mechanicals’ noun-focused, harshly punctuated language cut with colloquial 
interjections, their ‘hempen homespuns’ appearance, and their amorphous 
characteristics demand less interpretation by the audience. Bottom, who can play all 
of the characters in Pyrimus and Thisby, may, in this sense, be taken as an ‘arch-
type’ character, representative of all the members of the mechanicals, and, by logical 
extension, of the whole artisanal class.
119
 Their preoccupation with their own internal 
dynamics also suggests an ignorance of the influence of external forces upon their 
actions, and upon the events surrounding them, suggesting that they will, themselves, 
ultimately only have a minor influence upon the contextual ‘wider reality’ (or 
verisimilitude) of the play. At the same time, the ability of Puck to make an ass of 
Bottom, and make the Queen fall in love with him, has an economically satirical 
edge – once again, Puck embodies the binary nature of administration in its capacity 
to influence the ruler and the ruled in equal measure.  
Oberon represents the detached comprehension that systems of privilege and power 
have on social consciousness, describing the tension between social change and the 
continuity or ongoing legacy of traditional institutions. He is the ‘prime mover’, who 
is never encountered by any of the mortals in the play, and may, significantly, 
become invisible at will. In this way, Oberon represents the influence of social 
change and tradition as an entity ‘in the world’, yet not ‘of the world’. He relies upon 
his knowledge of the natural world to gain control over Titania (his ‘little western 
flower; | Before, milk-white; now purple with love’s wound’ II. 1. 173), and upon his 
agent to enact his plan. In her aria on the seasons, Titania speaks of winds made 
angry by neglect and disregard, suggesting that the powers the fairies possess are not 
                                                          
119 The English government passed the Weavers' Act in 1555, limiting the number of looms per establishment 
outside towns to one or two. These sped the decay of the old urban broadcloth firms. Queen Elizabeth 
nationalised the Statute of Artificers in 1563, providing state support to guild power. Had the Statute of Artificers 
been enforced, industrial growth might have been permanently arrested. For more see: Murray Rothbard and 
Harry A. Miskimin, The Economy of Later Renaissance Europe: 1460-1600 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1977). 
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the same as direct control. The power of the Fairy King and Queen may therefore be 
described as the power of discourse represented as the power of symbolic status and 
empowered language. Oberon and Titania are the embodiment of powers greater 
than their ability to wield them. These unruly powers encapsulate the conundrum of 
how monarchy, theocracy, and entitlement are to persist in a changing world. 
The implied message of the fay’s depiction in this reading would be the need for 
institutional administration and mediation, represented by Puck. Puck is a magnetic 
conflagration of impartiality and moral abdication, combined with impulsiveness and 
impropriety. As such, Puck is the primary means by which the symbolic power of 
the fay may adapt to the material resources of the lovers and the Court. The 
translation between the essential fay and the material lovers here becomes the task of 
the administrator, and is identical in this instance to the role of rhetorician. As future 
chapters will show in more detail, this dynamic constitutes a primary default source 
for subsequent images of the administrator character in literature: a representative of 
a force distinct from the institution’s rulers whilst remaining bound to them. If the 
play represents a form of mediation in the ‘in between’ space of the midsummer 
wood, this duality requires a proactive intermediary who must have the ability to 
interact with each social class. Puck characterises the apex between the invisible, 
non-temporal discourse of Oberon and the physical temporality of Athens and the 
‘visible’ wood. As a result, Puck’s language ranges from blank verse120 and the 
trochaic tetrameter of rhyming couplets, to rhyming pentameters
121
 in accordance 
with his ‘location’. Puck even uses a rhetorical inversion against Oberon by turning 
accusations of ‘misprision’ of ‘some true love turned, and not a false turned true’, a 
mistake instigated by Oberon, into a universal generalisation, as ‘fate o’er rules, that, 
one man holding troth, a million fail, confounding oath on oath’ (III.2 92).122 This 
elegant evasion of blame doesn’t divert responsibility onto Oberon, however, but 
appears to agree with him due to his apparently innocent misinterpretation. Such 
apparently innate rhetorical ability may be seen as the source of Puck’s influence and 
indeterminate status. It is Puck, the administrator character, who is the unifying point 
between the different linguistic registers and poetic forms used within the play, 
                                                          
120 See Shakespeare, The Tempest. Act III.i. 
121See Shakespeare, The Tempest. Act III.ii. 
122 See Shakespeare, The Tempest. Act III.ii. 
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allowing Puck to act as the embodiment of discourse tout court, as seen in 
Shakespeare’s use of Puck's mimicry and Puck’s eventual combining of styles. This 
allows Shakespeare to endow this character (who remains, in terms of courtly status, 
a cipher) with the empowered language, hegemonic knowledge, and moral 
impartiality required to drive the drama.
123
 The language of Puck is less 
demonstrative than the speech ethics of Love’s Labour’s Lost, but it may be read, in 
this way, as a microcosm of the wider rhetoric of the play’s themes. Indeed, Puck’s 
closing speech may even be read as a manifesto of personal empowerment through 
hegemonic discourse, extolling the role of the administrator, being ‘so strong that 
previous goals have become incommensurate’, and his continued agency in the 
world, and, as such, invokes a sense of the modern, the immediate and impermanent 
by referencing death ‘howling’ within ‘this weak and idle theme | No more yielding 
but a dream’.124 
In A Midsummer Night’s Dream, the emphasis appears, then, to be on the interaction 
between the different strata of society. In The Tempest, the true ‘currency’ of the 
island is ideological. The Tempest, however, also explores the ramifications of 
shifting power structures upon interpersonal social relations. This is achieved 
through the characters’ interpersonal rhetoric and the play’s drama arc. In The 
Tempest, rhetoric acts as a barometer of the will to power, and therefore rhetoric is 
extrapolated by will and force of reason into discourse rather than just the power of 
class; it is Ariel, as the administrator character of the play, who serves as the conduit 
between rhetorical discourse in the abstract and the power relations on stage. The 
dramatic role of Ariel differs from that of Puck in that Puck is a proactive figure, 
who interprets Oberon’s orders. Yet Ariel lacks none of Puck’s will and vitality, 
even going so far as to demand from Prospero ‘My liberty’.125 Just as the 
relationship between Puck and Oberon reflects the subject of the play’s 
examination,
126
 the relationship between Ariel and Prospero is presented in terms of 
                                                          
123 See Shakespeare, The Tempest. Act III.ii, incorporation of incantation and trochaic tetrameter in quatrains.  
124 William Shakespeare, A Midsummer Night's Dream, ed. by Peter Hollindale (London: Penguin Critical 
Studies, 1992). Act V.i.  
125 Shakespeare, The Tempest. Act 1.ii 
126 That is, how the rhetorical interrelations between individuals and small groups - depending upon their social 
status and their individual consciousness - ramify upon wider society. This is the meeting point between 
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utility rather than hierarchy. Their relationship represents discourse replacing 
rhetoric as the primary determinant in human interaction.  
Ariel describes how it has performed ‘worthy service, […] served without grudge or 
grumblings’, in order to ‘repay’ Prospero for freeing it from its ‘cloven pine’. 
Despite the verbal contract with which Prospero appeases Ariel, it is clear that 
Prospero’s power over Ariel surpasses that of an oral contract. Ariel makes no direct 
reference to magical compulsion (as Caliban does, saying ‘His art is of such 
power’),127 traditional authority (as with Alonso: ‘Thy dukedom I resign and do 
entreat | thou pardon me my wrongs’),128 or familial authority (as with Miranda’s 
‘Obey, and be attentive’).129 Indeed, the relationship between them appears intimate 
and familial, yet they are distanced from authentic interaction by the exploitative 
nature of their relationship.
130
 This has an alienating effect on interpersonal relations, 
trumping the power of rhetoric. Ariel’s primary mode of being within the play is as a 
personification of ‘use-value’, and the impact of this is an enforced portrayal of 
detached inhumanity, which inadequately reflects the affection Shakespeare suggests 
between the two. Indeed, Prospero appears even to welcome Ariel’s freedom, 
referring to it throughout the play. Prospero’s affection for Ariel is, however, clearly 
contingent upon Ariel’s utility. Moreover, Prospero’s promise of freedom, as it 
comes within the context of his renouncing magic, costs him nothing. All of their 
interactions are therefore lacking any authentic emotional investment beyond the 
gratitude earned at a lack of punishment or the gratification provided by a tool. This 
inauthenticity may be seen as key to their dysfunctional dynamic, and its origins may 
be read as being within the administrator role that Ariel has within the play, as the 




                                                                                                                                                                    
individual consciousness and relationships, on the one hand, and wider cultural traditions, structures, discourses 
and hegemony, on the other.  
127Shakespeare, The Tempest. Act 1.ii. 
128 Shakespeare, The Tempest. Act V.i.  
129 Shakespeare, The Tempest. Act 1.ii.  
130 Prospero’s adjectives for Ariel include ‘brave’, ‘slave’, ‘quaint’, ‘fine’, ‘dainty’ and ‘bird’. Ariel’s adjectives 
to these references include ‘noble’, ‘master’, ‘sir’, ‘lord’, ‘my commander’. 
131 ‘As my soul prompts it. Spirit, fine spirit, I’ll free thee/Within two days for this’ (1.ii p.21) and ‘I shall 
miss/Thee, but thou shalt have freedom’ (V.i, p.69) 
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Prospero is, in turn, himself confined within his relationship with Ariel. Ariel is 
complicit in the continuation of this master/slave relationship by promoting it in 
every encounter, evidenced in a continual and insistent use of subservient language. 
Prospero’s description of Ariel as ‘my diligence’, and his reliance upon Ariel to 
summon the storm (which he claims credit for to Miranda), and to create the illusion 
which waylays Alonso and his retinue (presenting himself on cue during Gonzalo’s 
impeachment to ‘some heavenly power guide us | out of this fearful country’ V. 1. 
114), suggest that the nature of his ‘art’ – the power it contains – is in actuality his 
power over Ariel. This power relies upon his ability to defeat Ariel’s rhetoric by 
exploiting Ariel’s internalisation of use-value. As this dictates their (Prospero and 
Ariel’s) interpersonal relations, Prospero is therefore an image of authority (a ‘Prince 
of power’ I.1. 62), adapting to an age in which traditional discourses of power are 
surrendering influence to commerce. This may be seen in Prospero’s use of props to 
indicate the semantic dialects he wishes to invoke (his cloak, his hat and rapier, and 
his wand, and his books). Prospero moves between hegemonic structures with but a 
scripted costume change. It is Ariel’s role in the play to personify Prospero’s 
influence. In this way, Ariel is, like Puck, a cipher. Unlike Puck, however, Ariel 
gains no emotional return or takes any conspiratorial glee from its actions. Prospero 
orders Ariel to ‘fetch’ his ‘hat, and rapier’ (V. 1. 84) in order to present ‘[a]s I was 
sometime Milan’ (86), and thus influence his encounter with Gonzalo, and 
authenticate his claim that Gonzalo ‘perforce’ ‘must restore’ (133). The rapier is 
used repeatedly within the text as an image of rhetoric, alluding to the relationship 
between the discipline of fencing and the discipline of rhetoric. (Ferdinand describes 
how his past interactions were ‘put […] to the foil’ and Stephano describes a verbal 
‘touché’ as a ‘pass of pate’ III. 1. 46; 244.) For Prospero, the rejection of magic may 
be read as equating to an abandonment of rhetoric. As rhetoric was often viewed as a 
discipline capable of refining the individual Prospero effectively abandons this art in 
favour of a pragmatic use of costume and the customs of tocher (or dowry), which, 
in turn, may be read as representations of the iconographic power of nobility.  
Ariel is the means by which Prospero determines the location of the play’s units of 
action. Just as Prospero guides the location of the characters in time and space, he 
also manipulates their environments as a way to direct their objectives in accordance 
with his own super-objective or final goal. The play’s super-objective is therefore 
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readable as being identical to Prospero’s ends. To the extent that the interactions and 
social conflicts within the play are either instigated or dictated by Ariel, Ariel itself 
becomes the manifestation of Prospero’s hegemony. That is to say, Ariel acts in the 
wilderness of the Isle as something like a substitute for the influence bestowed by 
commerce and a comprehensive infrastructure and the control of natural resources. 
Without these direct economic delineations of location, the characters are at a loss to 
categorise the land of the Isle. (‘Here is everything advantageous to life’ to Gonzalo, 
which to Antonio is ‘True, save means to live’; The Tempest, II. 1. 50.) The 
characters thus find themselves dependent upon Prospero, who is himself dependent 
upon Ariel’s being dependent on him.  
Ariel, like Caliban, is subjugated by Prospero’s rhetoric. By accepting the 
relationship dynamics that Prospero dictates, Ariel is, in a sense, complicit with these 
rules. Therefore, any difference between the subservient relationship with Prospero 




Part of my argument is, then, that The Tempest is the ultimate play in a series where 
speech ethics are used as a prism through which to analyse social power. This series 
retrospectively interrogates the development of the humanist project of rhetoric. 
Within The Tempest, oratory and rhetoric are represented as among the arsenal of 
tools recruited by individuals seeking to impose their will upon society. This 
portrayal is opposed to the alternative conception which appears to permeate Love 
Labour’s Lost, and which is portrayed sympathetically within A Midsummer Night’s 
                                                          
132 Ariel is the character least infused by the 'colonial' aspects of The Tempest. Kermode (1954) perceives a 
dichotomy within the play indicative of an exploration of art versus nature, a theme explicitly explored within the 
essays of Montaigne. The units of action informing this analysis primarily concern the concept of gardens as 
nature edited (and possibly its sullying as a result). Kermode’s continuation of this diametric reading of art versus 
nature to incorporate the depiction of rhetoric is informed by suggesting a deliberate partnering of the characters 
to reflect this dichotomy: ‘Prospero is, therefore the representative of Art, as Caliban is of Nature... as a man he 
learns to temper his passions, an achievement essential to success in any... activities’. While this dichotomy is 
somewhat forced, even by this reading Ariel has no partner. Ariel remains the embodiment of rhetoric and 
representative of self-reflexive concerns within renaissance culture - and thus rhetoric acts as a prism through 
which to examine the methodology of governance within the text. Thus it is the character of Ariel who 
exemplifies the emergence of a conceptual merging within the European Renaissance, in which rhetoric and 
artifice combine within the concept of the character of the administrator. See Shakespeare, The Tempest, p. xlviii. 
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Dream. Within these earlier plays, rhetoric is portrayed in a manner consistent with 
the popular conception of rhetoric, as an art with esoteric undertones that has an 
internally, and subsequent external, edifying effect. By contrast, The Tempest 
appears to portray rhetoric as the language (and language as the principal tool) of the 
established, supraindividual order, and therefore the voice of the administrator. 
Rhetoric is thus the primary means by which hegemony is enforced; Ariel is the 
means by which it is articulated, and, as such, Ariel is the representative of 
hegemonic agency – its administrator.  
How ‘Something which is given’ gains the power to ‘save the life of the King’133  
In The Merchant of Venice, it is the administrating character of Portia who, disguised 
as Balthazar, bridges the gap between the role of the administrator serving the 
interests of an external power and the administrator protecting the institution of the 
state. Through the ‘character’ of Balthazar, Shakespeare extends the concept of 
speech ethics as an image of civil society to encompass the institutions of state and 
law by portraying them as dependent on civil speech. In all of the four plays 
examined in this chapter, speech represents the internal world of the characters and is 
their primary means to enact their will upon the world. The administrator characters 
within these plays serve to enhance the authority of a central authority figure by 
acting as their agent, enhancing their power and extending the influence of their 
rhetoric. Skinner has successfully traced and demonstrated the formal influence of 
Cicero and Cicerian rhetoric on Shakespeare's dramatization of interpersonal conflict 
and how it's potential for dramatic tension may have influenced Shakespeare's 
incorporation of legal themes. Skinner notes how Shylock and Lucrece's trial may be 
read as a conflict between Shylock's flawed use of consititutio inuridicalis (where 
the act is admitted and the only question is to its justness) which is defeated by 
Balthazar's skilful recasting of the case as one of constitutio legitima or legalis 
(where the dispute ultimately arises from the interpretation of law -- speaking to 
Balthazar's status as an administrator character, as we shall see).
134
 Skinner contends 
that once the concept of 'invention' (as in the invention of an argument) entered the 
intellectual zeitgeist the role of rhetoric as an extension of logic and a means of 
                                                          
133 Portia means ‘something which is given’ in Latin and in German, whilst Balthazar means ‘to save the life of 
the King’. The Pocket Oxford Latin Dictionary ed. by James Morwood (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).  
134
 Quentin Skinner, Forensic Shakespeare, 1st edn (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 54. 
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analysis whose application may reveal truths is abandoned.
135
  Our goals in this 
chapter are to examine how this application of the rhetorical tradition intersects with 
concepts of systematised power and, ultimately, how this intersection influences 
Shakespeare's characterization and the aspects of which later influence subsequent 
and contemporary writers. In The Merchant of Venice, Balthazar represents the 
collective will of a Platonic circle of friends who, via the arts of rhetoric, impose a 
reading of the law upon the state in line with their civil society.  
The state in The Merchant of Venice equates to the interests of the small band of 
central protagonists placed under threat by Shylock’s vengeance. Shakespeare uses 
his characterisation of administrators, in this way, to represent theories of power 
relationships as these exist outside the action on stage (and, by implication, within 
the world of the audience). It is in this sense that Balthazar is the administrator 
character most obviously used to represent a very particular ideological reading of 
justice and contract law. Despite Balthazar’s influence, it is, however, ultimately the 
underlying affection of the protagonists, and Shylock’s self-loathing vengeance, 
which drives the dramatic development of the play. Shakespeare’s use of Balthazar 
as a disguise, behind which lies Portia, emphasises the point that it is the group 
dynamics which drive the action. Shakespeare appears to utilise the structure of 
rhetorical techniques and the theme of speech ethics to set political theories within 
the form of the morality play (rather than the comedy of manners). The subplot of 
subjugation and rhetorical definitions may be read, therefore, as analogous to a 
representation of the state as an ‘indispensable’ means for maintaining civil relations 
– in this manner, the state is itself an extension of the rhetoric used within the play.  
The Merchant of Venice acts as a vignette of a conflagration of discourses at the turn 
of the century: the increasing influence of the State as an entity distinct from Church 
and Monarch; the growing importance of commerce; and the last stages of the 
Aristotelian and Platonic theological conflict.
136
 In particular, the play stages those 
crises concerning concepts of worth and of essence that occur with the emergence of 
                                                          
135
 Skinner, Forensic Shakespeare, p. 314. 
136 The Merchant of Venice is widely held to have been first performed between 1597 (the same year nine 
hundred Jews were expelled from Spanish-owned Milanand 1599 and first put on sale in 1600. William 
Shakespeare, The Merchant of Venice, ed. by Leah S. Marcus (London and New York: Norton Critical Edition, 
2006), p. 2. all other quotes from this volume.  
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commerce and mercantile relations of exchange. New concepts of worth associated 
with the commodity – what later classical economics will designate ‘use value’ and 
‘exchange value’ – undermine existing metaphysical concepts of substratum/virtue 
and fulfilled potential. What Peter Miller (1992) calls ‘the vast machine of economic 
calculation that is accounting’137 comes to replace the theological and metaphysical 
value systems. Shylock is a victim of this shift. (As we shall see in the next chapter, 
Goethe's Faust further scrutinises such changes in concepts of worth at the end of the 
eighteenth century.) Within this tumult, there is an implicit call for the need for an 
institutionalisation of the administrative role to become universally acknowledged.  
So far, this chapter has attempted to trace the evolution of the concept of speech 
ethics (and its role within the transference of social engagement to social structures 
which corresponds to the transmutation of essentialist concepts into material 
circumstances) on a conspiratorial level in Love’s Labour’s Lost, on a communal 
level within A Midsummer Night’s Dream, and on a hierarchical level within The 
Tempest. I now move on to consider this as it is depicted at a legal and state level 
within The Merchant of Venice. Just as Contarini (1649) attempted in the mid 
seventeenth century to encapsulate the shifting dynamic between state and individual 
when he wrote to the Doge informing him that ‘the king [Charles I] no longer 
receives the title either of king or Majesty, and is merely called Charles Stuart, so 
that in putting him to death the victim may not be the king, the act being too 
abominable, but the private individual so called’,138 so, at an earlier moment, The 
Merchant of Venice re-examines the relations between state and citizen, depicting a 
society in which material circumstances have begun to supplant essentialist concepts 
within the machinery of the state. Shakespeare dramatises a conception of Venice as 
an unstable society dependent upon the suppression of its citizenry, pre-empting 
Rousseau’s description of the Venetian republic as having broken the social contract. 
                                                          
137 Peter Miller, 'Accounting and Objectivity: The Invention of Calculating Selves and Calculable Spaces', Annals 
of Scholarship, 9.1 (1992), pp. 61-85.  
138 Alvise Contarini, 'Venetian Ambassador at Munster, to the Doge and Senate, Advices from London, the 15th 
December 1648', in The Puritan Revolution: A Documentary History, ed. by Stuart E. Prall (London: Routledge, 
1969), pp. 174-81. 
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Having usurped its royalty, ‘all private citizens recover by right their natural liberty, 
and are forced, but not bound, to obey’.139 
At the same time, The Merchant of Venice provides a particularly significant 
manifestation of the colloquial Elizabethan interpretation of Machiavellianism in the 
1590s. As Raab (1965) notes, ‘At least from the middle ‘eighties [1580s] onwards, 
Machiavelli was being quite widely read in England and was no longer the sole 
preserve of 'Italianate' Englishmen and their personal contracts, as had been the case 
earlier.’140 Raab describes Machiavelli’s influence upon Elizabethan politics as 
cementing impressions ‘that there were patterns in human affairs which had little to 
do with Christian ethics’.141 The Merchant of Venice may be viewed as Shakespeare 
returning to the interplay between human affairs and state ideology with less focus 
upon speech ethics (as a metaphor for social consciousness versus state discourse), 
and more emphasis on how individual behaviour subconsciously manifests ideology. 
If Shylock is, of course, a problematic reminder of the era’s anti-Semitism, this 
enhances a tension here between the ideal society, and the realities of individual and 
collective rule. Shakespeare seems, then, to knowingly invoke a conventional anti-
Semitic association of the Jew with money, venality, and mercantile capitalism. 
The Merchant of Venice functions as a non-Christian morality play, with a similar 
formal structure to a psychomachia, in that it depicts the process by which ideology 
is internalised, manifested and, subsequently, rationalised as independent volition. 
The stage becomes a physically divided representation of bifurcated concepts in 
continual tension. This tension underpins all of the interactions and ideologies which 
exist within the subtext, and are refracted through the play’s dialogue and units of 
action. Paster (1985) describes Shylock as creating ‘a city within a city, a city 
apart’,142 but it is undeniable that the entity of the state exists within the play as a 
                                                          
139 Rousseau, The Social Contract and Discourses, p. 71.  
140 Felix Raab, The English Face of Machiavelli: A Changing Interpretation 1500-1700 (London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1965), pp. 34 - 35. The Merchant of Venice continues many of the themes identified within The Jew 
of Malta by Christopher Marlowe. See David Bevington’s interpretation of the figure of Dr. Roderigo Lopez, the 
Jewish doctor of Queen Elizabeth, in his introduction to William Shakespeare, The Merchant of Venice, ed. by 
David Bevington (New York: Bantam Books, 1988), p. xxvi.  
141 Raab, The English Face of Machiavelli: A Changing Interpretation 1500-1700, p. 256. 
142 Gail Kern Paster, The Idea of the City in the Age of Shakespeare (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1985), 
p. 196. By combining the elements of a port and a city, Venice was attributed the ‘natural’ qualities of both a port 
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continual point of reference. At the beginning of the trial, the Duke states that ‘the 
world thinks, and I think so too [...] | Thou wilt not only loose the forfeiture, | [… 
and] forgive a moiety of the principal’ (The Merchant of Venice, IV. 1) but 
differentiates between ‘the world’ (and its expectations) and the entity of the state, 
which becomes referred to as ‘the law’ in the trial scene. However, the distinction 
between the entity of the state and its law has earlier been exposed as a merely 
semantic distinction, with the statement by Antonio to Solanio, that the ‘duke cannot 
deny the course of law [...] if it be denied, | Will much impeach the justice of the 
state’ (The Merchant of Venice, III. 6). This is highlighted again with ‘let the danger 
light | upon your charter and your city’s freedom’ (The Merchant of Venice, IV. 1). 
Shylock’s use of slavery as an analogy to legally sanctioned moral equivalence 
reveals Shylock’s motivation as one of citizenship. Slaves, in the Venetian state and 
in state law, are possessions - ‘The slaves are ours’ (The Merchant of Venice, IV.1) – 
and therefore non-citizens and non-people. As a Jew, Shylock is fighting to be 
recognised as a citizen.
143
 This is the crux of Shylock’s argument and indicates his 
own rationalisations for his irrational desire to enact the internalised stereotype of the 
vengeful Jew and to see this stereotype accepted – ‘owned’ in a manner of speaking 
– by the state: 
JEW:                   So do I answer you. 
The pound of flesh which I demand of him 
Is dearly bought, as mine, and I will have it. 
If you deny me, fie upon your law! 
There is no force in the decrees of Venice.  
                                                                                                                                                                    
and a city – representing a no-where place (a utopia). Hegel described how ‘the principle of family life is 
dependent on the soil, on land, on terra firma. Similarly, the natural element for industry... is the sea’. For Hegel, 
‘rivers are not natural boundaries of separation ... it is truer to say that they, and the sea likewise, link men 
together’. G. W. F. Hegel, 'Philosophy of Right',  (Kitchener: Batoche Books, 2001) (190). Venice is therefore 
perceived to be the material representation of imperial, ethnic and religious ideals.  
143 In 1586 the last meeting of the delegates from Italy’s Jewish communities attempted to centralize Jewish self-
government but ultimately reflected the localism of the city states. In 1587 the rabbis of Jerusalem appealed to 
the Jews of Italy to finance the restoration of the Nachmanides synagogue in Jerusalem. In 1593 Pope Clement 
VIII ‘expels’ (renders ‘non-citizen’) all the Jews living in all the papal states except Rome. 
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I stand for judgement. Answer! Shall I have it? (The Merchant of Venice, IV. 
1) 
In a comedic tragedy, Shakespeare often contrasted pathos and bathos within the 
same characters and in the same context. By placing itself between farce and 
tragedy, The Merchant of Venice focuses upon norms (as ‘order without law’)144 and, 
by placing these norms against a backdrop of political and social tumult, emphasises 
the influence of ideology upon internal consciousness and the characters’ interplay. 
The bathos of the Belmont scenes superficially contrasts with the pathos of the 
scenes in Venice, and implies that fealty to inherent worth, as distinct from attributed 
or implied worth, is morally superior to the market morality exhibited in Venice. 
This apparent (and false) dichotomy supplies the Belmont scenes with a sense of 
irony, embodied within the person of Portia.  
Portia acts as a proto-‘thing-like’ being – a cultural commodity, governed, in 
Adorno’s words, ‘by the principle of [...] realization as value and not by [her] own 
specific content and harmonious formation’.145 The term ‘commodity’, defined as 
‘something useful or valuable’, has its etymological roots in the 
French commodité (‘benefit, profit’), from the Latin commoditatem (‘fitness, 
adaptation’), derived from ‘commodus’ or ‘convenient’, and, I want to argue, echoes 
Portia’s defining characteristics in this regard.146 Portia appears to act outside of her 
own personal interests in order to ensure that her value is realised throughout the 
play’s units of action. Portia gives Bassanio the ring so that it may act as a continual 
reminder of her value to him (and, so that upon its loss, it may indicate the ‘vantage 
to exclaim on you’). Similarly, Portia describes Bassanio in terms of the commodity: 
‘Since you are dear bought, I will love you dear’ (The Merchant of Venice, III. 2). 
Portia attends the trial and defends Antonio, proclaiming that ‘never shall you 
[Bassino] lie by Portia’s side | With unquiet soul’ (The Merchant of Venice, III. 2), 
yet her personal motivation to engage in the trial lacks some credibility when 
                                                          
144 Robert Ellickson, Order without Law (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991).  
145 Theodor W. Adorno, 'Culture Industry Reconsidered', New German Critique, VI (1975), pp. 12-19. See also 
K. Newman, 'Portia's Ring', Shakespeare Quarterly, 38.1 (1987). R. A. Sharp, 'Gift Exchange and the Economies 
of Spirit in the Merchant of Venice', Modern Philosophy, 83.3 (1986), pp. 20–37. W. Cohen, 'The Merchant of 
Venice', Shakespeare Quarterly, 37.1 (1986), pp. 20-37. See also Simon Critchley and Tom McCarthy, 
'Universal Shylockery: Money and Morality in the Merchant of Venice', Diacritics, 34.1 (2004), pp. 3-17.  
146 Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).  
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compared to the depiction of the internalised stereotype and cyclical abuse 
motivating Shylock. It is fitting that Portia is the agent who informs Antonio that his 
‘argosies | Are richly come to harbour suddenly’ (The Merchant of Venice, V. 1), as 
it is only through her intervention that the fantastical effects of poetic licence 
intervene in 
                    … the course of law,   
For the commodity that strangers have  
With us in Venice, if it be denied,  
Will much impeach the justice of the state  
Since that the trade and profit of the city 
Consisteth of all nations. (The Merchant of Venice, III. 4)  
Portia’s poetic license is dependent upon her successful portrayal as a commodity, 
and, as such, she is able to render a legally binding contract without rendering the 
state impotent, insofar as she functions within the ideological framework 
(represented through the rhetorical structure) of the Venetian state. Portia’s 
characterisation adapts in such a way as to knowingly reflect the audience’s 
preconceptions and predilections, culminating in the scene when she adopts ‘such a 
habit | That they shall think we are accomplished | With that we lack’ (The Merchant 
of Venice, III. 5) – that of a legal doctor. This ostentatious manipulation makes her 
defence of Antonio problematic for the audience. The commodification of Portia, 
and her complicity with it, reveals the extent to which individuals are altered by their 
economic status on a level of consciousness which influences individual morality 
and continues into social discourse.
147
 Portia represents a justification of commerce 
that appeals to the Aristotelian concept of ‘good’, Eudaimonia; she adopts the traits 
of a commodity in an attempt to achieve ‘moral flourishing’ through the fulfilment 
of material needs by rational means.
148
 The theme of value in The Merchant of Venis, 
                                                          
147 This dramatic conflict, between the willing commodification of the self and the priceless 'ideal', is also a 
central feature of Goethe's Faust, as will be seen in the next chapter, and Goethe, too, uses characterisation to 
embody this conflict. 
148 ‘Eudaimonia’ of ‘moral flourishing’ achieved through adopting excellence (arête) in thought. Whereas 
rhetoric alone ‘is a faculty which may be used to promote justice or abused to support villainy’, Aristotle argues 
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although less directly relevant to our purposes, incorporates and interrogates 
contemporary ideas in much the same way as those ideas of the intersection between 
knowledge and power which do concern us in the examination of the administrator 
character. Elements of the play, in particular the actions, treatment and depiction of 
Portia, seem to engage with Aristotle's theory of the Communis aestimatio or 
'common estimation'.   This concept of the common estimation suggests a rational 
for how it is that goods may be involved in reciprocal exchange, and argues that is 
the use to which these goods are put which forms the basis upon which they are 
needed. Portia's transformation into Balthazar is a transformation, Aristotelian terms 
of subjective form, but not of material, cause, or, arguably, purpose. This change 
itself is an instance in which the use to which the persona of Balthazar in the trail 
determines the need for her transformation, not the need for transformation itself. 
The morality within The Merchant of Venice thus reflects a cultural shift towards 
material inceptions of Aristotelian morality, in that the characters' ambitions may be 
described in terms of ‘living well and doing well’ (Eudaimonia). Shylock moves 
from the universal motivation of short-term gratification towards the happiness of 
Plato’s Republic, in which true happiness originates from the ‘arrangement of the 
soul’ that produces justice.149 Despite his Biblical language, this serves to underline 
his motivation for manifesting the internalised inhumanity he felt as a non-citizen. 
Shylock’s apology for usury – that Jacob bred from ewes – is not a citation from 
Jewish tradition. Deuteronomy is cited as an apology for usury and regulates its 
practice, forbidding charging interest from fellow Jews (23:20), but permitting its 
charge upon gentiles (23:21). Shylock’s use of Jacob’s ladder – a symbol of the 
Virgin Mary’s womb, uniting heaven and earth (Genesis 28:10-17) – could be said 
(rather speculatively) to allude implicitly to the Platonic roots of Eastern 
                                                                                                                                                                    
that a level of material comfort is needed to reach this state of fulfilled potential. See Aristotle, The Nicomachean 
Ethics. trans. by L. Brown D. Ross (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980).  
149Aristotle defines this willingness to endure for a higher gratification as being: 'which is in itself worthy of 
pursuit more final than that which is worthy of pursuit for the sake of something else, and that which is never 
desirable for the sake of something else more final than the things that are desirable both in themselves and for 
the sake of that other thing, and therefore we call final without qualification that which is always desirable in 
itself and never for the sake of something else'. Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, p. 10.  




 perhaps this is an attempt to gain status by demonstrating a superior 
knowledge of Christianity. Shylock’s tone is, at any rate, that of the pedagogue 
(‘Mark what Jacob did’, ‘This was a way to thrive’ The Merchant of Venice, I. 3), 
and Antonio is clearly blindsided by the reference (‘And what of him? Did he take 
interest?’ The Merchant of Venice, I. 3). The conflicting interpretation is between 
naturalism (Antonio’s ‘fashioned by the hand of heaven’) and Aristotelian 
materialism (Shylock’s ‘he was blessed; And thrift is blessing’).  
As such, this scene is a conflict of rhetoric, with Antonio employing a straw man 
argument (‘The devil can cite scripture’) and Shylock arguing post hoc ergo propter 
hoc (usury follows thrift) via a bad analogy (comparing the accumulation of money 
with the breeding of sheep). Antonio’s ability to intercept and counteract these 
arguments indicates to the audience a higher status and a more accomplished 
classical education. It is only after this conflict of rhetorical ability that Shylock cites 
his personal grievance as grounds for his choice of forfeit. Shylock’s motivation is 
therefore laid out in the manner of his crafting of the contract: a literal translation of 
The Old Testament, altered by small increments of rhetoric to accommodate his 
revenge for personal slights – achieved via manipulation of the circumstances for the 
loan via the material medium of capital. By acting upon his own internalised 
rhetoric, which marks him as essentially ‘other’, Shylock, motivated by emotion, 
engineers a material outcome from an essentialist principle. Extrapolated, this 
highlights the paradox at the heart of the Catholic state’s ideological justification for 
rule. Hence, the symbolic threat of Shylock becomes a constitutional reality. 
It is the trial that reveals the ideological jeopardy in which the contract places the 
concept of the Venetian state. Shylock’s immediate recourse is to the state – he ‘plies 
the duke at morning and at night, | And doth impeach the freedom of the state | If 
they deny him justice’ (The Merchant of Venice, III. 2). Yet the individuals who 
constitute the state’s elite are presented as far from impartial: 
                       Twenty merchants,  
The duke himself, and the magnificos  
                                                          
150 The Platonic Gnostic conception of logos is evident in the Book of John 1:1: ‘In the beginning was the Word, 
and the Word was with God, and the Word was God.’ See Philip Schaff, History of the Christian Church: 
Apostolic Chrisitanity A.D. 1-100 (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1883).  
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Of greatest port have all persuaded with him,  
But none can drive him from the envious plea  
Of forfeiture, of justice, and his bond. (The Merchant of Venice, III. 2)  
In this description, the paradox of the contract is matched against the paradox of the 
state as having the traits of a separate entity, despite its constituent members being 
themselves entities. Shylock’s desire for contractual completion is ‘envious’ (and 
therefore sinful), yet remains ‘just’ (and therefore righteous). Due to the 
institutionalisation of law, this moral paradox, that an action may be lawful but 
immoral, becomes extrapolated through the state machinery to compel its rulers to 
endorse Shylock’s revenge in the courts, despite having ‘persuaded with him’ as 
private citizens.  
The jeopardy comes with the public nature of the contract and the overt nature of the 
‘moral incontinence’ – Aponoia. The state would be clearly shown to be morally 
incongruent and logically inconstant, insofar as the Platonic concept of justice (as a 
transcendental impetus) conflicts with the Aristotelian concept of law (the 
circumstantially dependent achievement of potential) – a revelation with the 
potential to destabilise the very concept of state and introduce a dangerous precedent 
in which state law would have to bow to contract law in all instances. The individual 
‘contract’ would thereby supersede the role of the state and would have been 
institutionally recognised as doing so. Without the assumed authority of state 
constitution over individual agreement, the state would lose all authority – perceived 
and actual.  
The lack of sympathy for Shylock appears to represent an Aristotelian-like concept 
of injustice, in that a man committing self-harm does not merely commit a grievance 
upon himself but ‘towards the State; for it is the State that punishes him’. The view 
that Shylock deserves sympathy as he is acting out of a sense of injustice is, when 
understood within Aristotle’s paradigm, impossible:  
a man act[s] unjustly in the special sense towards himself; for that would mean 
that the same thing could at once be taken from and given to the same person. 
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Unjust treatment implies at least two persons, one of whom deliberately makes 
an aggression on the rights of the other.
151
  
Therefore Portia’s defence rests ultimately upon an unstated major premise 
concerning the ‘inconceivability’ of the state causing harm to itself. As such, it must 
be Shylock in the wrong, as the state may not ‘act unjustly’ towards itself – the aim 
of the state is to achieve the human good, which entails the design of institutions and 
utilisation of individuals to cultivate Aristotelian, teleological virtues as distinct from 
the protection of the individual. The result of the play’s insistent focus upon the 
interpersonal relationships of civil society – a concept which, by the 1600s, was not 
only established, but was viewed as a palpable force in the fortunes of a state
152
 – is 
that the action of the scene functions as a kind of ‘anamorphosis’, as Slavoj Zizek 
describes it, in which ‘if you look at the thing too directly at the oppressive social 
dimension, you don’t see it. You can see it in an oblique way only if it remains in the 
background’ [sic].153 Shakespeare softens the wider commentary and subversive 
themes within his plays through characterisation, ultimately enhancing their 
anamorphic effect. At the same time, by vocalising their ‘internal’ dialogue, 
Shakespeare depicts the suitors as ‘played’ against Portia’s asides. This serves to 
emphasise the unstated influence of the discourses upon which the state is 
dependent.   
The loan Antonio makes is free from interest until past ‘the appointed day of 
payment forward’ (rather than compiled from the moment the loan is taken) and the 
                                                          
151 Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, p. 100.  
152 ‘[T]here is no question to be made, but that every civil societie is contained and linked together in a certain 
unitie, and by distraction and breach of the unity is again as easily dissolved. For nothing have sooner 
overthrowne the mightie and opulent estate of many great and glorious citties that heretofore have perished then 
homebred discord and civill dissention’. Edmund Mattes, The Commonwealth and Government of Venice 
(London: John Windet for Edmund Mattes 1599). In Horace Howard Furness Memorial (Shakespeare) Library – 
online archive: 
http://dewey.library.upenn.edu/SCETI/PrintedBooksNew/index.cfm?TextID=contarini&PagePosition=1 accessed 
07/04/10 10.09 am. 
153 Slavoj Zizek, 'Zizek on the Film Children of Men',  (2010) <http://agitateur.wordpress.com/2010/03/09/zizek-
sur-le-film-%C2%AB-children-of-men-%C2%BB/>. The Merchant of Venice is therefore a play orientated 
around civil society rather than the family or the state, which Hegel described as burgerliche Gesellschaft, as 
being the arena in which the norms of society are created, and – in this instance and cited as such by Hegel - ‘by 
reason of the very horror of the law, it never had to be enforced’. See Hegel, 'Philosophy of Right',   (26).  
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‘interest’ is a penalty of Biblical dimensions: a pound of flesh. The pound of flesh, 
‘to be cut off and taken | In what part of your body pleaseth me’ (The Merchant of 
Venice, I. 3. 150), represents an implicit threat not only to Antonio’s life (the threat 
of fatal amputation or disembowelment: the punishment of a traitor), but to his 
ancestry (the threat of castration preventing heirs) and also to his Christian soul (the 
implicit threat of circumcision, given the bawdy tone of the play, would be in the 
minds of an Elizabethan audience and, to a presumably Catholic Antonio, would 
prevent resurrection upon judgment day). This pound of ‘fair flesh’ is, therefore, 
deliberately open to a paranoiac, anti-Semitic interpretation. The influence of the 
unstated force of commerce, and the failure of the discourses of the seventeenth 
century to address these, accounts for the ‘absence’ Moody sees as the play’s 
primary theme,
154
 whilst also accounting for Brown’s interpretation that the play 
focuses upon paradoxes of human experience.
155
 
The Merchant of Venice acknowledges the need for a new discourse to describe the 
relations between individual, society, and the organic word. It is not insignificant, 
then, that Donne (1626), for example, uses a similar narrative to The Merchant of 
Venice to illustrate the theory of impertinence as a phenomenon unaccounted for in 
the widely accepted concepts of destiny (‘to speak to a natural man’) and God (‘to 
speak to a Christian’): 
[A] merchant condensed, kneaded and packed up in a great estate, becomes a 
lord; and a merchant rarefied, blown up by a perfidious factor or by a riotous 
son, evaporates into air, into nothing and is not seen.
156
 
                                                          
154 Moody argues that the Merchant of Venice ‘is about the manner in which Christians succeed in the world by 
not practising their ideals of love and mercy; that it is about their exploitation of an assumed unworldliness to 
gain the worldly advantage over Shylock; and that, finally, it is about the essential likeness of Shylock and his 
judges... the play does not celebrate the Christian virtues so much as expose their absence’. A. D. Moody, 
'Shakespeare: The Merchant of Venice', Studies in English Literature 21 (1964), pp. 38-44.  
155 According to John Russell Brown The Merchant of Venice is ‘about conundrums such as the more you give, 
the more you get’ and that ‘giving is the most important part – giving prodigally, without though for the taking’. 
.John Russell Brown, 'Introduction', in The Merchant of Venice, ed. by John Russell Brown (London: Arden, 
1955).  
156 John Donne, 'A Sermon Preached at the Funerals of Sir William ', in Shakespeare's England, ed. by R. E. 
Pritchard (London: Thamesis, 1999) (p. 114).  
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Seventeenth-century conceptions of economics were limited in their ability to 
recognise the full potential of capital to influence social relations and consciousness 
by virtue of the existing Catholic paradigm, although these conceptualisations were 
changing, not least due to the emerging Puritan work ethic, as later famously 
described by Weber.
157
 In accountancy, which arose from St Cassian’s doctrine of 
confession,
158
 wealth was perceived as an extension of an individual’s physical 
actions, themselves a manifestation of their moral state:  
Also it is said that the head of the merchant has a hundred eyes, and still they 
are not sufficient for all he has to say or to do. These things are told by 
people who have had experience in them, such as the Venetians [...] So in the 
divine functions of the Holy Church they sing that God promised the crown 
to the watchful ones ... so that the daily care about your business would not 
seem heavy to you, especially the writing down everything and putting down 




It is worth noting, in this context, that, prior to the modern discipline of economics, 
value was not considered elastic as such - value was envisioned more in terms of a 
measure of jeopardy in accruement, or as a manifestation of inherent worth reaching 
full potential. Wealth was a quality to be attributed to an individual achieved by dint 
of his attributes, as with Brenton’s description of a Merchant as ‘the exercise of the 
exchange, the honour of credit, the observation of time and the understanding of 
                                                          
157 Weber argues that the values of the Reformation, while not the result of economic changes, concur with those 
of Capitalism, and that the Puritan outlook favoured (rather than encouraged) the bourgeois life – for more, see In 
a manner similar to how Aristotle argued that a level of material and socially privilege was probably a perquisite 
of Eudaimonia. This period saw the rise of what has retrospectively been termed mercantilism, an economic 
system based on the theory that the earth contained fixed quantities of gold and silver. Between 1521 and 1660, 
the Spanish imported 18,000 tons of silver from Mexico and Peru - three times the supply of silver in Europe 
before 1520. This movement facilitated the spread of commerce by allowing a common unit of exchange (rare 
mettle) to become internationally ubiquitous (albeit at a slower rate across the rest of Spain due the lack of a 
sophisticated banking system). Shylock’s equation of gold with a pound of flesh may be a direct assault upon 
mercantile value systems, and through it, a direct assault upon the Protestant Ethic as described by Weber.  
158 The doctrine of Semipelagimism attempted to find a middle way between the will power focused doctrine of 
Pelagianism and Augustine of Hippos’ emphasis on original sin and the need for Devine intervention. From 
James Alfred Aho, Confession and Book Keeping (Albany: State University of New York, 2005).  
159 Lucas Pacioli’s Treatise, 1494, trans. John Bart Geijsbeek, University of Toronto archive 1872 accessed 
online 09/04/2010 http://www.archive.org/details/ancientdoubleent00geijuoft.  
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thrift. His study is number, his care his accounts, his comfort his conscience, and his 
wealth his good name ... In sum, he is the pillar of a city, the enricher of a country, 
the furnisher of a court’. This confusion between capital as wealth and capital as 
inherent worth is present within Bassanio’s own sense of self-worth, stating that ‘all 
the wealth I had/Ran in my veins – I was a gentlemen’ (The Merchant of Venice 3.ii). 
These desperate concepts of value reveal Merchant of Venice as a microcosm of the 
confusions and contentions surrounding differing paradigms and discourses of value 
at the turn of the century. Shylock is portrayed as not conforming to this practice – 
he himself handles his accounts ‘by the near guess of my memory’ which stands in 
direct contrast to the proposed method of the real merchant Lucas Pacioli in the late 
fifteenth century: ‘Fourteenth Item: I have so many debtors (debitori) ... giving the 
names of each one...’160 
Shylock exposes himself financially by taking on a debt to ‘Tubal, a wealthy Hebrew 
of my tribe’ (The Merchant of Venice, I. 3). Shylock’s free distribution of debt, 
credit, and money stands in stark contrast to his prior reticence to lend to Antonio, 
suggesting that Shylock conspired to attain a level of unwholesome leverage by 
feigning thrift, and also implies – in the absence of the act of accounting – that 
Shylock’s usury is immoral in its apparent profligacy, as the act of exacting financial 
accounting serves, itself, as an act of religious meditation. For Pacioli, for example, 
the account of one’s wealth was also an account of one’s actions:  
But above all, remember God and your neighbour; never forget to attend to 
religious meditation every morning, for through this you will never lose your 
way, and by being charitable, you will not lose your riches.
161
 
Of course, Shylock, as a Jew, is an affront to the Christian doctrine. The existence of 
Judaism makes absolutist concepts of Christianity problematic, as Judaism outdates 
Christianity and does not acknowledge Jesus as the Messiah. In turn, this inherent 
insecurity may provide a basis for understanding how it was that Aristotelian 
ontology, under the stewardship of Thomas Aquinas, became so important to 
Christian doctrine, as it provided a rational for the doctrine of the trinity, rendering 
                                                          
160 See N. Breton, The Good and the Badde (1616), in R. E. Prichard, Shakespeare's England (Sutton: Sutton 
Publishing, 2003), p. 248. 
161 Shakespeare, The Merchant of Venice.1.iii 
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Catholicism independent from Jewish tradition. Trinitarian theory and Christian 
revelation translated Aristotelian concepts into the theory of grace and 
transubstantiation: ‘essence’ (‘what it was to be a thing’) and ‘nature’ (‘Platonic 
universal’) as ‘substance’ (‘the genus to which a substance belongs’), and ‘accident’ 
(‘the substratum or matter which unites all its properties). Moreover, Judaism itself 
provides an alternative narrative to that of Christian salvation through Jesus, which is 
perhaps implicitly at stake in the ways in which Balthazar and Shylock each argue 
for a different ‘narrative’ to the reading of the contract. If there is, then, a subtle 
semantic antagonism between Portia and Shylock here, this is perhaps indicated by 
her adoption of the name of a Magi, Balthazar. (This name is accepted by the 
Western church in the eighth century, but not by the iconoclast eastern churches.) 
The adoption of the name Balthazar by the character responsible for defeating 
Shylock’s contract contrasts directly with Shylock’s citation of Jacob for his apology 
for usury. All of these symbolic and personal aspects to the character of Shylock 
serve to isolate him within the play and within the allegorical structure of the play. 
Shylock becomes the quintessential autonomous agent within the play, to the extent 
that even his Jewish heritage is ultimately denied to him. Within the schema of this 
thesis, Shylock may thus be read as the ‘anti-administrator’ who uses rhetoric for his 
own ends, representing the death of civil conversation, and existing within the text as 
a representative of his own motives. Balthazar is his diametric opposite in every 
sense, and it is this sense of absolute autonomy which appears to lie at the heart of 
the sympathetic undertones which might be felt towards the character of Shylock 
despite his disproportionate desire for recompense. Just as the administrator 
character’s antithesis has an undercurrent of sympathy within his representation, 
within each of the plays examined within this chapter, the administrator character 
has an equally provocative undercurrent of domination and schadenfreude which 
appears to lie at the root of some of the future administrator character’s darker 
representations.  
The reference to Catholic imagery associates Shylock’s contract with the beliefs of 
Eastern and Judaic iconoclasts (characterised by literal interpretation). This effect is 
supported by the use of Catholic ideology to champion its literal interpretation. 
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During Elizabeth’s Protestant reign, this would suggest the investiture controversy162 
and would represent the triumph of the secular court over theocracy – both Jewish 
Old Testament law and, by association, as suggested by the reoccurring emphasis 
upon currency, possibly invoking within his Protestant audience  fears of Catholic 
financial domination and money hoarding, creating what Danson argues is a 
dialectical multiplicity of socio-economic relationships.
163
 (It is worth noting that, in 
January 1594, Venice became the centre of conflicts of jurisdiction between the 
Papacy and the Venetian state which continued well into the mid 1600s.)
164
 The 
bond, therefore, casts the fight for the ‘Christian’ (not ‘Catholic’) Antonio as a 
metaphor for the English struggle to remain Protestant against the combined forces 
of Catholicism and the (supposed) internal threat of Judaism. This need for state 
representatives with management or administrative responsibilities – a secular 
priesthood and defensive agents against the threatening ideologies – is highlighted 
and answered in Portia’s intervention: 
There is no power in Venice 
Can alter a decree established. 
‘Twill be recorded for a precedent, 
And many an error by the same example 
Will rush into the state. It cannot be. (The Merchant of Venice, IV. 1)  
Portia’s disguise is, in this sense, an extension of the negative concepts of rhetoric. 
Portia’s self-appointment of herself as a legal expert that may sway the Court, and 
the Duke's decision to appoint Belario, represents a re-enactment and inversion of 
the investiture controversy in the secular realm. The dependence upon Belario (‘good 
                                                          
162 The investiture controversy arose from the reclamation by the Catholic Church of the power of investiture of 
Church Offices and subsequent reclaiming this power from the state and the nepotism of the nobility. 
163Lawrence Danson, The Harmonies of the Merchant of Venice (New Haven: Yale Univerity Press, 1979).  
164 Don Cesare of Este, upon threat of ex-communication, ceded Ferrara and all the territory of the Duchy to the 
Pope. In 1600 the Pope demanded authority over Ceneda – a town south-east of Belluno (‘good-one’, with 
semantic qualities too close to Belmont, or ‘good-mountain’ to go unnoticed). By 1598 the Edict of Nantes lead 
to increased pressure for Catholic governments to submit to papal control. Cit: John Norwich, A History of 
Venice, Penguin Books, 1983, p. 506-517. ‘The King’s Men’ also performed Barnabe Barnes’ 1606 play The 
Devil’s Charter (in which Pope Alexander VI sells his soul) at the Globe Theatre. SeeJohn D. Cox, 'Stage 
Devilry in Two King's Men Plays of 1606', The Modern Language review, 93.4 (1998), pp. 937-47.  
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voice’ in French) is a reference to the potential role of rhetoric within the law, and 
constitutes a reminder of the state’s dependence upon ideology conveyed through 
‘argument’ to secure its authority. It is the reductio ad absurdum of Portia’s 
argument (‘the bond doth give thee here no jot of blood’ The Merchant of Venice, 
IV. 1)
165
 which allows for Antonio’s release and Shylock’s punishment. Portia’s 
argument relies upon the paradoxical premise that one may break the law during its 
inaction and the assumption that Shylock orchestrated the contract expressly to 
murder Antonio. This is the same logic Shylock uses to emphasise the absurdity of 
racial prejudice when he emphasises the arbitrary and reductionist quality of ethnic 
difference - ‘I am a Jew. Hath not a Jew eyes? Hath not a Jew hands, organs, 
dimensions, senses, affections, passions?’ (The Merchant of Venice, III. 1) - in direct 
response to Salerio’s statement of essential difference: ‘there is more difference 
between thy flesh [Shylock] and hers [Jessica] | than between jet and ivory’ (The 
Merchant of Venice, III. 1). Despite Shylock’s assertion that ‘there is no power in the 
tongue of man | To alter me’ (The Merchant of Venice IV. 1), it is the formulaic 
rhetorical trick of the machinery of the state – ideology delivered and embodied 
within the administrative character, achieved by Portia’s intervention – which adds 
authenticity to the jeopardy that Shylock purportedly represents to the legal stability 
of Venice. It is this argument which prevents Shylock from assuming the status of 
the ‘excluded middle’ (tertium non datur) between that which is the case (Semitic, 
owed usury, outcast) and not the case (Christian, credited, substantive, citizen).  
Portia’s intervention is propagandist – portraying the state as the manifestation of, 
and acting in defence of, rational justice rather than arbitrary, irrational law. Daniel 
Banes’ schematic interpretation of the trial, in his 1975 book The Provocative 
Merchant of Venice, in which Portia is ‘in an intermediate position’ within the 
Sephirotic Tree of Kabbalah, while in itself spurious, does indicate something of the 
extent to which the role of the institutional intermediary (be that within supernatural 
or secular hierarchies) was understood at the time.
166
 Portia is an apologist for the 
                                                          
165 This is also effectively a ‘continuum fallacy’, in that despite the spilling of blood being a indisputable 
consequence of the cutting of a pound of flesh, that it is not explicitly stated implies that the flesh must be taken 
without blood being spilt. 
166 Portia, in this reading, represents of ‘Tiphereth BEAUTY or MERCY’ mediating between Shylock’s ‘Sphira 
Gevura or Din, JUDGEMENT SEVERITY’ and Antonio’s ‘Hesed, LOVING KINDNESS’. See Daniel Banes, 
The Provactive Merchant of Venice (Chicago: Malcome House Publications, 1975). Banes’ interpretation of the 
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state in both narrative and ideology.
167
 Hence, Balthazar is never an unproblematic 
character or an outright hero but is, rather, an example of utility manifested. This is a 
character trait shared by all of Shakespeare’s administrators, but in Balthazar it is 
flaunted, and, behind the disguise, there is a sense of Portia’s revelling in the power, 
something that possibly has its roots in Portia’s behaviour towards the suitors. As 
such, Balthazar is coloured by the motivations of the higher powers the disguise 
represents, and these powers are cast as morally ambiguous through their depiction. 
Despite many provocative presentations of anti-Semitism, the questions raised by 
conflicts between value and state intervention in The Merchant of Venice remain 
unresolved. This lack of a clear resolution prevents the play from becoming an 
instrumental reduction of interpersonal interaction.
168
 Instead, the conflicts that run 
through The Merchant of Venice represent an apology for the entity of ‘the state’, 
and a call for an institutional, secular agency acting on its behalf as an alternative to 
prejudice or individualism. This represents a precursor to an ideology of what 
Charles Taylor calls the ‘disengaged self’, where the ideal of independence 
acknowledges the vision of instrumental control over an objectified world and 
objectified self.
169
 The emergence of this ‘disengaged self’ reflects a new cultural 
emphasis upon autonomy in which hegemony provides a means to subordinate the 
natural order (the ‘functional domain’), creating a sense of self-worth dependent 
upon the subject’s status as a rational, autonomous, empowered being. Shylock is 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Sephirotic Tree contains many dubious interpretations and translations, but was founded upon the immediate 
interpretations of The Merchant of Venice by the elitist ‘School of the Night’. See M. Bradbrook, The School of 
Night (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1936).   
167 The English Poor law of 1601 legislated for the distribution of grain supplies in times of dearth establishing 
poor rates on a parochial basis, the compulsory apprenticeship of poor children, and houses of correction, with 
attempts to find work for the deserving poor. Laws such as these stood in direct contrast to the assumption that 
certain sections of society were effectively commodities of the state – recourses to be exploited, as with Pope 
Clement VIII’s expulsion of the Jews living in all the papal states except for Rome, Avignon and Ancona in 
1593.  
168 Were the play’s conclusion to serve as more of a resolution, The Merchant of Venice might implicitly endorse 
the state; that is, were the play to suggest a ‘restoration of the human world and of human relationship to man 
himself’, which prevents the ‘the real, individual man’ from absorbing ‘into himself the abstract citizen’. For an 
argument concerning the ideological pretentions of the state, which has some relevance here, see Karl Marx, ‘On 
the Jewish Question’, in The Marx and Engels Reader, ed. by R. C. Tucker, 2nd edn (New York: Norton, 1978), 
p. 15.  
169For more on reason and the natural order, see C. Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern 
Identity (Cambridge and London Harvard University Press, 1989), pp. 121, 43 and 49.  
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therefore a man re-defined from ‘Platonic’ essential qualities to ‘Aristotelian’ (use-
manifestation) concepts of essence (effectively one of internalised circumstances) as 
‘other’: Shylock, that is to say, is a martyr crushed by the Thomist elements of state 
doctrine. By dramatising these intra-doctrinal conflicts, Shakespeare makes them 
relevant to a common audience. It is the apparent need for administrative 
intervention that unifies the play’s disparate elements.170 
Administrators as a caste (and rhetoric as a discipline) deployed in the same manner 
as the characterisation of a soldier, may be used to examine conflict, and are 
consistently employed in Shakespeare’s plays to indicate higher philosophical 
debates concerning ultimate meaning and systems of implementation and 
representation. While this study of the role of the administrator incorporates the 
tension between Platonic and Aristotelian conceptions of value, there is a stronger 
potential reading of the seemingly incongruent Act V, Scene 1 (‘The Moon Shines 
bright...’) which as an examination of value owes more to Mercantilist conceptions 
of inherent worth. The cosmological subject of the aria may reference the Scholastic 
San Bernardion’s On Contracts and Usury (1431), which describes how the heavens 
will ‘cast down’ usurers.171 (More speculatively, the name of Antonio, then, perhaps 
                                                          
170 Interestingly, this thematic concern may also be seen in the (much later) writings of Hegel (1789 - 1802): 
‘Another question extraneous to the concept of the state is which particular power is responsible for legislation, 
and what relative share the various estates or citizens in general have in this process. Likewise irrelevant is the 
character of the courts of law — whether, in the various instances of the administration of justice, the members 
inherit their office, are appointed to it by the supreme authority, or are freely entrusted with it by the citizenry or 
nominated by the courts themselves. It is also immaterial what the scope of a specific court’s jurisdiction is, 
whether this has been determined by chance, whether there is a common supreme court for the entire state, etc.’ 
G.G. W. F. Hegel, 'The German Constitution', in Political Writings, trans. by H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999). Page number? Shakespeare was clearly tempted (or at least reflects the 
temptation) to depict society via broad distinctions – itself a methodology which implies essential differences. 
Shakespeare uses the intermediary characters within these plays (Holofernes and Nathaniel, Puck, Ariel, 
Balthazar), and specifically the language of these characters, to imply strong social divisions without essential 
difference, as the intermediary characters interact liberally.  
171 ‘Accordingly, all the saints and all the angels of paradise cry then against him [the usurer], saying "To hell, to 
hell, to hell." Also the heavens with their stars cry out, saying, "To the fire, to the fire, to the fire." The planets 
also clamor, "To the depths, to the depths, to the depths." Bernodino, De Contractibus, sermon 45, 3:3, for more 
see Rothbard and Miskimin, The Economy of Later Renaissance Europe: 1460-1600. Also see Raymond de 
Roover, San Bernardion of Siena and Saint Antonio of Florence, the Two Great Thinkers of the Middle Ages 
(Boston: Baker Liberty, 1967)., ; and Alegandro Chafuen, Christians for Freedom: Late Scholastic Economics 
(San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1986).  
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becomes retrospectively significant as a reference to the 1446 Archbishop of 
Florence Antonius (known as ‘little Anthony’, or ‘Antonio’), who extrapolated 
Bernardion’s arguments to justify intervention in mercantile affairs, condemning 
monopoly practices – practices populist anti-Semitism equated with Judaism and 
usury.
172
) The scene acts as a justification for Balthazar’s intervention through 
allegory, and Balthazar represents the means by which natural order is re-introduced 
into the human praxis of trade, relationships, and religious practice.  
The aforementioned three plays explore the function of rhetoric within society at a 
point where the concept of rhetoric moves beyond issues of speech ethics, 
incorporating a greater awareness of the impact that cultural forces have upon 
relationships and consciousness. Shakespeare’s depiction of the role played by 
language, whether in law or politics, is both consistent with the approach to rhetoric 
as one of the ‘seven liberal arts’,173 and consistent with Baconian distrust.174 Within 
the play, language is intertwined with social duty and with concepts of absolute 
knowledge. The use of rhetoric and the portrayal of the administrator are symbiotic, 
integral parts of this project. Taking the rhetorical tropes characteristic of More’s 
Utopia and Machiavelli’s The Prince as a point of departure, The Merchant of 
Venice contains a dynamic between the two ‘styles’ of rhetoric, in which Balthazar, 
as the administrator, represents the triumph of rhetoric as a tool for good, by 
representing this manner of rhetoric as the external influence which (via Balthazar) 
                                                                                                                                                                    
 Antonius’ translation of Suma Theology published ‘the parts of prudence, if we take them properly, are the 
prudence whereby a man rules himself, and the prudence whereby a man governs a multitude... the multitude 
which is united together for some particular purpose; thus an army is gathered together to fight, and the prudence 
that governs this is called "military." ... such again is the multitude of a city or kingdom, the ruling principle of 
which is "regnative prudence" in the ruler, and "political prudence," simply so called, in the subjects.’ Thomas 
Aquinas, Summa Theologica, 2nd Edn (London: Burns Oates & Washbourne Ltd., 1920). Antonius has been 
referred to as the last of the Scholastics due to his approach to such supposedly humanistic concerns, as 
mercantilism, the family and commerce.  
172 Richard Goldthwaite, The Building of Renaissance Florence: An Economic and Social History (Baltimore: 
John Hopkins University Press, 1982).  
173 ‘Mediaeval education was built on the foundation of the ' Seven liberal arts'; grammar, dialectic (logic), 
and rhetoric’ were the idealised foundations for the education of free citizens. Depicted by Martainus Capella as 
being the seven bridesmaids to the marriage of Mercury and Philologia were Grammar, 
Logic, Rhetoric, Geometry, Arithmetic, Astronomy, and Music’. R. H. Robins, A Short History of Linguistics 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1967), p. 135.  
174 For more on the shift in perceptions regarding Rhetoric - from exploration into truth through meaning to art of 
deception – see Catherine Mills, 'Aspects of Distrust of Rhetoric', University of Birmingham, 1980).  
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triumphs. That is to say, Shakespeare uses the characterisation of the administrator as 
a space within which to examine the role of governance and its implementation.  
Within The Merchant of Venice, Shylock is the means by which the rhetoric of the 
civic entity and the rhetoric servicing the individual interact. The administrator 
indicates the influence of forces beyond the drama primarily, at this stage of the 
administrator character’s development, through rhetoric. In this regard, the 
administrator character in Renaissance literature and drama is arguably a more fully 
rounded character than is often the case in later variants (the various figures in 
Kafka’s stories, for example), to the extent that the administrator character may be 
viewed as a fully individuated character in his or her own right. This is particularly 
the case with Portia, who becomes the administrator character as an alter ego, in the 
form of Balthazar, through which the true nature of the powers influencing the play – 
the powers of civil society rather than that of Shylock’s revenge and a Hobbesian 
state of nature – are revealed, and the balance of civil society and the idealised 
natural order of peace and courtly love re-asserted. Shylock’s rhetoric acts to further 
his own goals, a fact which is raised as his character’s primary motivation. That 
Portia is arguing to save the friend of her love indicates the converse: she is arguing 
for civil society, again invoking Aristotelian and Thomist ideals of a natural law 
which supersedes laws of custom and contract. Thus, within their area of rhetorical 
exchange, Portia as Balthazar represents a legitimate rhetoric of reification, and 
Shylock represents rhetoric as the means to one’s own base gratification. This 
manifestation of administration may be traced from the language adopted by courtly 
hand books, to the pedant, to debates concerning artifice and nature, to the rhetoric 
of power and the influence of language upon commerce and global trade. This 
manifestation culminates with The Merchant of Venice’s examination of the 
application and continuation of power by a ruler, and asks whether this is to be 
considered an issue for rhetoric or ethics.  
Just as Shakespeare greatly influenced subsequent theatrical traditions, these 
depictions also fed into popular conceptions of institutions of governance.
175
 
Inventing a new means for depicting power as a means to construct this paradox, 
                                                          
175 See below in relation to The Brothers Karamazov, in which the Scottish enlightenment’s interest in 
institutions (influenced by the manner of their depiction in Shakespeare), influenced the conception of contingent 
entities and institutions depicted in the works of Dostoevsky.  
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Shakespeare thus empowers the text by permeating it with the ‘contradictions [that] 
are the very means by which power achieves its aims’ and, as with the Duke in A 
Midsummer Night’s Dream, and the Judge in The Merchant of Venice, thus 
‘theorises the process of inversion whereby art and politics end up in this mutually 
authorising relationship’.176 This chapter has attempted to demonstrate how 
Shakespeare’s use of the administrator character was, in this way, a key component 
in the underlying conceptual framework of his texts, whilst simultaneously providing 
a dramatic device to drive the plot. As such, I argue that Shakespeare’s 
administrators were as influential on later authors in this regard as were other aspects 
of his texts. Administrator characters are used by Shakespeare to embody beliefs 
about the forces influencing the world, and these representations are as varied as the 
content of his plays. Even pageantry and tradition are incorporated via fully rounded 
characters. Shakespeare both created new methods of using characters within an 
administrative role, and perfected earlier literary methods of characterising these 
conceptualisations of wider influences. Later authors continued to incorporate this 
valuable character into their texts, adapting them to better represent theories and 
imaginings of the powers influencing the world outside the text’s parameters. In the 
following chapters, this thesis will attempt to demonstrate how the administrator 
character comes, thereby, to persist as a constant and invaluable figure in later 
literary works.  
 
                                                          
176 Leondard Tennerhouse, 'Strategies of State and Political Plays', in Political Shakespeare, ed. by Alan Sinfield 
Johnathan Dollimore (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005), p. 112. 
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'You will be like God knowing good and evil': Mephistopheles and the changing 
ideals of progress 
 
Just as organisations are compelled to adapt to technical advance, changes in social 
attitudes and political systems, so, too, many historically-minded critics and 
theorists, from Lukacs to Moretti, have argued, art responds by developing new 
forms, such as the novel. These forms appear as, in some sense, innovations, often 
developed to express in new ways the effect of such changes in wider society on the 
individuated human experience. Such instances in which art appears to reflect 
broader historical changes include those at the turn of the eighteenth to nineteenth 
century, which allowed shared experiences to span previously impermeable 
boundaries (such as those of geography, ethnicity, religion and class) — changes 
referred to in the broadest sense as 'modernity'.  
The notion that art, in this way, reflects (and reflects upon) historical change is 
central to the concept of an ‘administrator character’, as — so this thesis suggests — 
in many texts, it is through this character that the bulk of social changes which 
concern the relationship between the individual and collective institutions are 
represented. Indeed, there are direct comparisons which may be drawn between, for 
example, Shakespeare's use of characterisation to explore sixteenth-century 
conceptions of the role of governance and implementation, and the emergence of the 
commodity form in opposition to the sanctity of ideals, and Goethe's use of 
characterisation to explore some similar themes in Faust. However, while 
thematically and in manner of portrayal, Goethe's administrator characters are 
comparable with those of the renaissance ‘humanist’ representations examined in 
earlier chapters, Faust is, of course, not a direct chronological continuation of 
renaissance humanism. Instead, the treatment of renaissance humanism is, in Faust’s 
first half, romanticised, while, in its second half, these differences are developed to 
great effect to introduce and explore emerging forms of social and political 
modernity. One of the key means by which this is done is, I argue, through Goethe’s 
characterisation of administration. 
  90 
 
In what follows, reading the character of Mephistopheles in Goethe’s Faust as an 
administrator character suggests, in fact, that there is a distinctive quality to Goethe’s 
use of this mode of characterisation which reflects wider and more diffuse changes 
taking place in art during this period. More interestingly, the means by which 
Mephistopheles, as the primary means by which the character of Faust is able to 
embark upon his quest of ‘endless striving’, appears to facilitate this quest is 
depicted through a number of innovative literary techniques. By using the text’s 
principal administrator character, Mephistopheles, as a prism through which to view 
the text, I argue that Faust presents a web of impressions of a transitional period in 
which Goethe is one of many authors who began to question the monopoly that a 
romantic conception of classical and Renaissance ideas had over their respective 
cultures, and attempted to capture this sense of change aesthetically by clothing it in 
the symbolism of the past in order to express new hopes for the future.  
Goethe’s thematic incorporation of historical intellectual movements is evident 
within his depiction of character, and in particular, the character of Mephistopheles. 
As such, Mephistopheles incorporates a particular impression of collective 
experiences in Europe (Germany in particular) as it entered the nineteenth century. 
Part One, written in the first decades of the nineteenth century, and published in 
1808, serves as a retrospective romantic portrayal of Renaissance culture and the 
continued influence of theology. Part Two, written towards the end of Goethe’s life, 
anticipates the effects of industrialisation, and offers an idealised aesthetic which 
embraces these changes. Just as Chesterton argued that Chaucer’s literature 
contained the author’s critique of his own era’s historical perspective, in which ‘life 
was conceived as a Dance, and after that time life was conceived as a Race’, I will 
argue that Goethe’s Faust begins with the ‘Renaissance’ and uses plot and character 
exposition to rapidly move towards the elaboration of new, more properly modern 
concepts of eternal striving.
177
 As such, Faust surveys the cultural environment at the 
turn of the century, contextualises this environment within the era’s own idealised 
notions of the past, and then uses the same symbolism to allegorise contemporary 
social changes.
178
 In this chapter, I argue, in particular, that the figure 
                                                          
177 G. K. Chesterton, Chaucer (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1932), pp. 158-9.  
178 The early to mid 1800s saw multiple social changes across the whole of Europe, which may well have had a 
'domino effect' upon each other. In 1803, Napoleon imposes the Convention of Artlenburg; from 1804 –1815, 
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Mephistopheles is used to incorporate a series of impressions of the new 
organisational structures of capitalist or bourgeois modernity and the growing 
influence of certain institutions which developed in symbiosis with industrialisation. 
It is thus Mephistopheles who provides both Faust and the audience with, to use 
Carlyle’s phrase, an ‘impression of worldly-mindedness’, by allowing 
Mephistopheles to become a characterised representation which both incorporates 
and  adapts the mundane processes of the world to fit the artistic demands of the text, 
thereby allowing Faust to represent the aesthetic quest for ‘Inquiry and 
Endeavour’.179  
The earliest known publication of the story of a doctor who sells his soul occurred, 
in English, in 1592 by an unknown author and translator.
180
 The plot of Christopher 
Marlowe’s Doctor Faustus is very similar to this chapbook, known as the Faustbuch 
(although probably known to Goethe as The English Faust Book) and deviates in 
terms of form and structure only in that Marlowe omits or merges minor details 
contained within the individual chapters. Indeed, Marlowe’s version of the story is 
closer to the Faustbuch than Goethe’s is to Marlowe’s. The Faustbuch presents the 
story as an ‘example every Christian may learn [... to] go not astray, but take God 
always before our eyes’.181 Marlowe’s play differs from this source material in the 
artistic interpretation of the implications of Faustus’ dramatic journey. Marlowe’s 
Faustus experiences a developmental character arc, in which he first views himself 
as something of a Prometheus, motivated to attain forbidden knowledge (‘Here tire 
my brains to gain a deity’ line 60).182 Later, Faustus comes to realise he has traded 
his soul for temporary powers and, worse, appears to feel that he has squandered 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Napoleonic Wars are held; in 1806, the Holy Roman Empire is formally dissolved; 1812–1814 witnesses the War 
of the Sixth Coalition, which includes German states; in 1813, the Battle of the Nations occurs at Leipzig and 
Napoleon is defeated; in 1815, the Congress of Vienna and German Confederation is formed; in 1817, 
the Wartburg festival is held; in 1837, there is the Protest of the Göttingen Seven; and from 1848–1849, 
The Revolutions (of 1848) in the German states occur. 
179 ThomasCarlyle, The Carlyle Anthology, ed. by Edward Barrett (New York: Holt, 1881), p. 33. 
180 Anonymous, 'Faustbuch - the History of the Damnable Life and Deserved Death of Doctor John Faustus', in 
Doctor Faustus, ed. by David Scott Kastan (New York: Norton Critical Edition, 1592) (p. 182). 
181 Anonymous, 'Faustbuch - the History of the Damnable Life and Deserved Death of Doctor John Faustus'  (p. 
209). 
182 Christopher Marlowe, Doctor Faustus, ed. by David Scott Kastan (New York: Norton Critical Edition, 2005), 
p. 58. 
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them. Faustus’ inability to acknowledge the difference between his original 
conception of the pact, (‘A sound magician is a demigod’; line 59)183 and the paltry 
actuality of its outcomes until it is too late is predicted in the play’s opening. The 
introductory Chorus explicitly compares Faustus to Icarus, in that his ‘waxen wings 
did mount above his reach’ (line 20).184 Boas reads these ‘inter-textual’, self-
reflexive interpretations of the play as revealing that Marlowe’s intention was to use 
Faustus to embody ‘those qualities of intellectual curiosity, passion for beauty and 
ardour for classical antiquity which were dominant in Marlowe himself’,185 thereby 
exploring the limits of Marlowe’s own beliefs. If it is true that Marlowe took the 
Faustbuch and used it to explore distinctly ‘Renaissance humanist’ concerns, Goethe 
may then equally be read as taking Marlowe’s interpretation of the original 
Chapbook, and building upon Marlowe’s themes to reflect his own interests and 
concerns at the turn of the eighteenth into the nineteenth century.  
Famously, Pushkin described Goethe’s Faust as ‘an Illiad of modern life’, implying 
the play had the potential to historically define ‘modern life’ as completely as The 
Iliad did for the classical world.
186
 Franco Moretti, in his The Modern Epic, reads 
Faust specifically as an epic of modern life in what is, however, a rather stronger 
sense: 
Rather than planning an epic poem and rationally preparing the means of a 
tragedy — a character with a strong epic potential. And so, after decades of 
hesitation, he eventually put together an epic poem. With respect to the 
dominant historiographical models, the relationship between means and ends 
is precisely reversed: the tools, the concrete technical possibilities, are 
everything; the project, the ideology, the poetics — nothing. And this, let it 
                                                          
183 Marlowe, Doctor Faustus, p. 58. 
184 Marlowe, Doctor Faustus, p. 56. 
185 Frederick S. Boas, 'Introduction', in The Tragical History of Doctor Faustus, ed. by Frederick S. Boas 
(London: Methuen and Co., 1932) (p. 211). 
186 Georg Lukacs, Goethe and His Age (London: Merlin Press, 1968), p. 157. Pushkin's own 1828 'A New Scene 
between Faust and Mephistopheles' satirises Faust's relationship with Margaret as sentimental, but this satire was 
written before the completed Part Two. Pushkin's 'Iliad' comparison may be read as a reappraisal of the play 
made after reading it in the context of the growing artistic awareness of socialist-materialist ideas. Pushkin's 
reading appears to incorporate an awareness of how art may be used to 'stereotype' an era, and is, therefore, not 
wholly flattering.     
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be clear, is not a defect. Quite the contrary. Because plans and poetics 
function (perhaps) when inside a stable formal paradigm: in times of 'normal' 
literature, so to speak. But if paradigms are shifting they are a waste of time, 
because change is not planned: it is the fruit of the most irresponsible and 
free — the blindest — rhetorical experimentation.187 
Moretti’s point here is that, to the modern ethos, it is the process (the ‘journey’, as it 
were) which is more important than the goal (the ‘destination’), and that in the 
modern epic, the process is itself the goal. Goethe’s interpretation of his artistic 
endeavour, despite being firmly rooted within the idealised Renaissance revered by 
sentimentalism, became increasingly divergent from the sentimental ideal as his 
literary career advanced. This change had peaked by the time he produced the 
finished Faust, which, when read in its entirety, is a play where the ‘shock of the 
new’ begins to eclipse the desire to pay homage to the past or to tradition. Moretti 
argues, in this vein, that Goethe breaks with Marlowe’s characterisation (and, by 
implication, those of Renaissance literature) by depicting a Faust who ‘wills not to 
will: to share the destiny of his species, rather than intervene in it’, to embody the 
‘experience allotted to the whole of mankind’.188 At the same time, Goethe’s writing 
style began to formulate techniques which would later be employed by authors to 
express what Marx describes as a specifically modern sense of that drowning of ‘the 
heavenly ecstasies of pious fanaticism, of chivalrous enthusiasm, of philistine 
sentimentalism, in the icy water of egotistical calculation’.189 It is in this way, 
Marshall Berman suggests, that the text captured, at an early moment, the sense the 
‘public shares [of] the feeling of living in a revolutionary age [... whilst] [a]t the 
same time, the nineteenth-century modern public can remember what it is like to 
live, materially and spiritually, in worlds that are not modern at all’.190  
Across the two parts of Faust, Goethe increasingly seems to emphasise a sense of 
‘truthfulness’ in art as being able, in line with this, to accurately portray the impact 
of social–material factors upon the individual. Within Goethe’s Faust, the play’s 
                                                          
187Franco Moretti, Modern Epic: The World System from Goethe to Garcia Marquez. trans. by Quentin Hoare 
(London and New York: Verso, 1997), p. 19. 
188 Moretti, Modern Epic: The World System from Goethe to Garcia Marquez, p. 17. 
189 The Marx and Engels Reader, ed. by Tucker, p. 475. 
190 Marshall Berman, All That Is Solid Melts into Air (London and New York: Verso, 1983), p. 17. 
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sense of what is possible and what is 'true' is contextualised within a symbolic 
context. The theatrical conventions of classical theatre, the Romantic trope of the 
spiritual quest, the language of the Renaissance, and the imagery of contemporary 
protestant theology, are all employed to express the aesthetic and social impacts of 
the era’s material changes. The play’s central conceit of the pact allows these themes 
to be covered without a sense of obligation to provide clear answers, allowing 
Faust’s story to remain a useful metaphor for the cost of progress. In particular, in 
abandoning classical (or neo-classical) and Renaissance (or sentimentalist) 
conventions, Goethe is relieved of an obligation to pass a ‘Christian’ judgment upon 
the central character, as well as to pursue those aspects of a morality play which seek 
to provoke action on the part of the audience. Whereas Marlowe’s Faust is 
dismembered, (‘limbs all torn asunder by the hand of death’, line 6),191 Goethe’s 
Faust dies of old age, and at the last moment, his soul is borne from Mephistopheles’ 
grasp by angels (‘They’ve spirited it slyly from my writ’ line 11830)192 and receives 
redemption. Consequently, as Moretti argues, if Marlowe’s Mephistopheles is ‘a 
mere executor, devoid of creativity or autonomy’, Goethe’s Mephistopheles may be 
seen as an artistic innovation in the role of an administrating character.
193
  
In fact, Mephistopheles’ role in Goethe’s text is, first and foremost, to reflect 
tangible manifestations of the era’s newly emerging social orders and structures. For 
example, in ‘Pleasance’ (Scene IV), Mephistopheles provides a source of income for 
the Emperor by spreading the fallacious belief that the kingdom has untapped gold 
reserves, allowing for paper money to be created which ‘circulates like gold of true 
assay’ (line 6083)194 founded entirely upon ‘confidence’ (line 6119).195 Similarly, 
Mephistopheles acts as the conduit of ‘modern’ applications of knowledge and 
progress when, for instance, he fulfils Faust’s desire to shape the land itself, to ‘drain 
                                                          
191 Marlowe, Doctor Faustus, p. 121. 
192  Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Faust. trans. by Walter Ardt, ed. by Cyrus Hamlin, 1st edn (London and New 
York: Norton Critical Edition, 1976), p. 300. All quotes taken from this edition unless otherwise noted. Ardt's 
translation, made at the time of the edition's compilation, holds that the ideas and delivery of Faust are purposely 
entwined and thus reflects this thesis' focuses on precisely regarding the use of characterised delivery. Ardt 
provides extensive interpretive notes for the choices and tenor of his translation, and as such the ideas and their 
delivery are more the focus of analysis than the use of language itself.  
193 Moretti, Modern Epic: The World System from Goethe to Garcia Marquez, p. 17. 
194 Goethe, Faust, p. 153. 
195 Goethe, Faust, p. 154. 
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this stagnant pool of ills [... and] open room to live for millions [...] Lush fallow then 
to man and cattle yields’ (line 11560).196 Having Mephistopheles ‘account’ for the 
insertion of these ‘modern’ forces seems, then, to keep the play’s commentary 
pertinent, whilst allowing Goethe to focus upon the aesthetic and experiential aspects 
of these changes through his central character, Faust himself. 
A closet drama, Faust was published in two parts, Faust, Der Tragödie erster 
Teil and Faust, Der Tragödie zweiter Teil. Prior to this publication, there appeared a 
partial printing in 1790 of Faust, which was, however, only a fragment. The earliest 
forms of the work, known as the Urfaust, were developed between 1772 and 1775; 
however, the details of that development are no longer entirely clear. Goethe 
completed a preliminary version of Part One in 1806, soon after his ‘storm and 
stress’ (Sturm und Drang) period, characterised by the treatment of theatre as a ‘tool’ 
to fortify the individual in the context of civil war. The 1808 publication was 
followed by the revised 1828–1829 edition, which was the last to be edited by 
Goethe himself. Goethe finished writing Faust Part Two in 1832, the year of his 
death, and the text appeared posthumously. In contrast to Faust Part One, the focus 
here is no longer on the soul of Faust, which has been sold to the devil, but rather on 
behavioural phenomena such as psychology, history and politics. The second part 
constituted the principal occupation of Goethe’s last years, by which point Goethe 
had embarked upon his goal of a ‘national literature’, which would speak to and for 
the polycentric nature of the German principalities, and in particular, the changes in 
German culture under the influence of industrial progress
197
 Despite the readings of 
Heine and Mme De Stael, who argued that ‘the German people is itself that learned 
Doctor Faustus’ (who, after Goethe’s death, saw a ‘falling off, a decadence’), and 
Wilhelm Dilthey, who argued that Faust is intended to represent the ‘spirit’ or mind 
of the German nation, the themes of Faust clearly aspire, as they progress, to a 
                                                          
196 Goethe, Faust, p. 254. 
197 Before its unification in 1871, Germany consisted of 294 states or 2303 territories and jurisdictions under the 
overall authority of the Holy Roman Emperor. Unlike France or England, where centralised royal power had 
been gradually established, Germany remained divided into smaller principalities along with many free cities and 
ecclesiastical states with elected prince–bishops. There were even independent monasteries, like that at Fulda. 
Goethe’s attitude towards this polycentrism was celebratory and saw it as a source of cultural strength. This 
cultural diversity would have certainly informed his emphasis upon the relationship with ‘earth’ over ‘state’ – the 
‘eternal feminine’ of Mother Germany. 
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universality beyond the limits of the nation.
198
 Faust is a play whose construction 
spans a tide of revolution throughout Europe and a succession of major technological 
advances. By analysing the role of the principal administrator character within a play 
whose major themes concern progress and empowerment, I aim to demonstrate how, 
as such, one may gain an understanding of the period’s ideas about, and attitudes 
towards, the agents of collective bodies and corporate intermediaries, and how these 
differ from their conceptualisation and representation during the era of Renaissance 
humanism which was considered in the previous two chapters.  
 
'Past and pure nothing are at last the same!' Mephistopheles’ role in ideological 
unshackling  
In Part One, Goethe’s interweaving references to experience, rhetoric, and 
Geisteswissenschaft - a collective term for the subjects of philosophy, theology, law, 
and the classics - represent more than mere ideas within Faust, serving, in fact, to 
represent forces that the characters are portrayed as initially expecting to affect their 
interrelations and the outcomes of their actions. Despite the description of Faust as 
The Lord’s ’servant’ who will be ‘guided’ (‘The gardener knows by the young tree’s 
green haze | That bloom and fruit will grace it down the years’ line 309), it is to the 
Earth Spirit (possibly the ‘primal force’ (line 325) from which Mephistopheles is 
permitted to ‘estrange this spirit’: Faust) that Faust turns to ease his ‘demented quest’ 
(line 302) for absolute knowledge — revealing how, at this stage, Faust is still 
striving to achieve a sense of certainty and to discover unquestionable foundations 
for ideas such as ‘absolute knowledge’, ‘true love’, and ‘truth’. The inherent 
contradiction in Faust’s actions (seen in his turning to a spirit as a source of answers 
rather than redoubling his study of theology, which, were his faith to be true, would 
be the source of all knowledge) already reduces God to one of many potential 
sources of knowledge rather than a point of absolute reference. Mephistopheles’ 
appearance may therefore be seen, initially, as continuing the message of the Earth 
Spirit — as both another source of dubiously authentic knowledge, and as a 
questionable means of realising it through application. This is particularly 
                                                          
198The Romantic School and Other Essays: Heinrich Heine, ed. by Robert C. Holub and Jost Hermand (New 
York: Continuum, 2002), p. 41. 
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interesting, as while Mephistopheles at first appears to strongly parallel the Earth 
Spirit, as the play progresses Mephistopheles, both through the character's use of 
language and how Mephistopheles effects the world, appears to shift away from the 
mystical towards the practical and material, as we shall see.   
The encounter with the Earth Spirit is followed by Mephistopheles’ masquerading as 
a professor, advising a student to favour the affectation of knowledge rather than 
learning for knowledge’s sake:  
‘Words are good things to be debated, | With words are systems 
generated, | In words are systems generated, | In words belief is safely 
vested’ line 1997). 
Mephistopheles’ subversion of education here has an important contextualising 
effect upon the play, by effectively delineating the play's apparent chronological 
setting apart from the thematic core of the play of eternal striving, which is presented 
as current and immediate; and by representing the Renaissance’s debates concerning 
the social purpose of rhetoric, speech ethics, and the humanist project as dated and 
discredited. Meaning is presented in Faust as informed by the past, influenced and 
shaped by natural constraints — yet as also fundamentally undetermined, and 
without teleology. Faust is thereby himself presented as being able to define his own 
priorities, his own ideas and, ultimately, to cut a path towards a revolutionary 
criterion for salvation, in accordance with Kant's broader conception of 
Enlightenment as '...the human being’s emergence from his self-incurred minority. 
Minority is inability to make use of one’s own understanding without direction from 
another. This minority is self-incurred when its cause lies not in lack of 




Faust is described as pursuing ‘philosophy, Jurisprudence, and medicine [...] and [...] 
theology’ (line 353), the four traditional faculties of the medieval university.200 
Later, Faust is described as Doctor of Geisteswissenschaft — a division of faculty in 
German Universities that originated in the nineteenth century and included the same 
                                                          
199 Immanuel Kant, 'An Answer to the Question: What Is Enlightment?', in Immanuel Kant. Practical 
Philosophy, ed. by Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) (p. 1). 
200 Goethe, Faust, p. 10. 
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subjects; yet the term appears to have been contemporary and may, possibly, have 
been incorporated into the play during one of its later re-writes.
201
 The roots of this 
discipline of Geisteswissenschaft lay in German idealism, in particular 
Hegel’s concept of a ‘Volksgeist’: the common ‘spirit’, or perhaps ‘mind’, of a 
people. This was paired with Goethe’s passion for the fortification of a wholly 
German cultural bedrock, as opposed to a polymorphic importation of the northern 
European renaissance. Goethe, in a letter to Schiller (Weimar, 27 June, 1797), 
describes how he ‘may apply our new theory of the epic poem’ to Faust, referring to 
the short essay ‘On Epic and Dramatic Poetry’ which had been written by Goethe 
and Schiller, in which they advocated experiments in a uniquely Germanic mode of 
epic — akin to an adaptation of the Renaissance humanist ideal tailored for the 
Germanic people to serve as a tool for their cultural coming of age, or 
‘Geistesgeschichte’.202 Faust’s character may then be viewed as incorporating both 
an exploration of the human condition per se and an attempt to establish a literary 
mode that would provide a more historically-specific expression of the German 
renaissance zeitgeist — a literary expression, that is, of Geistenswisseschaft, 
employing literature ‘to bring them [the people] forward that others might receive 
the same impression’.203 As such, Faust may well constitute the culmination of 
Goethe’s role in the construction of ‘philosophical poetry’ with which he assisted the 
transition from a Renaissance stance of ‘Humanität’ (intended to act in opposition to 
barbarism, a goal shared by Weimar classicism) towards the more specifically 
Germanic concept of a cultural Bildung or self-cultivation,
204
 intended to facilitate a 
culture which exalted the goal of a harmonious development of individuality. 
Subverting the traditional morality tale of ‘Faust’ still present in Marlowe’s play, 
Goethe transformed it into an allegory illustrating the potential of a new aesthetic 
which, while incorporating the best of medieval ideals, would embrace the modern, 
and present the new lack of moral absolutes as the freedom of self-determination. 
                                                          
201 More frequently used in plural form Geisteswissenschaften.  
202 Johann Wolfgang Von Goethe, Conversations with Eckermann: Being Appreciations and Criticisms (New 
York: M. Walter Dunne, 2005).  
203Goethe, Conversations with Eckermann: Being Appreciations and Criticisms, p. 416. 
204 The ideal of self cultivation represents a conceptual counterpart to northern European Humanism as 
‘Humanitat’, and the terms may be read as conceptually synonymous.  
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In the Doctrine of Colours, Goethe rejected Newtonian and Pythagorean concepts of 
a mathematic science: ‘For merely looking at something cannot get us anywhere. All 
seeing becomes contemplation; all contemplation, musing [ein Sinnen]; all musing, 
combination [ein Verknupfen]; and so it can be said that every attentive look into the 
world involves theorizing’.205 Such an interpretation of apparently objective 
phenomena is entirely in keeping with the problematic representation of knowledge 
in Faust, and the tension between the central characters. Faust cannot trust 
Mephistopheles due to Mephistopheles’ motives, yet Faust is dependent upon 
Mephistopheles as a source of knowledge and action. Unlike Marlowe’s Faust whose 
pact is a straightforward trade (‘That I [Mephistopheles] shall wait on Faustus while 
he lives [...] So he will buy my service with his Soul’(line 30) 206 and ‘When first by 
flattery you lull me into a smug complacency [...] Let that day be the last for me’ line 
1697)
207
 Faust’s contract is conditional, an effective wager of Faust’s soul against 
Mephistopheles’ ability to ‘lull’ him. As Faust’s foil, Mephistopheles’ character 
appears to adapt in order to provide Faust with whichever oppositional external 
influence(s) would best serve Goethe in his artistic endeavour to portray ‘the choice’ 
for eternal striving as the ultimate gestalt of self-determination and acceptance of 
limitations. Faust is both tempted into the pact and willingly seeks it, yet 
Mephistopheles acknowledges that Faust is, in many respects, fulfilling an impulse 
which is beyond his control: ‘Fate has endowed him with a forward-driving | 
Impetuousness that reaches past all sights’ (line 1856).208 Mephistopheles hints as 
much to Faust directly with ‘You are, all told — just what you are’ (line 1806) and 
‘You still remain just what you are’ (line 1809). This ‘hint’ by Mephistopheles is 
also a confounding of Faust’s motivations for entering into the pact which 
Mephistopheles offers: ‘I’ll give you what no man has seen before’ (line 1674). 
Faust challenges Mephistopheles to satisfy him, and therefore he does not ‘sell his 
soul’ so much as he wagers it in a bet, wagering that Mephistopheles lacks the ability 
to comprehend Faust’s ‘human mind in its high striving’ (line 1676). Mephistopheles 
subsequently becomes a threefold administrator in the sense that he administrates 
                                                          
205 Hialmar Hegge, 'Transcending Darwinsim in the Spirit of Goethe's Science: A Philosophical Perspective on 
the Works of Adolf Portmann', Newsletter of the Society for the Evolution of Science, 12.2 (1996), pp. 1-26. 
206 Marlowe, Doctor Faustus, p. 69. 
207 Goethe, Faust, p. 38. 
208 Goethe, Faust, p. 49. 
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Faust’s longing for experience, he administrates the tempting and subsequent attempt 
to gratify Faust for God, and he administrates the world (‘to fall in step with me for 
life’s adventure’ line 1644) for Faust.  
Faust and Mephistopheles do not so much form a 'pact' in Goethe's interpretation, as 
a wager. Contract law at the time was based on the principle expressed in 
the Latin phrase pacta sunt servanda (usually translated as ‘pacts must be kept’, but 
more literally ‘agreements are to be kept’). The legal precedent for contract law to 
eliminate deliberate attempts to encourage misinterpretations (of the kind arguably 
perpetrated by Mephistopheles) was not established until 1892.
209
 Contract law was, 
at the time, as such, a wager with written proof, precisely of the kind which 
Mephistopheles demands, and the pact reveals the extent to which Goethe was more 
interested in the concept of a pact which is both binding and liberating, rather than 
with the social realities of contracts as they actually existed at the time. In this way, 
the pact, and Faust’s triumph over it, encapsulates Goethe’s view of the broader 
social and cultural ‘pact’ being made with development and change during the period 
covered by the play’s writing, and Goethe’s hopes for how mankind would respond 
to the dual limitations and possibilities these changes would present.  
Where Faust and Mephistopheles diverge is in that while both are willing and 
complicit parties in this process, Mephistopheles is the facilitator (an ‘impression of 
worldly-mindedness’210) to both Faust’s process, and his own, not to mention the 
                                                          
209 The Carbolic Smoke Ball Company made a product called the ‘smoke ball’. It claimed to be a cure 
for influenza and a number of other diseases. The Company published advertisements in the Pall Mall 
Gazette and other newspapers on 13 November, 1891: ‘£100 reward will be paid by the Carbolic Smoke Ball 
Company to any person who contracts the increasing epidemic influenza colds, or any disease caused by taking 
cold, after having used the ball three times daily for two weeks, according to the printed directions supplied with 
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daily for nearly two months until she contracted the flu on 17 January, 1892. She claimed £100 from the Carbolic 
Smoke Ball Company. They ignored two letters from her husband, who had trained as a solicitor. On a third 
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complete confidence in the smoke ball's efficacy, but ‘to protect themselves against all fraudulent claims’ they 
would need her to come to their office to use the ball each day under the supervision of the secretary. Mrs Carlill 
brought a claim to court. The barristers representing her argued that the advertisement and her reliance on it was 
a contract between her and the company, and so they ought to pay. The company argued it was not a serious 
contract. See: Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Company [1892] EWCA Civ 1 (07 December 1892). See Gary 
Slapper and David Kelly, The English Legal System, 4 edn (London: Routledge, 2013), p. 90. 
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process which God both permits and orders. While Faust remains consistent in his 
depiction of restlessness and dissatisfaction, Mephistopheles’ portrayal reflects his 
role as facilitator, or administrator, and as such it develops along with Faust’s own 
perception of the nature of his pact. The contract between Faust and Mephistopheles, 
which follows from the ‘contract’ between God and Mephistopheles, acts as the 
symbol of this integral and pervasive dynamic which is itself key to the play’s use of 
references to existing ideas and concepts. These, collectively, appear to express 
Goethe’s understanding of his era as one fundamentally in transition, represented in 
his work through the imagery, ideals and stylistic traits Renaissance and a proffered 
future in which the aesthetic ideal of eternal striving is as equally informative as 
rhetoric was for the Renaissance. The pact may be therefore viewed as an artefact of 
this ‘second nature’ of modernity (to borrow a phrase from Lukács)211 which appears 
to hold most sway over human experience (or is, at least, presented as such within 
the play). As is clear, Mephistopheles gains much of his aura of power and 
foreboding through his willingness to cheat, misinterpret, lie and fool — situating 
him outside of the bounds of conventional society. As such, Faust’s deal may be read 
in more broadly symbolic terms as a relic of the past which is modernised and 
reconstructed through application, as it combines the dual imagery of the 
Renaissance’s emphasis on one’s word and courtly fealty, and the symbolism of the 
‘deal’ which the modern individual makes with economic and social apparatuses (the 
‘mechanics of conformity’) in which the critical reasoning of the individual has the 
potential to be lost. (Especially, in Faust’s case, the powers of negation: ‘what to all 
mankind is apportioned | I mean to savour in my own self’s core’ line 1770.) This 
reasoning is in danger of being lost within that ‘society’ which Mephistopheles (as 
the administrator) creates in order to become the intermediary through which Faust 
experiences the world, and it is Faust’s ability to ‘re-construct’ the contract which 
                                                          
211  Lukacs presents art as reflecting subjective experience of changes in the means of production.  Lukacs 
described the epic as the genre of 'first nature', 'the historico-philosophical objectification of man's alienation 
from his own constructs', while the 'second nature' art form of the novel was a 'projection of man's experience of 
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institutionalised alienation from his or her nature (as homofaber) and society's default order (communism). This 
institutional alienation predisposes Faust into entering into an arrangement in which he depends upon 
Mephistopheles for his fulfilment. Gyorgy Lukacs, selections from "Reification and the Consciousness of the 
Proletariat", An Anthology of Western Marxism, ed. by Roger S. Gottlieb, trans. Rodney Livingstone (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 57-59. 
  102 
 
saves him. The contract may therefore be understood as a rather loose metaphor for 
those aspects of the past which may be re-crafted to a new purpose as the world 
changes; relics such as art, virtue, or even love. Mephistopheles (in this reading) 
presents the established and alienated structures which attempt to stifle such changes.  
Goethe depicts the experiences of his characters as having the capacity to determine 
the plot itself. This idea lies at the heart of Faust’s pact with Mephistopheles, as it is 
Faust’s subjective experience that will determine the extent to which the contract has 
been fulfilled. The ambiguity of the contract is itself a retrospective comment upon 
the importance rhetoric appeared to have within Renaissance societies, and Faust’s 
ultimate triumph may be read as representing an unshackling from these concepts.
212
 
Rhetoric was a discipline promoted by advocates of Renaissance humanism; yet, in 
the absence of established, international legal discourse (compounded by the 
proliferation of legal systems and laws throughout the multiple princedoms of central 
Europe) or shared citations of precedent, the contract, by default, exists within 
specific circumstances, and cannot be ‘universally’ binding. Goethe’s portrayal of 
Faust’s and Mephistopheles’ power relations contained within the pact is itself a 
product of the transition between Renaissance humanism and modernism, as the 
failed project of the Renaissance man, Faust, wagers the promise of self-actualisation 
(central to the enlightenment project) in order to experience what Adorno and 
Horkheimer call the ‘most agonising lust’ of ‘the curse of irresistible progress’.213 
Faust’s last wish, which Mephistopheles fails to fulfil, is to quell the sea’s ‘self upon 
self upwelling [...] wave held on, then rolling backward’; indicative of a desire to 
dictate natural phenomena, and to control the process of change itself (line 11538).
214
 
The means by which Mephistopheles attempts to fulfil this goal, to dig a trench 
which ‘Ordains a border to the waves’ (line 11543), is depicted in the section ‘Great 
Outer Precinct of the Palace, Torches’.215 Here, the extent to which Mephistopheles 
appears to blend the supernatural with human knowledge is illustrated in the means 
by which he achieves this goal, which is through the physical labour of ‘Lemures’, 
                                                          
212 See my examination of the treatment of speech ethics in literature within this thesis.  
213Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment. trans. by Edmund Jephcott, ed. by 
Gunzeln Schmidnerr (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), p. 28.  
214 Goethe, Faust, p. 293. 
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the spirits of evil doers. Subsequently, Mephistopheles’ role comes to be perceived 
by Faust as that of an ‘overseer’ (line 11551) rather than the miracle worker or 
magician he earlier appears to be. This is a key instance of how Mephistopheles’ 
character morphs within the play to best serve as a foil to Faust’s own development 
towards an embracing of the dual limitations and freedoms characteristic of 
modernity and eternal striving. As Faust’s wishes become more ‘epic’ in scale (from 
wooing Gretchen to terraforming, for example), Mephistopheles adapts by 
actualising these wishes through ‘mundane’ means (that is, rather than through the 
fantastical, or by using fantastical agents to perform tasks which could be performed 
by mundane agents), and Mephistopheles’ own restraints equally adapt so as to 
embody the limitations of time, motivation, limited vision and bureaucracy.
216
  
In this way, Mephistopheles enhances the ‘epic’ nature of the poem as described by 
Moretti, insofar as the plot requires Mephistopheles to be ‘capable of changing 
function’,217 a capacity rooted in the requirement for Mephistopheles to adapt to 
Faust’s changing priorities and to anticipate his needs, as seen, for example, in the 
section (Act IV) entitled ‘In the Foothills’: 
 
Faust: As many things as you’ve been through - 
Go on and win a battle, too. 
Mephistopheles: No - you shall win it! For this show  
You are the Generalissimo. 
Faust: Yes, that would be the proper rank! 
Give orders where my knowledge is a blank. (lines 1309–1312)218 
 
                                                          
216 Moretti asserts that it is Part Two which is 'the "epic" part', suggesting it took Goethe 'a quarter of a century to 
realise it' whilst this thesis suggests that these changes may be rooted in broader social changes, including those 
of industry, politics and education, and compounded by changing modes of administration. Moretti, Modern 
Epic: The World System from Goethe to Garcia Marquez, p. 18. 
217 Moretti, Modern Epic: The World System from Goethe to Garcia Marquez, p. 20. 
218 Goethe, Faust, p. 262. 
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Here we see Mephistopheles anticipating Faust’s desires (which is, after all, the basis 
of temptation), and then adapting under Faust’s direction to better fulfil his wishes 
by supplying the knowledge Faust lacks. In effect, Mephistopheles, as a character, 
represents the infrastructure required by an actual authority figure to achieve his 
goals in one unified character, and the many servants required to carry out the tasks.  
In Faust, the relationship between protagonist and antagonist has become wholly 
interdependent and mutually exploitative. Both Faust and Mephistopheles are 
defined by each other, but the changes in Mephistopheles are always dictated by 
Faust’s own progress towards the achievement of the state of eternal striving. (This 
is true even in terms of Mephistopheles’ own impoverished view of what adequate 
recompense would be for his role in Faust’s quest: ‘I shall be at your service by this 
bond | Without relief or respite here on earth; | And if or when we meet again 
beyond, | You are to give me equal worth’ (line 1656).219) Mephistopheles is, in this 
respect, more akin to the ‘administrator’ and symbolic of the a myriad of 
functionaries and agents of material and social structures (rather than an advocate for 
theological–philosophical ideals or natural law): ‘the rational world is to be 
conceived as a great, immortal individual who continually brings into being what is 
needed, and in this way even becomes the master over chance’.220 Mephistopheles’ 
ultimate failure (in plot terms) lies in his idealistic limitations — he is limited by his 
belief in a ‘natural order’, which blinds him to Faust’s ability to continually redefine 
himself and continually challenge preconceptions, even the preconceptions of 
God.
221
 In doing so, Faust achieves a previously unrealised mode of redemption 
through ‘progress’ rather than through conformity, and through inspiration rather 
than through faith. Mephistopheles fulfils the role of administrating the wager, yet 
his goal is to tempt Faust, and he is fundamentally limited in his ability to 
comprehend the true nature of the wager (blinded by his preoccupation with the 
semantics and procedures of Faust’s wager). This limits Mephistopheles to 
attempting to bind Faust in the present, rather than attempting to pre-empt Faust’s 
                                                          
219 Goethe, Faust, p. 40. 
220 ' Die vernunftige Welt ist als ein grosses unsterbliches Indiviuum zu betrachten, das unaufhaltsam das 
Nothwendige bewirkt und dadurch sich sogar uber' Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Goethe's Letters in the Years 
1768 to 1832, ed. by Heinrich Doring (Berlin: J. Wunder, 1837), p. 416.  
221 Goethes Naturwissenshaftliche Schriften, ed. by Rudolf Steiner (Dornach: General Anthroposophical Society 
of Switzerland, 1883), V, p. 89.  
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continual progression; opening up the possibility that all systems of knowledge and 
power — administrations — might be regarded as, in some sense, ultimately limited, 
or, perhaps, self-defeating. The implicit culmination of this interplay between Faust 
and Mephistopheles is that the experience of this interplay constitutes, itself, a form 
of ‘constant striving’, of ‘storm and fury’, and that Mephistopheles unwittingly 
fulfilled his bargain (by acting as his servant) whilst failing to win the wager (by 
sating Faust’s desires).222 Faust’s apparently paradoxical ‘acquittal’ comes from the 
nature of this desire to remain in the moment whilst continually striving, such that, in 
the moment of redemption, Faust has achieved a state of continual progression. It is 
this reinterpretation of what constitutes a state of grace, as it were, that has 
retrospectively been interpreted by Berman and others as the very epitome of the 
modernist spirit. On this reading, then, Goethe’s Faust presents the reader with an 
alternative narrative for human development, directly at odds with those presented 
by classical aesthetics, theology, romanticism, Renaissance humanism or 
sentimentalism. In Faust, the desire to excel is the central redemptive virtue, an 
aspect portrayed primarily through the character of Faust himself, and the 
methodologies (‘road maps’) of earlier movements are thrust aside and revealed to 
be outmoded, an aspect of Faust’s progress which is revealed primarily through the 
administrator character of Mephistopheles.  
 
'The Grub and the chrysalis already show the future variegated butterfly': 
Mephistopheles and Goethe’s vision of an aesthetic future of eternal striving 
Goethe’s apparent proffering of eternal striving and destructive creation as impulses 
more appropriate for the ‘modern’ era appears to not be uncritical, and is, in some 
instances, portrayed as distinctly problematic. Goethe’s rough plan for Faust, drafted 
in 1800, began with the line ‘Ideal striving to achieve an influence upon and a 
feeling for the whole of Nature’, and includes the scored out phrase ‘Life’s Deeds 
Essence’. In this schema, Mephistopheles could be read as having a hindering effect 
on Faust’s ambitions, and seems to reflect Faust’s (and man’s) desire to adhere to the 
fetters of tradition, even those which fail to adequately address or voice the 
experiential realities of the zeitgeist. Faust, despite Mephistopheles’ exhortations and 
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manipulations (‘there comes a time, my friend, | When good things savoured at our 
ease give pleasure’, line 1691), chooses progress over contentment. The paradox of 
Faust finding a project which had the potential to never end (the imposition of his 
will upon the landscape itself) is in stark contrast to (broadly) classical conceptions 
of happiness as contentment through the management of expectations and the golden 
mean. Faust actively seeks a state of constant striving, and identifies this as a self-
determined form of happiness (a concept quite possibly unimaginable prior to the 
emergence of properly modern phenomena such as political or social revolution, 
industrialisation and the birth of empirical science) rather than as a preordained state 
of grace. Faust comes to embody an 'excess of meaning' -- how symbolism itself 
always suggests there is something 'more' -- and, as such, achieves redemption and 
insertion into the very realm of symbolism he initially rejected as lacking sufficient 
objectivity: 
All in transition 
Is but reflection; 
What is deficient 
Here becomes action;  
Human discernment 
Here is passed by; (line 12105 - 12109).
223
  
In this respect, it is perhaps significant that several passages in Marx and Engels’s 
writings, where they question the basic assumptions behind many of society’s 
organising principles, reference Faust directly. For example, Engels, in describing 
the tenor of the revolutionary spirit that he and Marx intended to invoke, wrote: 
I want to try and resolve at least part of Gutzkow’s task: the true second part 
of Faust — Faust no longer an egoist but sacrificing himself for mankind — 
has yet to be written. There is Faust, there is the Wandering Jew, there is the 
Wild Huntsman, three types of the anticipated spiritual freedom which can 
easily be placed in connection and relation with Jan Huss. What a poetic 
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Mephistopheles himself describes Faust, who throughout the play has displayed 
‘temperamental’ character traits, of acting over-emotionally and recklessly; yet, 
despite this behaviour, he is also described as having a fundamental consistency:
225
 
‘No Joy could sate him, no delight but cloyed, For changing shapes he lusted to the 
last’ (line 11585).226 This statement is followed immediately by Mephistopheles’ 
own declaration of constancy: ‘Why over? [...] over is as good as never was [...] The 
Ever-empty is what I prefer’ (line 11595).227 By having his two central characters 
possess these two central traits, Goethe succeeds in maintaining a sense of 
‘authenticity’ (if not ‘realism’, strictly speaking) in the play, despite its abstract 
underlying themes of self-determination, metamorphosis, and progress, and gains the 
ability to have Faust behave in a mercurial manner to move the plot forward, as well 
as to have Mephistopheles’ powers adapt to the requirements of social commentary.  
Another of the means by which Goethe achieves this new, progressive sense of 
‘authenticity’ is through his literary technique of providing a contemporary reference 
after, and a classical reference before, any act of apparent hypocrisy on behalf of the 
characters, as if to encompass the whole of classical and humanist essentialist 
tradition as justification. This structural technique occurs throughout the play, as in 
such instances as ‘Walpurgis Night’ where The Fair One makes a reference to the 
Bible — ‘You’ve thought such apples very nice | Since Adam’s fall in Paradise’ — 
immediately followed by the appearance of the Proctophantasmiac: a contemporary 
reference to Friedrich Nicolai described by Faust as being a rationalist who ‘must 
appraise. Unless he prattles over every phase [...] And we might win his qualified 
assent; | The more so if we pay him due acknowledgment’ (lines 4140–4150).228 
Aspects of the play such as Mephistopheles’ impersonation of the professor, the 
                                                          
224 Frederick Engels, 'To Wihelm Graeber in Berlin 13 November 1839', in F. Engels, Schriften Der Fruhzeit, ed. 
by Gustav Mayer (New York: H. Fertig, 1969). 
225 For more on the sentimentalist representation of ego, see Erich Heller, The Disinherited Mind (London: 
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226 Goethe, Faust, p. 294. 
227 Goethe, Faust, p. 294. 
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nature of the soul contract, and Faust’s salvation, reveal the extent to which all of the 
play’s characters, other than Faust (and, possibly, God) are limited by conceptions of 
the world which are no longer relevant. This literary technique has the effect of 
presenting the decisions and actions of the characters as both founded upon and 
diverging from prior historical conventions. Mephistopheles is, as always, both a 
prompt and a facilitator for these experiences and settings. If, however, 
Mephistopheles reflects these references within the narrative and the philosophical 
thrust of the play, it is Faust’s triumph over Mephistopheles which emphasises the 
idea that progress is the defining and true virtue of humanity. In fact, similar notions 
to Goethe’s as are expressed here came to underlie the actual development of 
modern systems of administration, which began to justify arbitrary laws and systems 
without reference to any ‘natural order’ or Divine inspiration. Such concepts, in 
which laws and systems were aligned to some preordained order, which had defined, 
in different ways, the writings of Plato, Augustine and More, and which lead 
Machiavelli to respond with an exceptional emphasis upon the pragmatic, all begin 
to foreshadow the ‘mighty cosmos of the modern economic order’, which Goethe, 




Mephistopheles drives the plot forward by carrying out Faust’s wishes — including 
what Berman terms as his ‘desire for development’ — whilst simultaneously seeking 
to damn him.
230
 Mephistopheles comes to monopolise Faust’s access to the 
supernatural within Part One, and to hijack the practical outcomes of his actions and 
whims in Part Two. At the core of Mephistopheles’ character is the paradox that, as 
a kind of administrator, he thus appears to serve two masters: on the one hand, 
fulfilling a role within the Divine chain (by acting as The Lord’s tempter) and, on the 
other, by facilitating Faust’s own desire for eternal striving or development. (Despite 
himself, Mephistopheles comes to appear sympathetic to both goals, as where, 
famously, he paraphrase’s Milton’s Paradise Lost, describing himself as ‘that force 
which would Do ever evil and does ever good’ (line 33).)231 Mephistopheles’ power 
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is not boundless, however, and he continually offers explanations and excuses as to 
why it is impossible for him to perform certain actions on Faust’s behalf (as with 
freeing Margareta in Part One: ‘I cannot lose the vengeman’s bonds, nor undo his 
bolts’).232 Notably, the limits of Mephistopheles’ power are not presented as limited 
to illusion and deceit, as would be concordant with the limits placed upon the devil’s 
power in Christian mystery plays. Mephistopheles, for example, does not lack the 
ability to create, which would be an acceptable limit on his powers justified by the 
argument that the act of creation is God’s dominion. Mephistopheles can create, as 
revealed in the scenes with the Homunculus and with the creation of wine in 
Auerbach’s Tavern (nor is he limited in his powers only to perform deceptions, such 
as illusions or dream manipulation). This variation is not wholly explicable in terms 
of authorial convenience or plot requirements. In fact, as suggested above, 
Mephistopheles’ power appears to expand and contract in line with Faust’s own 
ambition. Goethe’s writings broadly advocate a world view for which 
‘understanding’ is constructed, and based on sensibility and intuition, rather than 
through the interpretation of an underlying or imposed order. Mephistopheles, along 
with the figure of the Earth Spirit, represents this ‘living quality’ in the play wherein 
the subject and object are ‘dissolved together’ in a poise of inquiry — a concept 
entirety compatible with Faust’s description of eternal striving. Mephistopheles’ 
abilities, as with Goethe’s concept of knowledge, are related, in this way, to 
humanity through his functional value alone and represent a way of interacting with 
the natural order. If Goethe’s Faust artistically represents the increasing influence of 
human action upon the world, it is Mephistopheles who is the primary means by 
which the play incorporates a response to the ‘shock of the new’ characteristic of an 
emergent modernity and to the Promethean flavour of industrial change. 
Faust, if taken as containing some of Goethe’s own arguments concerning the 
authentic relationship between art and history, may be broadly read as a desire for 
progress and a belief in human potential, but as determined by individual and 
collective assertions rather than pre-determined. Goethe’s apparent ideal of ‘art as 
art’, and the play’s emphasis upon transformation as existing in tension with 
progress, permeates every aspect of the text, from the character’s dialogue to the 
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expectations placed upon the audience to engage in the play’s themes. As Faust 
states: 
In vain all treasures of the human mind [...]  
I find  
There wells within no fresh resource of strength;  
Not by a hairs breath am I grown,  
No nearer to the limitless unknown. (lines 1810–1815)233  
Subsequently, the effective ‘universe’ of the play is one in which no stable 
underlying objective order exists, and mankind is left free to define its own priorities 
and destiny. This effect originates from the central relationship between Faust and 
Mephistopheles, and influences all of the play’s subsequent action, with considerable 
significance for our understanding of the latter as a distinctively modern type of 
administrator character. Mephistopheles, as the representative of those aspects of the 
past and present which threaten to stultify the kind of bold self-determinism Goethe 
appears to advocate in Faust, represents those secular forces which appear, at first 
glance, to be deterministic and pre-ordained, but which may, in actuality, be resisted, 
bested and exploited, even as they attempt to hinder one’s progress.  
Berman asserts that Faust contains ‘the idea of an affinity between the cultural ideal 
of self-development and the real social movement towards economic development’ 
and is a ‘tragedy of development’ as a result;234 and, indeed, it appears that Goethe 
consciously sought to not only incorporate, but to actively invoke economic ideas 
within his characterization.
 235
 Fittingly, the very Faustian role of Schöpfungskraft 
— ‘of the power to create’ — is also reflected in future German economic 
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philosophies, even serving as a frequent metaphor in economic treatises, where the 
productive powers were seen as being the key to national wealth, emphasising what 
Werner Sombart described, in the first half of the twentieth century, as ‘the 
becoming, which forever is active and lives’.236 Sombart describes the culmination 
of this becoming as ‘Wholeness’ (‘Ganzheit’), and his expositions of this state are 
interwoven with references to both Goethe and Nietzsche. Sombart thus quotes Faust 
to illustrate his own theories of mankind as having an underlying drive to emulate 
‘creation in the image of God’ (‘Gottähnlichkeit’), with which he thus sought to 
convey the sense of awe felt by mankind at the extent of its own achievements.
237
 
The parallel between these economic ideas and the role that eternal striving plays in 
Faust confirms the ways in which Mephistopheles, as a supernatural force which has 
adopted human qualities, captures the blurred line between individual human actions 
and collective actions such as those undertaken by corporations, institutions and 
organisations. 
Written in 1930, Sombart’s book, Die Drei Nationalökonomien, implies that the 
heredity influence of the Renaissance upon German economics was, in part, actually 
transformed by the concepts of Goethe’s Faust. This is indicated in Sombart’s own 
words: 
 
I acknowledge, what in the innermost  
Keeps the world together, 
Behold all will to power and seeds 




Berman and Lukacs have both suggested that Goethe’s Faust is, for this reason, the 
literary archetype of dramatisations of that distinctively modern dilemma posed by 
the need to sacrifice something of the past in order to progress — to be creatively 
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destructive (in Schumpeter’s famous description of capitalist modernity) — and 
Mephistopheles is, at every point in the play, the means or the catalyst through 
which this is achieved. In Part One, Mephistopheles incorporates the worst aspects 
of past ideals and systems of knowledge. This theme continues in Part Two and 
Mephistopheles displays traits which appear to be allegories for the tools of 
industrialisation, urbanisation, early capitalism and the rise of the nation state, all of 
which are directly referenced in Faust, and which serve, in turn, as an analogy for 
mankind’s changing relationship with nature.  
Berman reads Faust as representing ‘modern environments and experiences [that] 
cut across all boundaries’, as a result of which ‘modernity can be said to unite all 
mankind’, at least in regard to the later sections of the play.239 The earlier sections, 
however, are more clearly concerned with a retrospective appraisal of the dual 
influences that idealised views of the Renaissance (such as in sentimentalism) and 
the continued influence of the Church had upon contemporary social issues such as 
education and personal liberties. It is Mephistopheles who provides Faust with the 
means to express his desire to eternally strive, thereby facilitating a transition from 
the preoccupation with the validity of knowledge and love, addressed in the early 
sections of the play, to the desire for industrial development and global change 
expressed in the later sections. Goethe’s Mephistopheles is the character who seals 
the pact and provides the power which ‘allows’ Faust’s tragic and redemptive 
journey of destructive creation, and thus Mephistopheles facilitates the source of his 
own undoing, outdone by Faust’s striving. This aspect of the play may, possibly, be 
at the root of Marx’s interest in Faust also, and his reading of Mephistopheles as part 
of a greater impression that historical ‘tools’ of power have come in capitalist 
modernity to hamper mankind’s development.  
As we have seen, Berman suggests that Faust expresses ‘the idea of an affinity 
between the cultural ideal of self-development and the real social movement towards 
economic development’, but analysis of Mephistopheles as an administrator 
character suggests, however, that he functions on more levels than as a depiction of 
unfettered capitalist exploitation.
240
 Berman’s argument is strong, supported by 
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direct textual citations and the biographical evidence of Goethe’s interest in the 
proto-socialist and industrial advocates Le Globe.
241
 However, Berman later suggests 
that Mephistopheles represents ‘the private freebooter and predator’, by citing how 
Mephistopheles ‘executes much of the dirty work’.242 Given the strength of 
Berman’s prior reading (Faust as the presentation of self' and economic 
development) it is more fitting to read Mephistopheles in this schema as 
representative of the technology, discourses and infrastructure (both past and 
present) which enable development to occur. Berman argues that there is a shift in 
Faust’s dialogue in the later sections of the play, suggesting that ‘Faust has begun to 
use post-1789 political language’, citing examples of the use of terms such as ‘free 
spirit’ and ‘all rights’.243 Here, if one accepts Berman’s observations, it again follows 
that we may expect Mephistopheles to display complementary shifts in his language 
use. However, these are not evident. Instead, Mephistopheles’ language continually 
reflects the manner expected by Faust in keeping with his ordered duties, an effect 
which becomes increasingly evident in Part Two. 
Goethe’s portrayal of Mephistopheles, rather than conforming to free market 
impulses or the desire for acquisition, conforms to motivations which are derived 
from his role as facilitating a fundamental issue at the heart of the text’s power 
structure, which reflects post-Enlightenment art’s growing interest in the effects of 
industrialisation. Mephistopheles is the primary representative of any promise of a 
‘higher reality’ in Faust, and it is Mephistopheles through which the audience (or 
reader) gets to observe Faust’s distance from the practical outcomes of his desires, 
‘driven far afield [distanced] by some strange leaven [Mephistopheles]’ (line 302). 
Mephistopheles is both ordered (‘lead him [Faust] down your path by shrewd 
resource’ line 326) to test Faust and permitted to do so in his own way (‘Provided 
that your Honour gives | Me leave to lead him gently up my alley!’ line 314).244 As 
such, Mephistopheles is both an agent and instigator, simultaneously an accomplice 
and prime mover, as it were. Mephistopheles’ internal motivations are, in effect, 
those of his external obligations, and he is therefore less a ‘character’ so much as he 
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is a personification. As Mephistopheles is clearly not conflicted in any sense, he 
lacks any form of character development, and may be seen, in this way, as the 
quintessential representation of an individual who is a product of discourses of 
power — an ultimately only relevant for the higher power represented. In this way, 
he is the very distilment of what it is to be an agent or employee, whose very power 
rests upon his lack of autonomy. For all of Mephistopheles’ clever word play and 
wily conniving, ‘it is not the intelligent person who rules, but intelligence; not the 
rational person, but reason’, as Goethe, in another context, puts it.245  
As consistently demonstrated throughout this chapter, Mephistopheles may then be 
seen as a character whose implications for the text ultimately transcend the 
‘character’ of Mephistopheles himself, and this effect itself suggests a dramatic shift 
in how Goethe perceived Mephistopheles' ability to influence his surroundings, from 
the classical and Renaissance Humanist methods of the play’s early scenes, to the 
later methods of industrialisation, labour-power and force. Mephistopheles, as with 
the other administrator characters studied within this thesis, is a presence whose 
impact upon the plot is not dependent upon its individual character, or the character’s 
goals, provided they are able to carry out the function of actualising the central 
protagonist’s goals. This is clearly evident in the later sections of Faust, when 
Mephistopheles acquires the aid of ‘The Mighty Men’ (who are themselves 
unnamed). This scene, in which Mephistopheles and these men murder the ‘aged 
couple’ in the watch tower (line 11240), represents the threat to Faust that he is now 
irredeemable, damned by his own short sightedness and his inability to second guess 
Mephistopheles (and therefore potentially Mephistopheles’ moment of triumph). 
However, this terrible deed is described as a collective act by all four, undertaken 
and reported in unison as ‘Mephistopheles and the three’ (11350). Their actions are 
undifferentiated and unattributed (‘we knocked in vain’ line 11352; ‘we met no 
response’ line 11357; ‘we fell to without ado’ line 11360), acting as one, and 
‘exeunt-ing’ together. Even in what is, in effect, the moment in which 
Mephistopheles is portrayed as at his most callous, inhuman and deadly, he is 
effectively merged into one of a variety of (literally) nameless servants. The marked 
changes between the Faust and the Mephistopheles at the end of the second part and 
                                                          
245 Goethes Naurwissenschaftliche Schriften [Goethe’s natural scientific writings], Volume 5: Spruche in Prosa 
[Sayings in prose].  
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the beginning of part one may be read as a break from the romantic tradition of 
characters and their circumstances as the conflict of ideals against the mundane. 
Frederick Beiser's reading of Hegel's thought advocates that Hegel held that ideas 
and history develop symbiotically and that the events in the world including 
economic and social circumstances are determined by concepts and ideas. Both Faust 
and Mephistopheles have changed by the end of the drama in both action and 
apprehension.
246
 Faust no longer seeks power or validation from more powerful 
forces or out of comparison between himself and his ideals, and instead acts without 
deference to any authority including the authority of his own prior concepts of 
individual actualisation. Mephistopheles now effects the world by multiplying his 
own individual influence in the form of amorphous thugs to the point of  his 
practically becoming a collective. Both Faust and Mephistopheles, then, may be read 
as changing as the world they inhabit changes, exemplifying Beiser's reading of a 
Hegelian relationship between the world and concepts.  
To summarise, in Faust Mephistopheles’ character incorporates systems of 
knowledge and power both past and present. The manner in which this power is 
manifested changes throughout the play to greater enhance what may be read as 
Goethe’s broader thematic assertion of the need to move away from past conceptions 
of virtue and accomplishment, and to craft new concepts fit for a coming era founded 
upon the collective mass achievements of industrialisation and technology. Faust’s 
eventual triumph over Mephistopheles, without whom he could have achieved 
nothing, represents a further layer within the play’s thematic concerns: that in order 
to continually achieve and strive, mankind must learn to interact with the very 
systems and methods it creates to achieve its ends; that mankind must learn to 
temper this relationship with an awareness that those self-same systems may 
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Press, 1993), p. 278. Interestingly, Taylor suggests a reading of Hegel which places a slightly different emphasis 
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Auto-da-fé:  Reading the Grand Inquisitor as an Administrator Character  
This chapter aims to show how chapter V, book V of The Brothers Karamazov, 
entitled ‘The Grand Inquisitor’, may be read as a work in which Dostoevsky invokes 
the administrator character to interrogate ideas concerning the development of 
modern social institutions, particularly, in this case, as articulated through the Tsarist 
bureaucracy, Russian socialist thought, and the ideas of the Enlightenment 
championed by Catherine the Great. While it is not possible to wholly differentiate 
these critiques - given how the story acts as a single allegory for a whole range of 
ideological, individual and institutional derangements, and given that the chapter is 
intended to function within the context of a wider novel - it is possible to describe, in 
the broadest terms, those aspects that appear most pointedly addressed to 
contemporary perspectives.  
From the 1860s, Dostoevsky's writing reflects the views of the Pochennichestvo 
movement, which rejected Europe's culture and contemporary philosophical 
movements, such as nihilism and materialism, idealized Russia's history, and 
promoted inter-personal change (humbling of the self and faith) as the means to 
achieve social change and a belief that the Russian Orthodox Church represented a 
means to achieve social reform. Above all, 'The Grand Inquisitor', I argue, explores 
the question of how an institution, which has been founded upon a particular set of 
ideas and principles (using the template of the Russian Church), may ultimately turn 
against its philosophical, ethical or theological foundations and abandon them in 
favour of maintaining the institution itself. Subsequently, the ‘poem’ (as Ivan 
describes it) appears to serve as a parable for a wider phenomenon: the tendency for 
the very processes and structures which were initially created as a means by which to 
disseminate and actualise a core set of ideas and values to come to be seen as an end 
in themselves. Dostoevsky's characterisation of the Inquisitor as administrator 
highlights the influence of ideology upon the realm of the intimate, and thereby 
suggests a critique of many of the proposed methods for organising communities and 
individual interactions which were being advocated from a range of different 
political perspectives during this period.  
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In 'The Grand Inquisitor', Dostoevsky uses the form of the ‘fable’ to incorporate a 
specific representation of the growing power of supraindividual institutions (such as 
the Orthodox and Catholic Churches), as well as wider debates around how best to 
order modern society. By presenting them in the way that he does, I will argue, 
Dostoevsky reflects (and reflects upon) a number of contemporary debates. In 
particular, Dostoevsky appears to have intended 'The Grand Inquisitor' to be read 
within the context of discussions surrounding the possibility of reforming the Tsarist 
bureaucracy, as well as various Socialist doctrines vying for influence within the 
oppositional Russian politics of his time. Yet there are also strong indications of a 
broader intention to counter, or at least interrogate, those ideals, earlier championed 
in Russia by Catherine the Great, which originated in the Scottish Enlightenment (as 
exemplified in the writings of Smith and Hume) in order to equate ideology with 
institution in the same manner as, at an earlier moment, Machiavelli equated power 
with power's perception: through character rather than through either mythic 
language or treatise.
247
 Just as the nineteenth-century Swiss jurist and political 
theorist Bluntschli, for example, viewed administration as ‘the activity of the state in 
individual and small things', so Dostoevsky's 'The Grand Inquisitor' suggests an 
attempt to analyse – in line with the author’s customary identification with a late 
nineteenth-century psychological realism in the novel - institutional failures by 
tracing their roots in individual psychology.  
As an administrator character, the Inquisitor is able to serve, in literary terms, as a 
representative of institutional power within the text with whom other characters may 
debate certain understandings of ideologies and institutions through interaction 
rather than merely through polemic or exposition. Bahktin described this as 'the 
dialogical' form of Dostoevsky’s writing, and 'the way he artistically visualised the 
life of human consciousness, a visualisation embodied in the form of content'; 'To be 
                                                          
247 John W. Cairns, 'John Millar, Ivan Andreyevich Tret'yakov, and Semyon Efimovich Desnitsky: A Legal 
Education In Scotland, 1761-1767' in Russia and Scotland in the Enlightenment, ed. by Peter Jones Tatina 
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and Thomas Wilson (New York and London: University of Oxford Press, 1975), pp. 247-73.  and A. G. Cross, 
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means to be for another, and through the other, for oneself'.
248
 The ‘extraordinary 
and unique place’ occupied by Dostoyevsky in the history of the novel is, then, for 
Bahktin, in the manner in which what his ‘characters say constitutes an arena of 
never-ending struggle with others’ words, in all realms of life and creative 
ideological activity. For this reason these utterances may serve as excellent models 
of the most varied forms for transmitting and framing another’s discourse’.249 In this 
way, Dostoevsky's presentation of the Inquisitor is a continuation of the tendency, 
already seen in a text like Goethe’s Faust, to use characterisation as one means by 
which to incorporate external concepts of power into the narrative by depicting the 
impact such wider concepts have upon the personality, interactions and philosophy 
of a given individual. While Faust, for example, incorporates the imagery and 
narrative tropes of Judeo-Christianity, Goethe employs them as a mythological 
backdrop to explore the ramifications of the central character's frustration with and 
subsequent rejection of reason, convention and faith, and instead embraced a new 
kind of aesthetic with incorporated self-actualisation and the quest for meaning. 
Dostoevsky employs the institutions of the Church and state as a backdrop for 
characters who have found reason, convention and faith wanting, and then explores 
the internal and external dynamics which occur when these characters and 
institutions conflict. Thus, what Goethe does in the abstract, Dostoevsky depicts with 
a sense of psychological realism, in which the characters' thoughts reactions and 
motivations are coherent and cogent, despite their extreme circumstances.     
The Russians customarily give 988 as the founding date for the Orthodox Church, 
and, through the history of the transformation of the Rus into the state of Russia, 
church and state progressed in symbiosis. From the sixteenth century, the 
government of the Russian tsar coincided with the rise of the metropolitan 
archbishops of Moscow, who themselves were largely aristocratic and, as private 
land owners, personally invested in the affairs of state. As such, the Orthodox 
Church represents, in mainstream Russian historiography, the underpinnings - the 
'authentic self' - of the Russian state itself. Dostoevsky himself appears to closely 
                                                          
248 Mikhail Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics. trans. by Caryl Emerson (Minnesota: University of 
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correlate the Russian land with his faith, describing that his exile to Siberia, 
conversely,  was a time of profound religious significance to him as his initial 
depression gave way to what he described as a 'wave of renewal' and which provided 
a 'rapturous apprehension of life'.
250
 It seems that Siberia offered a sense of purity to 
Dostoevsky, which appears to be closely tied in his mind to the fact of Serbia's 
distance from Europe and European ideals,   By having a Catholic Inquisitor defend 
the institution of the Church in 'The Grand Inquisitor', Dostoevsky could then be 
seen to be presenting his own 'dark reflection' of the Orthodox Church, and, by 
implication, the authentic Russian self. At the same time, analysis of the Inquisitor as 
an administrator character may also place this specific reading within a broader 
context as suggesting an examination of how ideologies come, more generally, to be 
perpetuated in the modern world.  
This chapter seeks to demonstrate how, in particular, Dostoevsky innovatively uses 
an administrator character to portray a state of fundamental inauthenticity as the 
product of interactions between individuals and institutions. (Hence, in part, the 
story’s later attraction for existentialist thinkers.) In this way, Dostoevsky’s 
depiction of the Inquisitor subverts the tradition of rhetorical dialectic and dramatic 
monologue, in a fashion that may productively be related to the tradition, stretching 
from Machiavelli and More, through Shakespeare to Goethe, which this thesis has 
discussed. That is, rhetoric was used by Machiavelli and More to 'shore up' and 
'prove' their political and moral arguments; was incorporated puckishly by 
Shakespeare into his characters' monologues and dialogues to reveal their 
motivations and self-justifications; and in Goethe, is used (in almost complete 
antithesis to how Aristotle intended, as a tool to present truth in the best possible 
light) to justify moral relativity and add seductive appeal to subversive behaviour. In 
Dostoevsky, rhetoric is employed by characters to prove points, explain their 
motivations, when required to advocate for any unconventional or subversive 
positions held, and to invoke the wider ideas or founding principles of a collective 
entity or institution and then cast them in a light which favours their own personal 
agenda.   
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'The Grand Inquisitor' fable, as told by the character of Ivan Karamazov, describes 
what appears to be the second coming of Christ, in the manner, as Ivan puts it, of 'the 
great fashion among poets to make the denizens and powers of higher worlds 
descend on earth and mix freely with mortals'.
251
 The fact that Christ's implied return 
occurs during the sixteenth-century Spanish Inquisition suggests, however, that this 
setting is intended to act, above all, as a direct example of an ideology realised 
through coercion, and hence as existentially ‘inauthentic’ in form. The Man - who it 
is interpreted by both the Inquisitor 'within' the ‘poem’, and by its 'audience' 
Alyosha, as Christ - in stark contrast to his interrogator, remains silent thought the 
narrative, and his identity as Christ is conveyed, within the story, via his 'light, 
enlightenment, and power',
252
 as is evident in the reaction of those who interact 
personally with Him. In this way, Christ's role within 'The Grand Inquisitor' may be 
read as embodying a means to realise world-transforming change which stands in 
direct opposition to the institutionally-driven cohesion of the Inquisition, instead 
achieving change via willing submission, effected through recruitment and fellow 
feeling.  
Dostoevsky appears, then, to be writing against what he may have perceived to have 
been the growing adoption of European Enlightenment ideals, and the entailed belief 
that correctly founded institutions, laws and constitutions would lead to a 
harmonious society:   
...there is nothing you can do about it; rather it must happen of itself; it 
must be present in one's nature; it must be an unconscious ingredient of 
the nature of the race. In a word, if there is to be a foundation for 
brotherhood and love, there must be love.
253
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The Chapter, Dostoevsky suggested to his editor N.A. Lyubimov, would 'compel 
them to recognize that a pure, ideal Christian is not something abstract but is 
graphically real ... Christianity is the sole refuge for the Russian land from all its 
woes'.
254
  In Dostoyevsky’s parable the Inquisitor appears to advocate for 
Christianity in the abstract, as it were, and the reader is encouraged to reject his 
arguments. The Inquisitor commands that 'the Man' (Christ) be arrested, and, once he 
is imprisoned, delivers a monologue to the silent Christ figure expounding his 
justifications for the Church. The Inquisitor explains that freedom of conscience is a 
terrifying burden which man relinquishes through worship. Worship's primary goal, 
for the Inquisitor, is to alleviate this fear through the sublimation of the individual 
will to the institution of the Church rather than through direct communion with God. 
Most of all, though, the parable appears to encourage the belief that The Church has 
achieved power precisely through means other than Christ's own teaching. Indeed, 
the Inquisitor argues that the Church has effectively excelled Christ, and so 
surpassed the need for Him. The Church, for the Inquisitor, excels in spectacle, 
provides a doctrinal focus for sublimation, and offers material security in exchange 
for alliance. The Inquisitor's fundamental argument is thus that the institution of the 
(Catholic) Church is more important than any interpersonal relationship for the 
faithful with Christ. By implication, this becomes a justification for the Inquisition, 
and for his own role as Inquisitor. Just as Christ represents an intermediary between 
man and God, the Inquisitor situates himself as an intermediary between man and the 
Church. His monologue is therefore a personal assertion of his own role as an 
administrator character, and an attempt on the part of the Inquisitor to assert that this 
is now of greater importance to the Church than Christ himself.  
The More Mechanical it is the Better - Tsarist Bureaucracy  
The Brothers Karamazov was started in 1879. On June 11th of that year Dostoevsky 
wrote a letter Lyubimov, already quoted, in which he described the Inquisitor as a 
'contemporary nay-sayer, one of the most vehement, [who] openly declares himself 
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  123 
 
in favour of the devil's council and maintains that it insures mankind's happiness 
more than Christ'. The Chapter, Dostoevsky continues, 'is an omen, and a striking 
one for Russian, stupid socialism... the future reign of socialism ... and the total 




Dostoevsky’s comments have to be seen in the context of opposition to the so-called 
'table of ranks' (Табель о рангах ) that was in use in Russia between 1722 and 1917, 
and which served to codify a national social hierarchy legitimised by the state. The 
Code of the Law of the Russian Empire of 1832, vol. IX, ‘Laws about Estates’, 
categorised the population into four 'estates': the nobility, clergy, and the rural and 
urban inhabitants. A further subsection included those who fell within the 'table of 
ranks', the military, civil servants and the court. The highest ranks automatically 
bestowed a level of nobility. Subsequently, the nobility constituted both an 'estate', 
and the upper hierarchy of the civil service, and the civil service was effectively 
synonymous with the nobility as a result.
256
 Frank, however, suggests that 
Dostoevsky's ideals stood in stark contrast to the pervading direction of social 
reconstruction of Russia towards the empowerment of a modified landed gentry. 
Franks contends that Dostoevsky's incarceration and time in the military suggests 
Dostoevsky “experienced 'a leap of faith' in the moral beauty of the Russian 
peasantry, ... Parricide”.257 
Outside of the state establishment, however, there began to emerge in the mid 
nineteenth century various groups of Russian radicals, collectively known as 
Populists (Narodniki), who, influenced by the writings of Alexander Herzen, 
Nikolay Chernyshevsky, and others, advocated new modes of social organisation. By 
the time Dostoevsky wrote The Brothers Karamazov, and prior to the later 
nineteenth-century influence of Marx, 'Utopian socialism', which advocated the 
construction of an industrial democracy, was probably most favoured by the 
dominant Populist groups as a model. Advocates for reform thus concerned 
                                                          
255 Dostoevsky, The Brothers Karamazov, p. 759. 
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themselves with postulating how best to arrange a society in which individual 
freedoms were protected by voluntary associations and community organizations, 
and which most effectively regulated worker participation in managing industry and 
government. 
Dostoyevsky appears to have equated the church-centred theocratic Christianity of 
Catholicism with socialist ideas being adopted by the middle and upper classes. 
Dostoevsky's diary entry for January 1877 reads: 
[France] developed from the ideas of 1789 her own particular French 
socialism - i.e., the pacification and organization of human society 
without Christ and outside of Christ, as Catholicism tried but was unable 
to organize it in Christ; this same France - in her revolutionary 
Convention, in her atheists, in her socialists, and in her communards of 
today - is and continues to be in the highest degree a Catholic nation...
258
  
A similar interpretation is voiced by Ivan as exposition for ‘The Grand Inquisitor’: 
‘One may say it is the most fundamental feature of Roman Catholicism, 
in my opinion at least. “All has been given by Thee to the Pope,” they 
say, “and all, therefore, is still in the Pope's hands, and there is no need 
for Thee to come now at all”.’259   
It seems clear that Dostoevsky is channelling his own opinions through the voices of 
some of this characters, particularly in regard to Socialism. Prince Myshkin delivers 
a long speech towards the end of Part 4, Chapter 7 of The Idiot which describes 
Socialism as the secular continuation of a project of social control instigated by the 
Catholic church: 
‘Socialism is the progeny of Romanism and of the Romanistic spirit. It 
and its brother Atheism proceed from Despair in opposition to 
Catholicism. It seeks to replace in itself the moral power of religion, in 
order to appease the spiritual thirst of parched humanity and save it; not 
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by Christ, but by force. “Don't dare to believe in God, don't dare to 
possess any individuality, any property!”’ 
There are direct correlations that may be drawn between Myshkin's view of secular 
Catholicism and Alyosha's impassioned response to Ivan's poem: 
 ‘That's not the idea of it in the Orthodox Church.... That's Rome, and not 
even the whole of Rome, it's false-those are the worst of the Catholics 
the Inquisitors, the Jesuits... They are simply the Romish army for the 
earthly sovereignty of the world in the future, with the Pontiff of Rome 
for Emperor... It's simple lust for power, for filthy earthly gain, for 
domination - something like a universal serfdom with them as masters - 
that's all they stand for.’260  
Socialism, or at least the interpretation articulated within some Enlightenment 
models of institutional influence, is presented by Dostoevsky here as simply a 
secularised version of Catholicism’s attempt to impose a collective unity, and 
thereby merely an alternative means of imposing serfdom. 
Significantly, Dostoevsky, in the author's introduction to The Brothers Kazamarov, 
asserted that the central message of The Brothers Kazamarov was contained, in 
microcosmic form, within 'The Grand Inquisitor' story. Dostoevsky wrote that his 
original intention was for the novel (finished in 1880) to have a second volume, a 
sequel which, due to his death in 1881, Dostoevsky never completed. (Of course, 
Dostoevsky added: 'Indeed, I am actually glad that my novel has of itself split into 
two narratives'.
261
)  More pertinently to our purposes, Dostoevsky reveals that the 
'first novel' (The Brothers Karamazov as we know it) 'takes place thirteen years ago', 
placing the events of the novel approximately around the year 1866. This allows the 
reader to draw some interesting historical analogies. Given that 'The Grand 
Inquisitor' was viewed by Dostoevsky as containing the summation of the novel as a 
whole, a focus on this section of the novel may clarify those elements of the wider 
novel overtly intended as a commentary upon Russia circa 1866. 
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Reading 'The Grand Inquisitor' as a more or less autonomous encapsulation of the 
novel's themes does not, however, discount reading 'The Grand Inquisitor' with 
regard to its relationship with the wider novel. Indeed, the interesting analogies 
between Russian history around 1866 and the events leading up to 1879, when 
viewed with direct reference to the novel, further encourage a reading of 'The Grand 
Inquisitor' as a 'an omen' warning against the inherent tendency for organisational 
structures to become self-serving and to abandon their founding principles, and 
indicates the possibility of critical speculation regarding those specific political and 
economic ideas which informed Dostoevsky's depictions of Tsarist democracy, 
'stupid socialism', and the Russian intelligentsia’s enthusiasm for ‘Western’ 
rationalist thought.  
Alexander II, 'the Tsar Liberator' (often referred to as 'Russia's White Hope'), reigned 
between 1855 to 1881, and has generally been perceived as overseeing a regime that 
started with great promise, but lost momentum and ended in assassination and 
unfulfilled hopes.
262
 Despite multiple reforms, Alexander never instigated the 
changes to the underlying social structures which might have led to significant 
changes in Russia's economic fortunes. Most strikingly, perhaps, Dostoevsky may 
well have intended to allude to the failed assassination attempt upon Alexander on 
April 4th 1866, given his precision about the novel's setting as being 'thirteen years 
ago' from the June of 1879. The would-be assassin was one Dimitry Karakozow who 
was a member of the revolutionary socialist 'Ishutin Society'. Further, Karakozow 
was believed to have been himself inspired by the character of Rakhmetov in Nikolai 
Chernyshevsky's 1863 novel What is to Be Done?, a work which detailed the 
struggles of two ascetics who appear to hold socialist sympathies.
263
 The obvious 
similarity of 'Karakozov' with 'Karamazov' is surely no coincidence, particularly 
considering that a major portion of the plot of The Brothers Karamazov revolves 
around the murder of Fyodor Karamazov by a deluded assassin. In Book Eleven 
(Brother Ivan Fydorovich) the character Smerdyakov confesses to Ivan Karamazov, 
insisting that he, Ivan, had given implicit approval for the act. Ivan, in a later 
retelling of the conversation, appears to accept a portion of the blame, stating: 
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‘If it is not Dmitri, but Smerdyakov who's the murderer, I share his guilt, 
for I put him up to it. Whether I did, I don't know yet. But if he is the 
murderer, and not Dmitiri, then, of course, I am the murderer, too.’264 
It is notable, regarding Dostoevsky's description of 'The Grand Inquisitor', that in his 
1879 letter to Lyubimov, as encapsulating 'the main theme' of The Brothers 
Karamazov (the 'whole novel is written for its sake') is that Alexander celebrated his 
survival by building multiple churches and places of worship in Russian cities.
 265
 
Similarly relevant is the continued influence and power that the Russian Church 
enjoyed, more generally, under Alexander (despite his reform agenda), the expansion 
of which in 1866 was only a part. Under Alexander, primary education, for example, 
was left in sole purview of the Church,
266
 and despite Alexander's instigation of 
'emancipation' (which allowed the serfs’ communal ownership of land upon 
'redemption' payments) the Church retained possession of large amounts of land 
without tax. At the same time, in the light of poor agricultural yields, the Russian 
nobility began to sell poorly-worked and depleted land to communes, choosing to 
take jobs in a vastly expanding state bureaucracy (the expansion of which was 
primarily funded by redemption payments) and in the Church (again, exempt from 
such payments).
267
 Thus the state bureaucracy, the land owners, and the Church may 
well have been regarded as synonymous in the minds of the Russian middle class. 
The image of a Church Official (the Inquisitor), it could then be argued, would have 
presented the natural choice for a character intended to embody a self-serving 
bureaucracy at this point in the latter half of the nineteenth century.  
Many aspects of The Brothers Karamazov may similarly be seen as offering a 
commentary upon the growth of Russian bureaucracy and state institutions, 
particularly those of the Orthodox Church and the Legal System.  In 1864 - two 
years before the events in the novel are set - local assemblies (Zemstvos) were, for 
example, established as part of Alexander II's ongoing attempts at social reform. It is 
these attempts to abolish serfdom from above which Frank suggests account for 
Dostoevsky's (possibly biased) support for Alexander II, as 'Dostoevsky had become 
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a revolutionary only to abolish serfdom and only after the seeming dissolution of all 
hope that it would be ended'.
268
 These assemblies effectively acted as franchises, 
with centralised funding provided to recruited officials in exchange for the provision 
of provincial and county government services. Such assemblies orchestrated the 
delivery of a new, 'liberal' legal system (liberal in the sense that it had a jury system 
rather than in terms of the actual legislation that it passed).
269
  Dostoevsky opposed 
the new system, not because he approved of its predecessor, but because he appeared 
to wish for a legal system that would focus upon moral accountability rather than the 
details of the crime itself, and which focused on reprobation - undoing the harms 
caused and alleviating suffering - rather than punishment. Dostoevsky was critical of 
the existing Russian system of trials, describing how ‘my way [trial by jury] could 
not be implemented and that [the opinion is] that “the more mechanical it is, the 
better”.’270  In attempting to ensure liberal principles were maintained, the new 
judicial administration became increasingly systematised from 1864, and 
Dostoevsky overtly criticised these courts as out of touch with the realities of those 
they passed judgment upon. This perception may have been furthered by the 
introduction of a jury system, judges appointed for life, and justices of the peace who 
handled minor local offenses. These reforms, however, excluded the existing peasant 
volst courts, discarding many years of established case law, and which could 
therefore be perceived as the imposition of a legal system. The emphasis upon 
abstract principles, pre-described offences, and mandated sentences were critically 
highlighted by Dostoevsky in his description of the trial of one Mrs. Dzhunkovsky. 
Mrs Dzhunkosky was tried, and acquitted, for child abuse and neglect in a manner 
mocking the Apnoeic alienated justification: 
As I said earlier, the defendants were acquitted. And why not? What’s 
remarkable is not that they were acquitted but that they were charged and 
brought to trial. Who – what court – could have found them guilty, and 
of what? Oh, of course there is a court that could find the guilty and 
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show clearly of what, but it is not a criminal court with horrors who 
judge by written law.
271
   
Kucherov argued that this distrust of ‘mechanical’ institutions, which dictated 
quantitative decisions according to abstract legal criteria, anticipates a pervasive 
approach of seeing institutions as distinct from the citizenry.
272
 In effect, in an 
attempt lay a formal moral foundation for the legal system, the law became removed 
from the individual circumstances faced by the courts. 
Book Twelve of The Brothers Karamazov, ‘Judicial Error’, details the wrongful trial 
and conviction of Dmitri Karamazov for the murder of Fyodor Karamazov, father of 
Ivan, Dmitri and Alyosha. This event, too, correlates to historical occurrences in 
Russia in the 1860s-70s. In 1864 Alexander II attempted a reform of the judiciary, 
abolishing the pre-existing system of class-based courts. Alexander's reforms were, 
however, only partially successful.
273
 Although juries were introduced, and the 
police were somewhat reformed, the administrative authority still monopolised the 
volost courts run by, and on behalf of, the nobility. In The Brothers Karamazov, 
significantly, Dmitri Karamazov is tried by a jury. Yet Dostoevsky presents the jury 
process in an entirely negative light, and presents the jury itself as hopelessly 
fragmented, contradictory and incoherent: 
‘A solid speech’, a gentleman in one group observed ... 
‘he brought in too much psychology’ said another ... 
‘But it was all true, the absolute truth!’ ...  
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‘... But that was all rot’.274 
Similarly, in the 1877 trial of Mrs. Dzhunkovsky, Dostoevsky criticises the jury as 
having no frame of reference within which to judge the conditions that drove 
Dzhukovsky to behave in the manner she did, and the court system as consequently 
valuing formalistic procedure over proportionate justice, that what is 'remarkable is 
not that they were acquitted but that they were charged and brought to trial'.
275
 
Dostoevsky authored further articles concerning the trials of Kronenberg and 
Kornilova in December 1877, both individuals accused of child abuse, which the 
author Fetyukovich later criticised as using an inappropriately empathetic narrative 
in defence of their actions as being acts of ignorance.
276
 When viewed in the context 
of Dostoevsky's criticisms of the growing abstraction of legal institutions, the 
Karamazov trial presents, then, a portrayal of a formalized, mechanical process 
echoing both the Kronenberg and Kornilova trials and the trial of Mrs. 
Dzhunkovsky, and representative of the specific operations of the state, of the kind 
later perceived by Adorno and Horkeimer: ‘The formalization of reason is only the 
intellectual expression of mechanized production. The means is fetishized…’277 The 
apparent ambivalence in the depiction of the expected role of the ‘jury’ becomes an 
example, in this way, of the capacity which apparently immutable concepts such as 
truth, fact and justice have to be reconfigured by their institutional settings. As with 
the trial of Dmitri, Dostoevsky’s journalism reports the juries' detachment from and 
objectification of the defendant as resulting from a lack of sensibility rather than 
prejudice, while their interest in the case is depicted as prurient rather than civic. 
Equally, Dmitri's jury also provides an interesting contrast to the earlier, more 
fantastical, encounter between the Inquisitor and the Man, in which the Inquisitor is 
both the judge and jury. Both instances may be viewed as undesirable extremes, for 
Dostoevsky, and further imply that the content of the main body of The Brothers 
Karamazov was intended to reflect, in part, upon the contemporary failures of the 
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liberal reforms of the late nineteenth century. Whereas, then, a philosopher such as 
David Hume suggested, writing in the eighteenth century, in exemplary 
Enlightenment fashion, that while law may, in some instances, run counter to an 
individual’s private interests, the formalism of the legal system benefits society as a 
whole, Dostoevsky's journalistic and novelistic depictions reject such a clear 
differentiation between individual interest and social benefits. Just as the Inquisitor is 
portrayed as an individual principally defined by his role, so this role is contained 
within the text's larger depiction of the institution of the Church - an institution with 
which the fate of the Karamazov family is entangled. In this way, Dostoevsky may 
be read as arguing throughout The Brothers Karamazov for the importance of the 
individual's role in virtuous social institutions - one instance of which may be seen in 
his depiction of the jury. 'The Grand Inquisitor' acts, in this regard, as a kind of 
centralising point within the novel.   
In Russia throughout the 'liberal reforms' of this era, there appears to have been a 
tendency to turn to the Church as a default authority. While the Orthodox Church 
represented the faith of the nobility, 'Old Believers' and sectarians comprised 
approximately one third of the Russian population, and the economic interests of the 
Church were also tied to the existing establishment, as it was dependent upon the 
State for its income and exempt from paying taxes.  Throughout the nineteenth 
century elementary education was left to the Church, and its influence was such that 
(even after the many attempted reforms during the reign of Tzar Alexander II) 
Pobedonostsev could describe the role of the Orthodox Church in 1896 as being 'to 
inspire the people with respect for the law and for power'.
278
 The continuance of such 
a symbiotic relationship between Church and State may have been read by 
Dostoevsky as illustrative of the tendency of Alexander's program to stop short of 
true reform. Thus it appears that a reading of 'The Grand Inquisitor' which analyses 
the character of the Inquisitor as being a representative of the type of official 
Dostoevsky feared would emerge from an authoritarian state, positions the 
Inquisitor's justifications as an 'exposé' (обличение ) of the mind of such an 
administration as it is embodied in an individual (and psychologically realistic) 
figure. Dostoevsky's novel depiction of the administrator figure, by comparison to 
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earlier depictions, is that rather than being an 'avatar', if you will, of the institution, 
the Inquisitor's rationales and justifications appear to pre-empt those of the 
systematised power structure he represents, and, in turn, his apparent individual 
flaws and seemingly self-motivated justifications are themselves represented as 
allegories for institutional bias and corruption.  
Stupid Socialism   
Dostoevsky's journalistic critique of the Tsarist bureaucracy was overt. However, 
Dostoevsky was equally clear regarding his reservations concerning much of the 
socialist activism in Russia at the time. Indeed, 'The Grand Inquisitor' itself seems to 
support the interpretation that while Dostoevsky joined such Socialists in opposing 
many of the existing dysfunctional social organisations, he feared the potential for 
the underlying ideals of many forms of Socialism, far from offering a freedom from 
the tyranny of top-down control, to lead to individuals becoming more reliant upon 
systems, institutions and collective bodies by virtue of their reliance on the power of 
state as a means of social change.  
The 'Grand Inquisitor' is introduced within the novel by the character Ivan as a 
‘poem’ which he is in the process of composing (выдумал), and which he recites to 
his brother, Alyosha. The 'poem' is set in Seville, during the Spanish Inquisition of 
the sixteenth century. It is, in effect, a fable describing the journey of ‘the Man', and 
appears to be about the second coming of Christ (there is a level of pseudo-
ambiguity about the identity of 'the Man'). The Man walks through the city, and 'He' 
conveys 'His' identity to the people through 'Light, enlightenment, and power';
279
 
qualities which will serve as a counterpoint to the qualities of 'miracle, mystery and 
authority'
280
 (чудо, тайна и авторитет) which the Inquisitor later asserts are the 
superior virtues of the Church. The Inquisitor, a character loosely based upon the 
first Grand Inquisitor Tomás de Torquemada, commands his troops to imprison the 
Man. The Inquisitor subsequently ‘interrogates’ the Man, but effectively delivers a 
monologue, as the Man remains silent throughout. The reason for the Man's silence 
is guessed at by the Inquisitor as being that, were He to speak, '[w]hatever Thou 
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revealist anew will encroach on men's freedom of faith'.
281
 At the end of the 
Inquisitor's exposition, the Man, who at no point confirms or denies His identity, 
kisses the Inquisitor, a kiss which 'glows in his heart, but the old man adheres to his 
idea'.
282
 The Inquisitor commands the Man to 'Go, and come no more', and the poem 
ends with: 'Prisoner went away'.
283
 The majority of the poem's content comprises the 
Inquisitor's arguments concerning freedom, whose exposition incorporates the three 
temptations of Christ as they are described in the New Testament, Matthew 4:1–11.  
The monologue of the Inquisitor concerns a re-interpretation of Satan’s three 
temptations, interpreted in a way which appears to imbue (or, possibly, to 
'supplement') each temptation with societal ramifications (rather than the essentially 
spiritual or moral meanings they had within the gospel) and to interpret these 
ramifications.
284
 The interpretations which the Inquisitor gives, however, reveal a 
strong bias towards authoritarianism and against individual faith. The Inquisitor 
frames the first temptation, that of bread for all, as having the quality of 'miracle'. 
'Miracle' becomes, when presented by the Inquisitor, an economic proposition: the 
removal of want. The Inquisitor asserts that bread was 'the one infallible banner 
which was offered Thee to make all men bow down to Thee alone'.
285
 This first 
argument sets the tone for the Inquisitor's wider argument by asserting the 
proposition that Christ misunderstood the 'true' nature of human psychology, that 
Christ 'dist ask far too much from him [man] - Thou who hast loved him more than 
Thyself',
286
 and that the Church will 'persuade them [mankind] that they will only 
become free when they renounce their freedom to use ... They will be convinced that 
we are right, for they will remember the horrors ... Thy freedom brought them'.
287
  
The second temptation, to 'cast Thyself down' from 'the pinnacle of the temple', 
constitutes Christ's heavenly protection, and is presented by the Inquisitor as offering 
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the potential ability to acquire psychological power over the people.
288
 The Inquisitor 
also asserts that in the absence of 'mystery', mankind 'will worship deeds of sorcery 
and witchcraft'
289
 leading to 'unrest, confusion and unhappiness - that is the present 
lot of man after Thou didst bear so much for their freedom'.
290
 According to the 




The third temptation, possession of all kingdoms of the world by accepting 'the 
sword of Caesar', becomes 'authority' in the Inquisitor's schema, and is described in 
terms of political power. Specifically, the Inquisitor asserts that human beings desire 
submission to a universal state that can provide universal peace and security: 'we 
shall persuade them that they will only become free when they renounce their 
freedom to us and submit to us'.
292
  
Dostoyevsky’s representation of the Inquisitor might perhaps be related here to a text 
such as Saint-Simon's 1825 book The New Christianity, which advocated a return to 
a form of authentic ‘Christianity’. Saint-Simon became retrospectively associated 
with socialism as the term was used to refer to his ideas by later admirers, and it is 
quite possible, of course, that in Dostoevsky's mind Saint-Simon was not one of the 
advocates of 'stupid socialism', and that his work was merely co-opted by the later 
movements of which Dostoevsky disapproved. Nonetheless, it is significant that in 
The New Christianity Saint-Simon argued for what, in today's vernacular, would bear 
rather more resemblance to a technocracy (a form of government controlled by 
experts) than a Theocracy (rule by the divine or divinely inspired of the type 
advocated by Augustine in his City of God).
293
 As Saint-Simon wrote in The New 
Christianity (1825), 'the new clergy, basically, will... teach the new Christian 
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The New Christianity will have ... its clergy, and there will be leaders 
among this clergy ... the New Christians will regard the moral doctrine as 
the most important element of their religion; they will look upon ritual 
and dogma only as accessories ... All men must behave as brothers 
toward one another; and this ... will be presented as the principle that 
today must be the aim of all religious activity.
295
  
Saint-Simon argues that it is, above all, industrial advancement that heralds such 
social change, describing how 'the more society progresses, the more its religious 
rituals have to be perfected; for the object of religious ritual is to draw the attention 
of men regularly assembling on their days of rest to the interests common to all 
members of society, to the general interests of mankind'.
296
 Dostoevsky's Inquisitor, 
in stark contrast, has no plans for social development. The Inquisitor does not 
describe his role, or the role of the Church, as being to advance humanity, rather he 
describes their role as being to prevent humanity's decline.  If there are, then, certain 
similarities between Saint-Simon's description of the New Christianity, and the 
Inquisitor's description of his own role, this relies upon a co-option of Saint-Simon's 
central ideas in ‘socialist’ thought, and in particular the place of the state within it, 
rather than any direct instantiation of them. To the extent that 'The Grand Inquisitor' 
story may therefore be read as engaging with the exploitation and misinterpretation 
of the ideas of thinkers such as Saint-Simon, the Inquisitor character’s justifications 
seem to illustrate the abuses of ideology Dostoevsky apparently associated with 
'stupid socialism' more generally.  
In fact, it is striking the degree to which Dostoevsky's early writing (as with, for 
example, the character in The Landlady, Ordynov) appears supportive of many of 
those positions advanced in favour of 'Utopian socialism'; a socialism which, 
according to Marx and Engels, 'inculcated universal asceticism and social levelling 
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in its crudest form'.
297
 During his imprisonment and exile in 1849, however, 
Dostoevsky appears to have come to believe that life under a radical socialist 
programme, which enforced communal living and a pooling of resources, would 
constitute the generalized conditions of a prison camp. Dostoevsky himself admitted 
that Notes from the House of the Dead was an autobiographical account, and it may 
be assumed that it was his experiences during this incarceration which lead to his 
apparent disenchantment with the 'socialist state' that was described by contemporary 
Utopians as a form of communal living.
298
  
Dostoevsky's account of prison life included his reaction to the suppression of 
individual autonomy he found in prison: 
Later I came to know that, besides the deprivation of liberty, besides 
the compulsory labour, there is another torment in prison life, also 
more unbearable than all the rest. This is being forced to live herded 
together. Community life, of course, exists elsewhere ... but I am 




Rather than valuing the scarce luxuries afforded them more, or becoming removed 
from material desires, or forming a commune in which goods were distributed based 
upon one's ability to provide or upon one's need, Dostoevsky describes instead how a 
prisoner would 'squander all ... [their] earnings, down to the last copeck, in one day 
and then once more plod away at work for months, until the next outbreak'.
300
  
In fact, the 'stupid socialism' Dostoevsky describes appears to be, above all, the 
'Utopian Socialism' advocated by Nikolai Chernyshevsky, Nikolai Dobrolyubov and 
others within Russia itself - that form of socialism promoted in the journal 
Sovermennik ('The Contemporary'), which ran from 1836 to 1866. This magazine 
appears to have become associated in the consciousness of the middle and upper 
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class with radical socialism, as seen when it was forced to close down as part of the 
official response to the assassination attempt on Alexander II in the June of 1866. 
Dostoevsky's critique of socialism should not, then, be confused with a direct 
critique of, say, Marxism, which in 1866 had yet to become a major influence in the 
Russian socialist movement. Indeed, one might note some marked similarities 
between Marx's analysis of bureaucracy in his 1843 Contribution to the Critique of 
Hegel's Philosophy of Right as a 'hierarchy of knowledge',
301
 in which for the 
bureaucrat 'the world is a mere object to be manipulated by him',
302
 and the 
Inquisitor's assertion that the Church 'proclaimed ourselves sole rulers of the earth ... 
and shall be Caesars, and then we shall plan the universal happiness of man'.
303
 
Similarly, Marx also associates the Church with bureaucracy, and, in so doing, 
argues that both religions and state bureaucracies utilise ideology primarily to 
achieve benefits for their individual members (or class): 
[T]he Catholic Church was the real presence of ... the Holy Trinity ... In 
bureaucracy the state interest and particular private aim is established in 




Arguments around the role of the State, and the role bureaucracy should perform 
within the State, were central to the debates around the various contemporary 
interpretations of Socialism, and comparisons between elements of these 
interpretations may be drawn with aspects of The Brothers Karamazov. Hegel 
located the dignity of man in his being a vehicle of rational will and morality in the 
will of universal reason, to which man, as a rational being, will seek to conform. The 
State, for Hegel, is man's second nature, achieved through escalation of common life: 
the family, which provides a unity based on feeling; civil society, achieved through 
contracts and external ties; and the State, in which unity is mediated by reason. The 
central tenant of Hegel's thesis, that the universe exhibits reason and that this reason 
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is God (or Geist)
305
, and, more specifically, that society is the manifestation of man's 
rationality, is however directly denied by the Inquisitor, telling the man: 'I swear, 
man is weaker and baser by nature than Thou hast believed him! ... He is weak and 
vile ... unrest, confusion and unhappiness - that is the present lot of man after Thou 
dist bear so much of their freedom!'
306
 Charles Taylor notes a direct convergence 
between Marx and Hegel's interpretation of the division of labour and 
industrialisation in relation to personal empowerment; and Taylor notes a dichotomy 
between Hegel's perception of bourgeois economy as something to be contained 
within the ultimate reason of the State with Marx's belief that the State was itself 
conditioned by economic relations.
307
 The Inquisitor, however, sees the State as the 
direct consequence of inherent human weakness: 
'all that man seeks on earth... someone to worship, someone to keep his 
conscience, and some means of uniting ... Mankind as a whole has 
always strived to organize a universal state. There have been many great 
nations... the more highly they were developed the more unhappy they 




This is at the crux of the Inquisitor's rejection of the man (Christ) and the Inquisitor's 
belief that the institution of the Church has improved upon the naiveté of 
Christianity, promising that: 
 '...we shall persuade them that they will only become free when they 
renounce their freedom to us and submit to us. And shall we be right or 
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shall we be lying? They will be convinced that we are right, for they will 




The Inquisitor's argument, that true freedom is the psychological refuge from the 
horrors of slavery and confusion engendered by freedom, could be read as a 
dystopian rendering of a society in which 'conflicts within civil society were held in 
check and rationally synthesized in the supreme will of the state', as Kolakowski 
interpreted Hegel as desiring.
310
 The obviously maleficent manner in which the 
Inquisitor presents such a system is reminiscent of  Marx's objection to the same 
assertion by Hegel - Marx's objection being that such dynamics inevitably engender 
'contradiction between his private capacity and his capacity as a citizen'.
311
 It 
appears, therefore, that the Inquisitor desires to not only have the Church intercede 
with society's ordering, but with the citizen's very thoughts. This appears, too, to be 
Dostoevsky's primary over-arching objection to the old Tzarist regime, the reformist 
agenda, and to the Russian socialists: that these models all, in their different ways, 
aspire to administrate the internal dynamics of the individual.     
Within the context of The Brothers Karamazov, the world described by the Inquisitor 
would, the novel suggests in an exposition of Alyosha's beliefs, lead inevitably then 
to what is described as a socialist state: 
[I]f he [Alyosha] had decided that God and immortality did not exist, he 
would at once have become an atheist and a socialist. For socialism is 
not merely the labour question, it is before all things the atheistic 
question, the question of the form taken by atheism to-day, the question 
of the tower of Babel built without God, not to mount to heaven from 
earth but to set up heaven on earth.
312
 
If Dostoevsky, by his own assertion, intended the poem to comment upon the 'stupid 
socialism' of the mid to late nineteenth century, then, writing ‘as himself’, he also 
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provides a counter in his diary, a few years before commencing work on the novel, 
to the claims made by the Inquisitor: 
An organism as exalted as Russia cannot be satisfied with material 
advantage alone, cannot be satisfied with ‘bread’ alone. This is neither an 




‘The Grand Inquisitor’ is not, in terms of a first reading at least, obscure. The 
Inquisitor clearly lays out his ideology and explains his reasons for his actions. The 
idea that society is, in some sense, opposed to (or at least suppressive of) the 
individual and is, at best, disinterested in the individuated states of being of 
individuals, such as faith, love or authenticity, is articulated by the Inquisitor. And, 
as a general theme, this relation between individual freedom and state cohesion is 
one that is certainly explored within much early 'socialist' philosophy in the wake of 
Hegel and Rousseau. For example, Rousseau's description of how an individual who 
seeks power should act bears some striking similarities to the justifications of the 
Inquisitor: 
Anyone who dares to undertake the founding of a people should feel 
himself capable of changing human nature, so to speak, of transforming 
each individual, who himself is a perfect and solitary whole, into part of 
a greater whole from which this individual receives, in a way, his life and 
his being; of altering the human constitution in order to strengthen it, and 
of substituting a partial and artificial existence for the physical and 
independent existence we have all received from nature.
314
  
While Rousseau's interpretation of community as a collective venture seeks to raise 
its constituent members to a new level, however, Dostoevsky presents his Inquisitor 
as a direct inversion of this ideal: one who seeks to co-opt this process, asserting that 
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'man is tormented by no greater anxiety than to find someone quickly to whom he 
can hand over that gift of freedom'.
315
 As he continues: the people 'will be convinced 
that we are right, for they will remember the horrors of slavery and confusion to 
which Thy freedom brought them'.
316
 Here, Dostoevsky may not be offering a 
counter to Rousseau, or the wider ideals of a 'greater whole', but, rather, suggesting 
how an emphasis upon the means rather than the ends of such endeavours may lead 
to greater alienation.  
Dostoevsky's Inquisitor is, in some sense, seeking to 'liberate' the ideals of the 
Church from the founder and transpose this authority to the institution. In the 
broadest terms, the process of establishing core principles with the goal of their 
being adopted en masse through the formation of ‘universal’ institutions underpins 
much of early socialist thought. However, this process opens the way for the 
phenomenon which 'The Grand Inquisitor' examines: the danger that as individuated 
interventions (such as individual patronage or even aristocratic rule in which any 
single figure with enough authority may intervene, be appealed to, or remove) are 
abandoned (or even outlawed) in favour of collective responses (such as a jury or 
local councils, in which the regulating effects of responsibility and accountability 
become weakened) the power of abstract systems and their ‘personification’ in 
system regulators will increase. In fact, the point is that Dostoevsky was not 
attacking any precise position advocated by any one of the many forms of socialism 
active within Russia during the mid-nineteenth century. Rather, reading the 
Inquisitor as an administrator character suggests, the ‘poem’ constitutes a clear but 
more general warning about how all revolutionary or reformist ideals may be 
perverted, via the mediation of the state and its bureaucratic administrators, for 
institutional (as well as personal) ends. 
Men of Systems - Reservations concerning Enlightenment  
The theme of the betrayal of ideals in 'The Grand Inquisitor' is no way limited purely 
to an engagement with 'stupid socialism' or the Tsar's Bureaucracy. There are 
multiple instances in Dostoevsky's writing where the values and institutions derived 
from Russia's early history, such as the Orthodox Church and the village commune, 
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are placed in opposition to distorted representations of ideals held to be synonymous 
with 'Western rationalism', and many of the Enlightenment values championed in 
Russia in the second half of the eighteenth century by Catherine the Great. In 
'Rebellion', for example, Ivan recounts the story of a prisoner, who converted the 
night before execution, and was therefore met and embraced by 'the aristocratic and 
well-bred society of the town', but was still executed.
317
  This pamphlet, Ivan relates, 
was 'translated into Russian by some Russian philanthropists of aristocratic rank and 
evangelical aspirations, and has been distributed gratis for the enlightenment of the 
people'.
318
 Ivan claims that although, to Russians, is seems 'absurd to cut off a man's 
head, because he has become our brother and has found grace', that Russians 'have 
our own speciality', which is 'inflicting pain'.
319
 Ivan's anecdote seems to depict 
precisely the adoption of the language of faith to justify the use of force which he, 
Ivan, relays on behalf of the Inquisitor, and Dostoevsky's overt references to the 
proliferation and approval by the aristocracy of this process serve as the introductory 
passages leading to 'The Grand Inquisitor'.   
Priscilla Mayer has argued that Dostoevsky, and other writers of the era, responded 
to the intellectual caché which French literature had achieved within the Russian 
aristocracy. Mayer argues that, in Crime and Punishment in particular, Dostoevsky 
'sets French subtexts into dialogue with the force that was to overcome the moral 
failure he feels they represent', thereby responding to the French tradition by 
emphasising morality and philosophy and drawing on the Russian narrative 
traditions including Pushkin and Orthodox Christian writings.
320
 More broadly, 'The 
Grand Inquisitor' (as well as several of Dostoevsky's other works) may be seen to be 
presenting corrupted interpretations of Enlightenment ideas, possibly mimicking 
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In broader terms the relationship proposed in Dostoyevsky’s later works between 
Russia and Western Europe is a contentious one, in which Russia must beware of 
cultural domination, with the implicit suggestion that Russia's ruling classes may be 
adopting European social structures and institutions for personal gain, at the cost of 
Russia's identity. There appears to be no doubt that Dostoevsky was well versed in 
European literature (‘He liked to read Walter Scott... Charles Dickens... he did not 
like Thackerary. He liked to read Balzac’),322 yet, equally, he appears to have acutely 
felt, and even resented, the influence of European culture in Russia: 
Who of us Russians (those, at least, that read periodicals) does not know 
Europe twice as well as he knows Russia? I have put down ‘twice’ 
merely out of politeness, I should probably have said ‘ten times 
better’.323 
If Dostoevsky, therefore may be seen as having, in some sense, 'translated' the realist 
novel into a 'Russian' context, both in terms of content and in terms of form, in order 
to use a favoured mode of artistic expression (the 'language', if you will) of the 
Russian Upper Classes and establishments,
324
 he also appears to have intended to use 
it to deliver both a direct criticism of unthinking adoption of Western European 
culture and to present existing Russian folk culture as colourful and intellectually 
vigorous. Auerbach interpreted Dostoevsky's goals as being broadly 'thematic' in this 
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sense, citing Lacerteux's argument that Russian literature became a conduit for a 
particular set of themes and modes of presentation: 
'[Russian literature] ...is based on a Christian and traditionally patriarchal 
concept of the creatural dignity of every human individual regardless of 
social rank and position, and hence that it is fundamentally related rather 
to old-Christian than to modern occidental realism'.
325
 
These 'anti-themes' may, collectively, be read as rejecting many of the underlying 
assumptions perceived by the authors in Western Europe and the Western-Europhilic 
Upper Classes, Liberals such as the character Pyotor Alexandrovich Miusov, whose 
material advantages so cushioned them from the practical impact social upheaval 'of 
the type common in the [eighteen] forties and fifties' that the Paris Revolution of 
February 1848 could be classed as, in a phrase from The Brothers Karamazov, 'one 
of the most comforting recollections'.
326
 
We can also see that Dostoevsky was consciously and overtly entering into pan-
European debates surrounding a number of social and political issues, ranging from 
the role of the state to modern economic behaviour. Yet, as Moretti observes, in 
Russian nineteenth-century literature, including Dostoevsky, one often finds 'an 
uncanny radicalization of Western ideas that liberates their destructive potential', 
'placing bourgeois values as far as possible from their original context, to capture 
their unique mix of greatness and catastrophe'.
327
  
In this light it is worth remarking that there are notable similarities between, for 
example, the Inquisitor and the ‘man of systems’ described in Smith’s (1758) Theory 
of Moral Sentiments. Significantly, Scottish Enlightenment ideals, imported into 
Russia, are also referenced directly within Dostoevsky’s earlier Crime and 
Punishment (1866). Two passages, for example, describe ‘political economy’ as one 
of many confused misconstrued justifications used by Raskolnikov: 
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‘But Mr. Lebeziatnikov who keeps up with modern ideas explained the 
other day that compassion is forbidden nowadays by science itself, and that 
that's what is done now in England, where there is political economy.’ 
‘[I]f I were told, “love thy neighbour,” what came of it? ... Economic truth 
adds that the better private affairs are organised in society--the more whole 
coats, so to say—the firmer are its foundations and the better is the common 
welfare organised too. Therefore, in acquiring wealth solely and exclusively 
for myself, I am acquiring, so to speak, for all ... as a consequence of the 
general advance.’ 328 
The ‘man of systems’, who is ‘so enamoured with the supposed beauty of his own 
ideal plan of government, that he cannot suffer the smallest deviation from any part 
of it’, directly corresponds, too, to the heart of the Inquisitor’s polemic: that neither 
the Inquisitor’s representation of the Church nor the man of system’s government 
‘consider that the pieces upon the chess-board have no other principle of motion 
besides that which the hand impresses upon them’.329 Dostoevsky through the 
character of Ivan emphasises, however, different aspects of the Inquisitor’s 
motivation than those of Smith’s man of systems who ‘goes on to establish [the 
system] completely and in all its parts, without any regard either to the great 
interests, or to the strong prejudices which may oppose it’.330  The aspect of the 
Inquisitor’s character that demands that ‘the man’ ‘mayest not add to what has been 
said of old, and mayest not take from men the freedom which Thou dist exalt when 
Thoust was on earth’ has moved beyond merely justifying the system, to this 
additional equation of the system itself with a moral imperative.
331
 Thus the 
Inquisitor ‘begs the question’, by first crediting the system with the traits of a moral 
imperative, and then arguing that these traits contribute towards its status as 
'moral'.
332
 Smith contrasts the man of systems with the ‘man whose public spirit is 
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prompted altogether by humanity and benevolence' and 'will respect the established 
powers and privileges even of individuals, and still more those of the great orders 
and societies, into which the state is divided’.333 Where Smith contrasts the man of 
systems with the man of benevolence, Dostoevsky contrasts ‘the man’ (Jesus) 
against the Inquisitor. Just as Smith suggested a man compelled by a public spirit 
would avoid force in favour of understanding, Dostoevsky implies that the Inquisitor 
lacks the ability to respond intuitively to 'the man', and is instead compelled by his 
role within society to behave coercively.
334
  
In Crime and Punishment, the character of Petrovitch attempts to justify his crimes 
by citing ideas which appear to be drawn from Smith: 
Science now tells us, love yourself before all men, for everything in the 
world rests on self-interest. You love yourself and manage your own 
affairs properly and your coat remains whole. Economic truth adds that 
the better private affairs are organised in society--the more whole coats, 
so to say ˜the firmer are its foundations and the better is the common 
welfare organised too. Therefore, in acquiring wealth solely and 
exclusively for myself, I am acquiring, so to speak, for all, and helping to 
bring to pass my neighbour's getting a little more than a torn coat; and 




This is Petrovitch’s own interpretation of Darwinian theory and laissez faire 
economics, but, in order to attribute motive, Petrovitch's citation of a misunderstood 
Classical Economics is effective because of its context, rather than its content: 
Petrovitch could just as easily mis-cite Augustine’s doctrine of dualism or 
Machiavelli’s theory of the fox and lion. It is the fact that Petrovitch’s justifications 
for his opportunism appear to be internally authentic (that is, genuinely believed) 
which leads the reader to question both the idea espoused, and Petrovitch's 
interpretation. Just as with Petrovitch, the Inquisitor's arguments are, it seems, not 
intended to be presented in order to be challenged or to present a deliberate series of 
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propositions leading to a conclusion. Rather, Petrovitch and the Inquisitor are 
presented as character studies illustrating the dangers of any internalising of such 
‘abstract’ arguments, and then taking the arguments themselves as end points rather 
than as a means to uncover truth or ensure right action. In this way, both Petrovitch 
and the Inquisitor – each of whom have reasoned arguments for their actions, and 
display reason in their exposition and advocacy of them - seem to challenge a 
fundamental premise of Enlightenment thought that reason alone is sufficient in 
addressing social and personal welfare issues. It is easy to draw an analogy here 
between the arguments advanced by Petrovitch and the Inquisitor with the manner of 
institution with which each character seems to identify: Petrovitch with the 
solipsistic individualism of an unregulated ‘civil society’, the Inquisitor with the 
authoritarianism of the state. If Dostoevsky does suggest an alternative to the 
Enlightenment belief that society may be best served through the establishment of a 
set of fundamental principles, imposed and proliferated through institutions founded 
upon these principles, it is that virtues are not external criteria to be imposed. In 
particular, Dostoevsky appears, through his favourable depiction of Zosima’s life in 
The Brothers Karamazov, to suggest that, contra the Inquisitor, virtues are qualities 
to be achieved through acts and faith rather than rules to be enforced, and that which 
is virtuous must be sought out and applied on an individual basis. 
An Omen - Conclusions and implications 
It seems Dostoevsky sought to depict the internal justifications used by those who 
would pursue ideological ends blind to the potential costs (in this instance, to the 
costs to existing communities and customs, and in terms of personal relationships 
with one's environment). If this is in some sense true, it follows that critics who have 
taken his work out of its specific historical and ideological context may have missed 
many of it its intended references, and subsequently interpreted the Inquisitor rather 
too 'literally' - as a character who illustrates 'innate' traits within humanity in general. 
The reading of the story by Erich Fromm, in his book Escape from Freedom, 
appears, for example, to embody such a 'dislocation' in reading Dostoevsky outside 
of his critical engagement with the ideas and politics of his time, and instead seeing 
within the poem evidence of a ‘universal’ truth that '[b]oth the masochistic and 
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Notoriously, Fromm analyzes the conceptions of freedom and authority espoused by 
the Grand Inquisitor and relates these to modern political movements, especially the 
phenomenon of Hitler’s Nazi Germany. In this way, Fromm connects the attitudes 
expressed by the Inquisitor directly to Hitler’s understanding of how to mobilize the 
masses, quoting extensively from Mein Kampf, and emphasizing Hitler’s insight that 
the Nazi movement provided security and safety for people who feared the terrible 
uncertainty in Germany after the First World War. 
 
In this situation [of powerlessness] to quote a telling description of 
Dostoevsky, in The Brothers Karamazov he has ‘no more pressing need 
than the one to find somebody to whom he can surrender, as quickly as 
possible, that gift of freedom which he, the unfortunate creature, was 
born with’.337 
If Fromm implies that this may be taken as an unchanging capacity of the human 
condition – albeit one that achieves an extreme expression in fascism – a reading of 
the Inquisitor as an administrator character, it could be argued, relocates the poem, 
by contrast, within the particular historical and cultural context within which it was 
composed. Such a reading appears significantly more telling for an awareness of 
how power and freedom were perceived in Russia during the late nineteenth century.  
In fact, the attack within 'The Grand Inquisitor' on Utopian Socialism is perhaps 
most accurately read (possibly in spite of Dostoevsky's own intentions) as a 
summation or postscript to a failed enterprise. Indeed, it appears what Dostoyevsky 
most firmly intended the Inquisitor to represent was how the imposition of a 'top 
down' order, no matter how well intentioned, would benefit those already in power, 
already corrupt, and already exploiting the Russian people. Frank reads the poem as 
effectively Dostoevsky's attempt 'to praise Him for protecting the very foundation 
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of man’s humanity as Dostoevsky conceived it'.338 In this way he built upon the 
figure of the administrator character and provided it with a newly internalized and 
psychologically ‘real’ narrative and voice.  
The story of 'The Grand Inquisitor' itself, despite strong central themes, offers no 
clear solutions, and its ending appears deliberately open to interpretation. Criticism 
of the poem seems to support this deliberately open, ‘Rorshach’ quality. D. H. 
Lawrence reads the kiss, for example, as 'the kiss of acquiescence to the 
Inquisitor'
339
, while Rosen objects to reading the poem apart from the main body of 
the novel, arguing that the ambiguity of the poem itself is irrelevant when viewed in 
the context of the pro-Christian message of The Brothers Karamazov, for which 
(quoting Dostoevsky) ‘The whole novel serves as an answer’.340 Set within the wider 
context of the novel, however, Ivan’s ‘poem’ appears most significantly to be setting 
the stage for the later introduction and examination of Alyosha’s mentor Father 
Zosima, and this character's alternate interpretation of the role of the individual 
within society. The chapter ‘Notes on the Life in God of the Elder Zosima’ describes 
a key moment in his coming to faith. When Zosima was a young man, the woman he 
loved decided to marry another man.  Filled with vengeance, Zosima challenged his 
rival to a duel.  After a drunken night prior to the duel, Zosima asked himself 'what 
am I worth, that another man, a fellow creature, made in the likeness and image of 
God, should serve me', and remembers the dying words of this brother, Markel: 
‘Mother, my little heart, in truth we are each responsible to all for all, it's 
only that men don't know this. If they knew it, the world would be a 
paradise at once.’341 
Zosima's subsequent epiphany, that is was possible that he, himself, was 'more than 
all others responsible for all, a greater sinner than all men in the world' leads him to 
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seek the forgiveness from the servant he had beaten whilst drunk the night before, 
and then from his prospective duelling partner.
342
 
According to Zosima, it is not the state or institution, but the Christian realization 
that we are guilty, not only for our own failings but are also implicated in the 
wrongdoings of all people that moves us out of our atomistic, self-absorbed and self-
imposed shackles and frees us to experience love and intimacy with God and others.  
For Zosima this is not simply a personal realisation, but one with universal 
implications: that the 'salvation of Russia comes from the people'.
343
 Indeed, Zosima, 
as a man who responds to his environment by drawing on his past and engaging with 
his community, might be viewed as the direct counterpart to the Inquisitor in this 
respect. 
Couched this time within the context of a critique of the Catholic Church, in The 
Idiot the following words are spoken by the character of Prince Myshkin: 
‘Roman Catholicism in its essence .... is not exclusively a theological 
question. For socialism, too, is the child of Catholicism and the intrinsic 
Catholic nature! It, too, like its brother atheism, was begotten of despair 
... in order to replace the lost moral power of religion, to quench the 
spiritual thirst of parched humanity, and save it not by Christ, but also 
by violence!’344 
A constant external influence upon Dostoevsky throughout his literary career was a 
long sequence of social upheavals, in which alternative systems of social order were 
considered, and in which the power of bureaucracy and institution continued to rise. 
Dostoevsky's 'The Grand Inquisitor', when viewed as constructed around an 
administrator character, suggests an attempt to highlight the potentially alienating 
effects of institutions and administrations, and to agitate for a reappraisal of those 
means of existing collective organisation embodied in the ‘concrete’ notion of the 
‘people’, which have been abandoned in the quest for reform. The Inquisitor himself 
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may be read as the quintessential representation of an individual who has alienated 
himself from the rest of humanity through the positioning of an institution between 
himself and his fellow man. The Inquisitor views mankind as weak, selfish and 
petty, but refuses to appreciate his own complicity in this state of affairs. Thus 
Dostoevsky depicts the Inquisitor as an administrator character in order to illustrate 
how institutions, bureaucracies and administrations - regardless of their founding 
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‘Their Administration was a squeeze, nothing more’: Heart of Darkness and the 
monopoly 
 
Its impressionistic descriptions, non-linear nature, and framed narration cast Heart of 
Darkness as a work open to wide-ranging interpretations. However, in approaching 
the text with particular attention to the many characters who may be read as 
administrator characters, this chapter will attempt to demonstrate that Kurtz, the 
Company men, and ‘the Administration’ (significantly, Marlow uses the terms 
‘Administration’ and ‘the Company’ interchangeably) act within Heart of Darkness 
as manifestations of a kind of ‘unifying principle’, which, collectively, re-present the 
noble claims made by various figures within the text in defence of colonialism so as 
to portray them as disingenuous and corrupt. These ‘manifestations’, indicative of 
the forms of organisation and exploitation underlying colonialism, are presented 
symbolically rather than journalistically and emerge, I suggest, through the 
depictions of Kurtz, the Company Administration, the sleeping sickness, and an 
assortment of emblematic items in the novella which collectively form a causal chain 
that implicates Europe in those atrocities performed in the name of ‘civilisation’ of 
which it often presented itself as ‘formally’ ignorant.   
As has been widely recognised, Heart of Darkness breaks with traditional 
expectations of the novella form. Conrad incorporates elements of formal 
experimentation (most obviously seen in the impressionistic descriptive style), and 
while Heart of Darkness lacks subplots, the intense focus upon Marlow’s internal 
journey is choreographed against the journey which occupies the majority of the 
plot, producing encounters which are often simultaneously metaphors for both wider 
global interactions and Marlow’s own psychological development. The novella also 
incorporates multiple points of view (through the use of layered and unreliable 
narration) and a sense of generic adaptability (by containing elements of farce, satire, 
horror, and the epic) that are more often associated with a full novel.  It appears that 
in writing Heart of Darkness, Conrad treated such nineteenth-century ‘realist’ norms 
as the linear narrative, the unifying, reliable narrator, unambiguous symbolism, and 
internally motivated characters, with a degree of flexibility and ambiguity. Hence, 
linear narrative is replaced by weaving, non-linear recollections; the narration is 
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highly subjective; events have symbolic importance and highly symbolic items and 
descriptions have multiple possible interpretations; and, most importantly for our 
purposes, characters may often be read as if each is, above all, a symptom of some 
larger system or other phenomenon, reflecting their situation, their location and their 
culpability. Thus, when viewed through the prism of the administrator character, 
Heart of Darkness invites an approach to reading the novella, I will argue, as if 
reading a collection of symptoms and abstractions, intended to point towards the 
point at which formal language and symbolism breaks down and phenomena become 
ineffable.  
It is broadly accepted that Conrad was required to move beyond traditional literary 
techniques to satisfactorily depict a story which incorporated his own experiences in 
the Congo. Leavis described Conrad as using 'objective correlatives': details and 
facts which have 'specificities of emotion and suggestion with them'.
345
 Fothergill 
has even noted how Conrad used punctuation to add undertones to his passages.
346
 
Further to these stylistic choices, Conrad appears strongly driven by a desire to 
engage directly with politics and ideology. Conrad's interest in the causal 
relationship between character and systematic environment -- the internalisation of 
systematised power -- is drawn into sharp focus through this relationship with 
Dostoevsky. Ruppet has argued that Conrad's individual novels may be viewed as 
depending 'more on genre that on any overarching political perspective', with Heart 
of Darkness engaging with 'the politics of contemporary colonial fiction and the 
imperial Gothic'.
347
 Ruppet extends this reading by noting that Conrad's well 
documented desire to engage in intellectual and literary 'conflict' with Dostoevsky is 
very apparent in Under Western Eyes, which includes direct references to Crime and 
Punishment  in plot construction (both are character driven, both revolve around the 
committing of a crime and the subsequent persecution and confession), 
characterisation (both prominently include a psychologically conflicted and 
politically engaged student who feels persecuted by officialdom). Under Western 
Eyes, however, provides a direct and overt commentary upon the Russian autocracy 
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and seems to suggest Ziemianitch's internal conflict is a response to external, 
political and bureaucratic, influences, whereas Dostoevsky's Dementyev seems 
driven by existential conflict. We may, therefore, posit that Conrad attempted to 
depict in Heart of Darkness the phenomena of the agent (that an individual may in 
some sense be merely a product of an underlying system, and simultaneously 
embody that system); abstraction (that established symbols — even symbols of 
power, such as brutality or wealth — dissipate when forced outside of their specific 
setting); and of ineffability (that some forces defy formal description).  
‘It is his extremity that I seemed to live through’: the ineffable 
As has often been noted, Marlow’s narration frequently suggests an ineffable quality 
(too complex or abstract to be conveyed through direct description) to his recounted 
experiences, which may only be hinted at through his symbolic and multi-layered 
narrative. Just as there are ineffable qualities to both the subjective nature of the 
symptom and to how the outcomes of causal chains ultimately surpass their 
component elements, so Heart of Darkness attempts to indicate the ineffable through 
an illusion of narrative apophasis. This illusion occurs through the ways in which 
Conrad appears to only depict individual outcomes and instances, which indicate a 
deeper underlying cause that is itself beyond description. As with each aspect of 
Conrad’s literary style examined in this chapter — symptom, causality and 
ineffability — the administrator characters are points at which all three elements 
(elements which exist in the narrative as stylistic themes that may be traced and 
investigated independently) unite within the narrative and are expressed through 
characterisation. Simmel, writing in 1903, argued that: 
The deepest problems of modern life flow from the attempt of the 
individual to maintain the independence and individuality of his 
existence against the sovereign powers of society, against the weight 
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Simmel's case for their being a gap between individuals and supraindividual forms is 
echoed in Conrad's depiction of colonialism, and the effects it has on the individuals 
who both partake and are affected by it. The shared ethos of administrations is that 
information may be employed to create pre-determined outcomes. Heart of Darkness 
may represent a specific literary point of realisation — in the face of the stark 
contrast between the realities of the colonial project and its stated goal of 
proselytising civilised practices — that realising such a level of control on such a 
scale (by even the most ‘august benevolence’) was an illusion.  
Conrad, in his 1917 author’s note, asserts that he laid ‘no claim to artistic purpose’ 
and, writing about his stories, asserts that the ‘only bond between them is that of the 
time they were written’.349 This implies Marlow’s narrative may be viewed as 
deliberately contrived to mirror Conrad’s own series of disjointed experiences:  
 
‘... No, it is impossible; it is impossible to convey the life-sensation 
of any given epoch of one’s existence, – that which makes its truth, 
its meaning – its subtle and penetrating essence. It is impossible. 
We live, as we dream – alone ...’ 
 
The ineffable nature of what Conrad grapples with is acknowledged in his 22nd of 
December, 1902, letter to Edward Garnett, writing that ‘your brave attempt to 
grapple with the fogginess of HoD, to explain what I myself tried to shape blindfold 
[...] has touched me profoundly’.350 In this way, it could be said that Conrad 
effectively weaves existing but, as of the time of composition, unsystematically 
defined discourses into Marlow’s narration to indicate a series of questions - such as 
those concerning the ability to control versus the ability to understand - which 
imperialism and nationalism failed to address, and which could not be engaged 
directly in Conrad’s literary narrative.  
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Famously, Conrad’s recourse to the ineffable is criticised by Leavis. In The Great 
Tradition, Leavis takes issue with, for example, Conrad’s allusions to an ‘implacable 
force’, or ‘inscrutable intention’, and asks whether these are, actually, ‘an intrusion’, 
and whether, as such, ‘anything is to be added to the oppressive seriousness of the 
Congo by such sentences’?351  Indeed, Leavis goes further, suggesting Conrad may, 
here, be ‘convicted of borrowing the arts of the magazine-writer’, ‘intent on making 
a virtue out of not knowing what he means’; presumably referencing authors of 
popular fiction such as Poe who made frequent use of such adjectives as 
‘indescribable’ and ‘unspeakable’ as descriptive terms.352 Yet, it was not Conrad’s 
goal to provide an empirical account of the exploitation of the Congo, and just as 
Leavis praises Typhoon for its contained and objective narrative style, it is possible 
to view the ‘fogginess’ of Heart of Darkness as a positive feature of the text, with its 
own specific intent and effect.
353
 In fact, read in light of the way prior authors have 
used characterisation and character interaction both to reflect upon and analyse the 
emerging use of systematised knowledge — by the state, institutions, and individuals 
— through narrative, as has been traced in this thesis, and given the explicit 
emphasis in the novella upon how Europeans were not ‘colonialists, their 
administration was merely a squeeze, and nothing more, I suspect’, it seems clear 
that Conrad did, in fact, know what he meant in his use of such a language of the 
‘ineffable’.354 Leavis suggests that much of the power of the narrative of Heart of 
Darkness arises in response to a ‘whole wide context of peculiarities’ — that every 
scenario and vignette within the narrative references multiple other such instances 
within the narrative — generative of an atmosphere of ‘objective correlates’.355 
Building on Leavis' point, these correlates are reflected in the representation of 
several ‘objective’ aspects of the narrative  (the manager’s white suit, or the Russian 
boy’s patch work clothing, for example) as simultaneous correlates of subjective 
instances, open to multiple interpretations and experienced in multiple ways from 
multiple perspectives (the white suit and the patch work, for instance, convey 
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underlying economic and power relationships that are both symbolically and 
materially evident). Conrad incorporates within these ‘correlates’ the subjective and 
the ineffable. When Marlow tells Kurtz’s intended that the ‘last word he pronounced 
was – your name’, the reader knows full well that this is a lie. The reader is also 
made aware that out of feeling for the intended’s loss, social conventions, and the 
extent to which the intended — and, it is implied, the whole of European society at 
the time — was deluded as to Kurtz’s and the Company’s true nature, Marlow is 
incapable of telling the truth, and, indeed, even if he were to do so, Kurtz’s intended 
would not understand and quite probably disbelieve him.
356
  
At the turn of the century, argues the cultural historian Carl Schorske, among others, 
political mass movements in Europe were ‘weakening the traditional liberal 
confidence in its own legacy of rationality, moral law and progress’.357 Authors and 
thinkers during the cultural moments of Civic Humanism and the Enlightenment 
exploited literature as a medium ideally situated to analyse the interaction between 
new and established concepts. Within this literature, as we have seen, the 
administrator character provides a prism through which to view the text’s ideological 
hinterland, indicating the socio-political backdrop against which to read the text and 
to frame the debates with which it engages. Reading Heart of Darkness in this 
context implies that Conrad’s choice of a non-linear and impressionistic style 
functions as a direct response to the desire to dominate and systematise - a desire 
which appeared to run throughout the colonial project - and points to a loss of 
confidence in ‘rationality, moral law and progress’ as the true motivations 
underpinning it and purporting to give it coherence.  
Marlow articulates this desire for ‘rationality, moral law and progress’, but does so 
using the language of symbolism and the ineffable. Trapped, awaiting supplies, at a 
Company trading post, Marlow states what he ‘really wanted was rivets’: ‘To get on 
with the work – to stop the hole’.358 Rivets — physical, quantifiable units designed 
for a clear purpose with the capacity to provide a fixed point and to bind things 
together, even to overcome entropy and to ‘stop the hole’, as it were — seem, at this 
point in Marlow’s narrative, to represent the antithesis to the ineffable and to 
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inefficiency. (After all, that which ‘saves us is efficiency – the devotion to 
efficiency’.)359 But, as Marlow indicates, the rivets were in the wrong place (there 
‘were cases of them down at the coast’, and one ‘kicked a loose rivet at every second 
step in that station yard on the hillside’), to such an extent that rivets had even ‘rolled 
into the grove of death’.360 If it is fair to equate Marlow’s fetish for rivets with the 
desire for ‘fixed points’ of rationality, moral law and progress, then it is fair to 
suggest that the image of rivets being rendered useless and devoid of function 
indicates how the very standards and systems of the colonials (which the rivets seem 
to represent) are equally useless when situated within an alien environment, and that 
such customs are inevitably maladaptive. Just as a rivet is intended to be used within 
a specific infrastructure to perform its function, so, too, do laws, customs and ideals 
depend upon a multitude of social conventions to function. Whereas, then, 
Shakespeare may depict the debate over the pound of flesh in The Merchant of 
Venice as a conflict in which both sides share rules of engagement (and through the 
application of which mutually conclusive outcomes may be reached), that which is 
meaningful to Marlow is, in the context of the Congo, irrelevant to even his fellow 
Europeans.  
Conrad’s emphasis upon inefficiency also reflects the extent to which the 
international public were kept in the dark concerning the realities of colonialism. As 
noted by Ewans, Leopold II took direct action to ensure that all knowledge 
concerning the realities of the Free State was restricted: 
 
There were few visitors to the Congo and the pressures exerted on 
all who went to work for the Free State, as well as on other 
residents, meant that reliable information about what was going on 
there was slow to emerge. Free State employees all had to sign 
strict undertakings of secrecy, which their conditions of 
employment made it almost impossible for them to break. Were 
they to do so, the State would have no difficulty in making their 
lives unbearable, by denying them their commissions, withholding 
their pay, restricting their movements and preventing their 
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obtaining employment when they eventually returned to Belgium. 





Even Kurtz’s manuscript, his report for the International Society for the Suppression 
of Savage Customs, written before ‘his nerves went wrong’, appears to reflect 
historical documents in circulation regarding the management of colonies.
362
 Kurtz is 
described as having written in the report that by using ‘the simple exercise of our 
will we can exert a power for good practically unbound’. Many similar sentiments, 
such as the claim that India ‘if thus raised to the same condition as Java, would form 
the grandest empire it has ever yet entered into the heart of man to conceive’, were 
expressed by James Money, the author of How to Manage a Colony, with whom 
Leopold II corresponded before achieving his dream of acquiring foreign territory.
363
   
Marlow, at the beginning of his narrated journey, encounters, in the city likened to a 
‘whited sepulchre’ (which appears to be located in Belgium), the Company’s ‘great 
man himself’ behind ‘the door of Darkness’.364 Marlow seems to be using these 
terms sardonically, as if to draw attention to the dichotomy between the quiet 
banality of the nominal head of the Administration, and the brutal exploitation the 
Congo has suffered under the influence of that Administration. The ‘great man’ is, in 
actuality, no more to Marlow than ‘an impression of pale plumpness in a frock 
coat’.365 This character is effectively voiceless (he ‘murmured vaguely’), with his 
only personal impact upon Marlow being an attempt to pre-emptively silence him: 
‘...I undertook amongst other things not to disclose any trade secrets. Well I’m not 
going to.’366 
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In fact, there is contained within this encounter a microcosm of Marlow’s whole 
account, in that it consists of Marlow’s impressions, experiences, encounters and 
prejudices, yet is absent of any ‘trade secrets’ or any hard facts of how the 
Administration actually operates. Indeed, there is, by contrast to much late 
nineteenth-century realism or ‘naturalism’, a noticeable absence within the whole 
text of any statistical or formal in-depth accounts of the Company’s logistics. This 
absence suggests, perhaps, that the root of the impact Heart of Darkness has lies 
precisely within the absence of exact details, which are left for the reader to surmise. 
Conrad’s depiction of the accountant tending his books to the groans of the dying 
and the droning of flies is, in this sense, not just a depiction of cause and effect, but 
also a depiction of a formal system of accounting failing to acknowledge the truly 
important. Leavis, who found Conrad’s use of the ineffable to be ‘an intrusion’, 
elsewhere praises Dickens, in The Great Tradition, for his depiction of ‘certain key 
aspects of Victorian civilization [...which] suggested to him connections and 
significances he had never realised before’, as exemplified in the use of Gradgrind’s 
and Bounderby’s characterisation to link the political exploitation of utilitarian ideals 
to individual examples of ‘rugged individualism’ in Hard Times.367 However, when 
Conrad makes explicit use of the ineffable, so to speak, this paradox invites the 
reader to acknowledge the absence of discourse concerning how the use of 
systematised knowledge and power to exploit the Congo made every colonial 
morally culpable. Viewing the text in this way suggests that the Administration acts 
as point of reference which underlies the whole narrative, while no practical 
description of the Company’s logistics is provided, rendering them opaque. The 
characterisation of the director may be viewed as an encapsulation of this broader 
literary technique. In this way, Marlow’s narration indeed may be read as what Watt 
described as one of the ‘new narrative elements ... [that] reflect ... the general 
ideological crisis of the nineteenth century’.368 Indeed, the amanuensis (the frame 
narrator) at one point ‘interjects’ in order to declare how he ‘listened on the watch 
for the sentence, for the word that would give me the clue to the faint uneasiness 
inspired by this narrative...’369  
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In Heart of Darkness, the administrator characters are rendered down (in both 
descriptive and characteristic terms) to their most basic level, serving as conduits 
through which to view the corrupt nature of the colonial Administration. At the same 
time, these characters are further revealed as representing facets of a deeper failing 
apparent in modern institutions’ tendency to use collective action for exploitative 
ends. As such, the administrator characters represent aspects of the essential 
components of this tendency: the willing blindness of its participants and their 
collective ‘pitiless folly’. They do so as appropriate manifestations of their differing 
occupations and roles within the colonial project. These characters who hold an 
administrative function also constitute the points within the text where Conrad’s 
depiction of different thematic ideas converge: his depiction of the symptom; the use 
of ‘ineffable’ language to indicate the presence or influence of forces unaccounted 
for by the prevailing narratives of his era; and the use of narrative to reflect historical 
causal sequences and forms of association. It is within the representation of the 
Company’s administrators that these elements are revealed as manifesting within and 
through individuals — and, through interaction with Marlow, these motivations and 
justifications are explored and interrogated.  
 
'Perhaps I had a little fever too': a symptomatic narration  
A central argument of this chapter is that in Heart of Darkness, Conrad constructs 
what I will call a symptomatic narrative — a narrative which is itself intended to be 
read as a collection of symptoms indicating some underlying (but unseen and 
perhaps 'unseeable') historical agent. This symptomatic approach may be read as 
extending through every aspect of the novella, from characterisation to Conrad’s use 
of metaphor. Symptoms are subjective abnormalities in the status quo, observed or 
experienced indications of a change — the end point of a causal chain, the measure 
of which may only be gauged (at least initially) by the extent and the severity of the 
symptoms it renders. So, in the key example of this in Heart of Darkness, the 
symptoms of the sleeping sickness, referred to at several points in the novella, 
include delirium and incoherence, but they are, themselves, beyond what may be 
expressed or described in words. In this way, reading Heart of Darkness as a 
symptomatic text also entails a reading of the means by which Conrad depicts causal 
chains in general, and the increasing influence of comparatively new phenomena 
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(such as transnational economics, corporate entities and administrative bodies) 
within the text.  
While a ‘symptom’ need not directly apply to a physiological state or within the 
context of disease, there is a strong historical context of physiological symptoms 
associated with colonialism which were, at the time of the writing of Heart of 
Darkness, poorly understood and which were generally referred to (even within the 
medical community) via a language of symbolism. During the late nineteenth 
century, the ‘colonial’s disease’, or ‘sleeping sickness’ (known from the 1900s 
onwards as Congo trypanosomiasis) changed from an illness which mostly infected 
small pockets of individuals to an epidemic affecting the length of the Congo. The 
cause of the sickness was unknown, but its spread coincided absolutely with the 
arrival of colonial forces, and with colonial activities. Similarly, I want to suggest, 
many elements within Heart of Darkness correlate with this epidemic. Not only do 
many descriptions of individuals — and especially Kurtz himself — strongly 
correlate with the symptoms of the colonial disease, Marlow’s account itself 
becomes increasingly impressionistic and non-linear in a way that might, arguably, 
be read as exhibiting such symptoms at the level of narrative voice and form itself. 
Indeed, Marlow makes frequent references to the dream-like quality of his 
experiences, going so far as to link these explicitly to a malarial or fever type 
infection (it is not suggested that Marlow described as specific disease, rather that 
Marlow drew upon a set of symptoms and cultural impressions): ‘...the dream-
sensation that pervaded all my days at that time. Perhaps I had a little fever too ’.370 
Marlow similarly references dreams by describing Kurtz’s delirious ramblings as 
‘words heard in dreams, of phrases spoken in nightmares’, and says of his own 
journey: ‘I remained to dream the nightmare out to the end’.371 Reading the novella 
in the context of this plague strongly suggests, therefore, that these aspects of the text 
could well have been read as references to the sleeping sickness at the time of its 
publication.  
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The trypanosomiasis epidemic began in the southern Congo, and spread north along 
the banks of the Congo — just as Conrad describes Kurtz’s own journey.372 Infection 
rates of sleeping sickness greatly increased in line with the amount of traffic on the 
Congo River, and the river traffic, in turn, increased as large numbers of the 
Congolese were compelled to travel the river as conscripted porters, steamboat crew 
members or as conscripts into King Leopold II’s militia, the Force Publique. It 
appears, then, that as Conrad was writing before the disease was identified (and 
therefore was seen and experienced as more an unexplained ‘phenomena’ than an 
epidemic), he, too, was repeating a presumed causal relation between the act of 
colonialism and the disease’s symptoms. Just as the sleeping sickness exists within 
the novella as a reoccurring, undefined and poorly understood phenomena, so too, 
then, does the administration of the Company appear. Indeed, the sickness and the 
Administration symbolically function within the narrative as different manifestations 
(symptoms, if you will) of the same malaise — colonialism. 
 
A reading of Heart of Darkness which interprets the novella’s symbolism as 
referencing the sleeping sickness, and the sickness as providing an over-arching 
metaphor for colonial power, is further supported by how the descriptions most 
indicative of the disease appear concurrently with images of administrative 
corruption. Congo trypanosomiasis is a parasitic disease akin to malaria, caused by 
protozoa (parasitic single-cell organisms) transmitted by the tsetse fly. Its colloquial 
name is a reference to the illness’ symptoms. The ‘sleeping sickness’ begins 
innocuously, with similar symptoms to the common cold. As the disease progresses, 
the victim develops confusion, clumsiness, sleep disruption, cyclical fatigue, and 
mania, and as the disease worsens, the victim ultimately succumbs to delirium, 
coma, and death. The causative agent, the tsetse (or tetzi) fly, remained unidentified 
until 1903 (by David Bruce), and effective drugs weren’t developed until 1910.373 
Superstitions surrounding the disease attributed its origins to witchcraft, but the 
correlation between the arrival of Westerners and the activities of Leopold II’s ABIR 
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Congo Company could not have gone unnoticed.
374
 Other monikers for the illness, 
apart from ‘colonial’s sickness’ and ‘sleeping sickness’ included ‘Congo sickness’ 
and ‘colonial sickness’. Just as the name ‘Congo sickness’ speaks to the connection 
between proximity to the river and the illness, the idea of it being the ‘colonial 
sickness’ — rather than the ‘colonial’s sickness’ — is noteworthy for suggesting the 
act of colonialism as itself in some way causal.  
 
The consequences of the sleeping sickness are also interesting in terms of the 
response to its successful identification. In 1903, a team from the Liverpool School 
of Tropical Medicine (LSTM) investigated sleeping sickness. Subsequently, the 
LSTM recommended that the Belgians instigate a response composed of ‘a score of 
administrative measures designed to regulate various African activities in order to 
control the incidence and spread of sleeping sickness’.375 This speaks to the manner 
in which the colonial powers viewed the Congo — as something to be dominated 
through administration, and in which administration (including medical 
administration) functioned as an extension and continuation of military force.  
 
The use of  ‘administrative measures’ to ‘regulate’ and, through the act of regulation, 
to ‘control the incidence and spread of sleeping sickness’, suggests a Western 
colonial belief that insofar as it is possible for a phenomenon to be identified and 
systematised (even without full understanding), it could be the subject of 
administration, and thereby controlled.  Foucault posited that it was at the end of the 
eighteenth century that ‘medical gestures, words, gazes took on a philosophical 
density that had formerly belonged only to mathematical thought’376 — that the 
subjective character of an individual’s symptoms could be attributed a ‘mechanical’, 
‘mathematical’ certainty when viewed as one among an epidemic. In effect, the 
disease is used as an excuse to collectivise the individual members and 
characteristics of a group (or ‘population’), and thus use statistical and empirical 
rationale to ‘smooth over’ their differences and amalgamate them into a group upon 
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which various ‘governmental’ measures could be enacted. Indeed, Conrad’s 
depiction of the use of medical discourse to facilitate cultural domination and further 
the Western assumption of superiority is echoed in Foucault’s analysis. Foucault 
perceived that medical diagnosis (given the level of biological understanding at the 
time) overreached itself inasmuch as no ‘measurable mechanics of the body can, in 
its physical or mathematical particularities, account for a pathological 
phenomenon’,377 so, for example, Conrad’s ‘alienist’ doctor is presented as a 
practitioner of phrenology (and measured Marlow’s head, ‘the dimensions back and 
front and every way, taking notes carefully’).378 Here, the doctor’s trust in 
phrenology may well be a direct comment on the cultural uses of phrenology by the 
Belgian colonial authorities. King Leopold I appointed Dr Andrew Combe, a 
‘pioneer’ of phrenology, his royal physician in 1836, although Combe’s leaving the 
post shortly after may suggest this role was created more for the sake of 
appearances.
379
 In Africa, phrenology was employed by the Belgian colonials as a 
means to arbitrate the population, one outcome of which was the ‘discovery’ of an 
ethnic difference between the Hutus and Tutsis of Rwanda, which resulted in the 




This historical context, in which it was believed systematisation (even without 
understanding) was all that was required for control, appears to speak to the 
symbolic and moral ambiguity at the centre of Heart of Darkness. Indeed, it might 
be suggested that Conrad was precisely writing against this implicit ideological and 
political backdrop of systemic attempts to control without understanding, and was 
therefore attempting to depict a scenario which could not be dismissed with the 
presumption that ‘administrative measures designed to regulate’ could ‘control the 
incidence and spread’ of the poorly misunderstood barriers to imperial expansion. 
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(This would provide one rather different reading, then, of the language of 
‘ineffability’ criticised by Leavis and others in the novella.) Just as the cause of 
Kurtz’s apparent illness, and the multiple victims in the ‘grove of death’, appear to 
be overt references to the sleeping sickness (without ever being systematically 
described or identified as such), so the administration itself is never systematically 
described. Indeed, within Heart of Darkness, to be a part of the administration is 
associated with its own set of symptoms, while, at the same time, the symptoms of 
colonialism also affect the Congo itself, manifesting in, for example, the grove of 
death, Kurtz’s madness, and, of course, most famously, ‘The horror! The horror!’ of 
Kurtz’s last words.  
 
In this way, the administration functions as an overarching metaphor for the disease, 
while the disease functions, in turn, as a metaphor for both the affliction of 
exploitation in the Congo and the European lust for power. Both the apparent illness 
and social corruption pervade the events depicted as manifestations of a shared 
culpable influence, but remain inexplicably undefined, and therefore outside the 
remit of institutional, ‘administrative measures designed to regulate’. Kurtz, as 
perceived by ‘western eyes’, may be seen as a victim of the illness (both 
trypanosomiasis and colonialism itself), whose condition appears to be a physical 
manifestation of internal corruption — as if Kurtz himself is being consumed by the 
‘sickness’ of the colonial project. Of course, Conrad is never overt in identifying 
Kurtz’s infection with the sleeping sickness (it is not named), although this was, 
perhaps, as much as anything due to the fact that the sickness had yet to be medically 
codified as a disease, and its symptoms and causal agent (the tetzi fly and parasitic 
infestation) yet to be defined. If Conrad’s choice of an undefined and poorly 
understood malady was therefore deliberate, designed to enhance the sense of a 
confused attempt to impose order upon a misunderstood phenomenon, it may also be 
argued that Conrad intended by its use to reflect deeper problems with the colonial 
project.  
 
My central claim is, then, that, throughout Heart of Darkness, the administrator 
characters — the characters through which, the text represents contemporary 
concerns regarding institutions and socio-economic infrastructure, and through 
which the author engages with the European literary tradition of characterising the 
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same — are (possibly for the first time) themselves portrayed in a manner akin to a 
symptom. That is to say, Conrad depicts his individual administrator characters, I 
want to argue, as symptoms of some wider underlying and poorly understood 
phenomena, such as institutional corruption, the collective force of an abstraction, or 
the desire to conquer the unknown rather than understand it.  
 
The seeds of this individual realisation of systemic corruption are anticipated by 
Marlow’s conversation with the alienist doctor: 
 
‘Ever any madness in your family? [...] I have a little theory which you 
Messieurs who go out there must help me to prove. This is my share in 
the advantages my country shall reap from the possession of such a 
magnificent dependency. The mere wealth I leave to others.’381 
 
Again, it is unclear here as to whether the doctor’s ‘theory’ refers to a disease (of 
either pathogenic, a deficiency, hereditary or physiological causes) or simply to the 
nature of the colonial enterprise. The phrasing of his question, however, indicates 
that it pertains to madness. Thus, the doctor’s use of the collective term ‘Messieurs’ 
suggests it is the colonial activities that are the potential source of some form of 
personal, institutional or even systemic ‘devolution’, foreshadowing Marlow’s 
experiences. 
 
Conrad’s use of symbolism and metaphor is often presented in terms of the 
‘symptomatic’. Marlow’s encounter with the knitting ladies, the doctor and the man-
of-war are all presented as having a symbolic significance which Marlow himself 
indicates and attempts to identify. As such, these are examples of Conrad’s 
‘compounding’ symbolism — layering individually symbolic instances upon one 
another — until it is as if the reader has been presented with enough evidence to 
draw conclusions as to a unified ‘transcendental signified’, or ‘cause’ for the 
metaphors. In this way, Conrad’s use of symbolism directly mirrors a series of 
symptoms from which the reader is invited to draw a diagnosis. The first of the 
Company’s functionaries that Marlow encounters, the knitting ladies, appear to 
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symbolically reference the Norns (the mythic Viking weavers of fate), as they 
‘seemed to know all [...] about me [...which] seemed uncanny and fateful’.382 These 
‘Norns’ are referenced again much later within the text, in book three, as ‘a most 
improper person to be sitting at the other end of such an affair’, unifying the final 
section and reiterating the sense that the events described are united by more than 
simply Marlow’s personal experience, via the influence of the Administration.383 
Leaving the Chairman’s office, Marlow is met by a secretary (‘with an air of taking 
an immense part in all my sorrows’) who has ‘some clerk’ lead Marlow to the 
doctor.
384
 Marlow notes that ‘there must have been clerks in the business’, but this 
fact, the nature of their activity, their level of complicity or even the extent of their 
awareness of the true nature of the Company is less important to Marlow than his 
impression that ‘the house was still as a house in a city of the dead’; a fact conveyed 




The doctor is described as an ‘alienist’ and a philologist, and as attempting to record 
the mental impact of serving in the Congo upon the Company’s agents. Despite this 
goal, the doctor is depicted as lacking even a base level of empathy, and is 
apparently blind to the ‘mental changes’ his questions might provoke within those he 
quizzes, or, indeed, the effects of telling his ‘subject’ how ‘the mental changes’ will 
affect the validity of any conclusions reached through interacting with those under 
his ‘observation’.386 Marlow’s assertion in conversation with the doctor is that he, 
Marlow, is not ‘typical’ (‘if I were I wouldn’t be talking like this with you’) is 
dismissed with the advice to avoid ‘irritation more than the sun’.387 This suggestion 
reveals the extent to which the doctor, who presumes to be able to gauge the effect of 
acting for the Company upon any given individual, is effectively blind to the realities 
Marlow will encounter. These initial encounters with the agents of the 
Administration indicate to the reader that the constituent members of the 
Administration are wilfully blind to its inherently exploitative nature, in the same 
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manner as is Marlow’s aunt who sees Marlow, as an new employee of the 
Administration, as ‘an emissary of light, something like a lower sort of apostle’.388 
This wilful ignorance combines with the narrative style in which the primary means 
by which the reader will experience the influence of the Administration is via 
Marlow’s impressions, rather than via any explicit description of its activities or 
edicts. These allusions to institutional blindness occur throughout the novella, and 
continue to expand in their implications to incorporate even those entities presented 
as beyond the remit of the Company. Such is the case, for example, with the French 
man-of-war blindly ‘firing into a continent’.389 Marlow’s sense that ‘there was a 
touch of insanity in the proceeding’ is jarringly paired with the banal motive for this 
encounter, ‘her [the man-of-war’s] letters’, which Marlow’s ship had been charged 
with delivering. These letters, and the statement (which appears in the text in 
parentheses) ‘the men in that lonely ship were dying of fever’, suggests that the 
Administration has itself an infectious quality, or that the man-of-war is a symptom 




The unifying influence of the first person account given by Marlow provides the 
reader with the sense of a common cause behind the ‘high and just proceedings’, 
which Marlow himself encourages when he compares this influence to ‘a flabby 
pretending weak eyed devil of a rapacious and pitiless folly’, and emphasises a 
common lack of rationality in the scenarios he encounters (‘a vast, artificial hole 
somebody had been digging [...] the purpose of which I found impossible to 
divine’).391 This sense of ‘pitiless folly’ is linked, in Marlow’s mind, with an event 
‘several months later and a thousand miles farther’. This allusion, at first sight, 
appears to be directed towards Kurtz, but the inclusion of a reference to distance (‘a 
thousand miles farther’) suggests that Marlow is, in fact, referring to his encounter 
with Kurtz’s intended, and his own apologetics for the colonial project. If the reader 
is intended to perceive the Company as the primary manifestation of a deeper 
institutional malaise, here we see the resultant complicity that results from a failure 
to actively oppose it. Despite this impression being grounded in the style of 
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Marlow’s narration, the clearest expression of this phenomenon remains the 
Company, and in order for this collective impression of the Company to form, it is in 
turn the Company’s agents who provide an array of various forms or manifestations 
of this ‘pitiless folly’.   
 
Of course, the ‘pitiless folly’ of the exploitation of the Congo is also depicted via its 
direct influence upon the environment and its native inhabitants, and it continues to 
be Marlow’s narration which merges these atrocities into one amorphous activity — 
again with a presumed common cause. Marlow’s description of the ‘grove of death’, 
which he visits immediately before meeting the chief accountant for the first time, is 
of the afflicted occupants appearing as ‘black shadows of disease and starvation 
lying confusedly in the greenish gloom’. Marlow describes one sufferer who: 
... had tied a bit of white worsted round his neck – Why? Where did he 
get it. Was it a badge – an ornament – a charm – a propitiatory act? Was 
there any idea at all connected with it. It looked startling round his black 
neck this bit of white thread from beyond the seas.
392
 
Although, as previously stated, the causative agent and vector were not identified 
until 1903, the first Western account of the illness to which this appears to refer was 
published in 1803 (by Thomas Winterbottom), and the symptoms of sleeping 
sickness were well known, if poorly understood, within the Congo. The physical 
description of the afflicted former workers matches symptoms displayed by sufferers 
of sleeping sickness, and, if it is the case that the thread were ‘worsted’, as Marlow 
recounts, this item adds to the symbolic impression that the young man is being 
choked by colonial culture. As far as the young man’s situation is concerned, 
infection by the sleeping sickness, combined with failing health due to overwork and 
cultural invasion, are, in effect, composite manifestations of the same processes 
behind Marlow’s own situation.  
Reading the novella with consideration to the history of Congo trypanosomiasis, it 
seems, then, clear that Conrad intended his depictions of Kurtz’s sickness to match 
the symptoms of an ailment akin to sleeping sickness (a colonial disease, rather than 
the colonial disease), which in turn appears to have been intended as an analogy for 
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the corruption of the colonial project (rather than, for example, a deliberate attempt 
to depict a specific pathology). The increasingly ‘diffuse’ nature of Marlow’s 
descriptions of Kurtz’s mental state, do indeed conform to the progressive nature of 
the mental deterioration caused by Congo trypanosomiasis. The progressive mental 
deterioration of the actual disease trypanosomiasis, which leads to coma and death, 
appears to be melded, however, with what is also an actual physical dissipation of 
self, the last physical description of Kurtz being ‘a vision of greyness without form 
filled with physical pain and a careless contempt for the evanescence of all things – 
even of pain itself’.393 Again, this is starkly reminiscent of the description of the 
company director — the ‘impression of pale plumpness in a frock-coat’ which 
emerged from behind ‘a heavy writing-desk’.394 Just as the company director has no 
real identity within Marlow’s narrative outside of the Company itself (and is thus a 
being effectively subsumed into its role), so too does Kurtz’s true identity remain 
contentious and unclear throughout the remainder of the narrative. In fact, every 
character Marlow talks to about Kurtz gives a contradictory impression of him.
395
  
Conrad strongly implies that Kurtz was seen by the tribe as a supernatural entity: 
‘unspeakable rites, which – as far as I reluctantly gathered from what I heard at 
various times – were offered up to him’.396 This is foreshadowed early in Marlow’s 
account in his description of his predecessor, the Dane Fresleven, who was stabbed 
and killed by a native. Marlow was able to visit Fresleven’s remains, as the 
‘supernatural being had not been touched’.397 This anecdote serves to foreshadow the 
revelation of the natives’ idolatry of Kurtz, and it heightens the reader’s awareness of 
how Marlow is interpreting the events and imposing his own narrative to explain 
them. It is Marlow’s interpretation that the natives view the colonisers as gods — it 
is equally plausible that the natives feared corruption. Similarly, with Kurtz, it could 
be that the natives were attempting to appease Kurtz, or even guard against his 
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tyranny. Marlow tells of how, when leaving to ferry Kurtz away from his camp, 
‘three men plastered with bright red earth from head to foot strutted to and fro 
restlessly’. Again, Marlow imposes his own symbolic context to explain the events, 
describing the scene as ‘some satanic litany’, envisioning the natives as perceiving 
the ferry as a ‘fierce river-demon’.398 But in fact it was common practice for natives 
to plaster a red clay mixed to a paste with oil over the body to protect against tsetse 
fly, a tradition of which Marlow was, necessarily, ignorant. He is, we might 
speculate, therefore unable to separate pragmatism from superstition.
399
 Indeed, 
Conrad makes it clear to the reader that this inability of Marlow and the colonials — 
the failure to differentiate between superstitious and efficacious practices — extends 
to the practices of the colonials themselves. Conrad appears unwavering in this 
representation, as if to implicate himself, as author, equally in this judgment — and 
by implication, the reader and the colonial project as a whole.  
The sources of evidence for what Kurtz is like in action, which Marlow takes as far 
more accurate than the accounts given by the Company agents, are the artefacts 
which Kurtz has left behind: the heads on poles, the commissioned report, the 
painting of the blindfolded lady. These artefacts are interpreted by Marlow as 
revealing truths about the practical effects of colonialism and state-funded capitalist 
exploitation which resonate with Marlow’s own experiences (regardless of Kurtz’s 
intentions in creating them). The encounters in which Marlow and Kurtz converse 
lead Marlow to believe Kurtz is not ‘a lunatic’, and that ‘his intelligence was 
perfectly clear – concentrated [...] his soul was mad.’ Kurtz’s final words, ‘the 
horror’, for Marlow ‘had a candour [...] a vibrating note of revolt in its whisper, it 
had the appalling face of a glimpsed truth’, ‘thrown to me from a soul as 
translucently pure as a cliff of crystal’.400 This clarity is an evidential clarity, in stark 
contrast to the presumed knowledge that the Company’s agents purport to possess 
regarding both the Company and Kurtz himself. The accountant for whom Kurtz is 
‘satisfactory’ and the manager for whom Kurtz is first ‘a visionary’ and later 
‘unsound’, both lack Marlow’s willingness to listen to Kurtz on his own terms. 
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However, the final judge of the realities of Kurtz’s activities, the state of his mind, or 
the cause of Kurtz’s physical decline, is the reader. Conrad’s apparent intention is to 
provide the reader with a second-hand experience of a fictional encounter with an 
individual who embodied the logical conclusion of the ‘criminality of inefficiency 
and pure selfishness when tackling the civilizing work in Africa’.401 This desire to 
express an ‘African nightmare feeling’402 strongly suggests that Kurtz is merely the 
human face of the intended larger focus of the narrative. Indeed, a reading of the 
novella which emphasises the role of administrator characters reveals the extent to 
which the sleeping sickness and the Company are employed in ways which directly 
complement Conrad’s use of administrator characters, and highlights how these 
elements merge within Kurtz’s depiction.  
 
‘A most improper person to be sitting at the end of such an affair ’: causal chains  
The term ‘causal chain’ is used to describe a sequence in which each event is caused 
by its predecessor and influences its successor accordingly. In a very real sense, 
therefore, conventional literary plots conform to this description in their use of 
forms. Yet, in Heart of Darkness, Conrad uses narrative to indicate the past and 
present influences ‘upon’ the event directly addressed within the novella.  It is 
certainly the case that Conrad uses Marlow’s narration to reference historically real 
institutional structures and contemporary discourses of power from an experiential 
and individualised perspective. Jameson has described realism as uniting the 
‘experience of daily life with a properly cognitive mapping, or well-nigh “scientific” 
perspective’, and thus reads Conrad’s literature as ‘a strategic fault line in the 
emergence of contemporary narrative, a place from which the structure of twentieth-
century literature and cultural institutions becomes visible’ and simultaneously 
‘juxtaposed’.403  
In 1876, Leopold II of Belgium engineered the formation of the International 
Association for the Suppression of Slavery and the Opening Up of Central Africa 
                                                          
401Extracts from Correspondence, letter to Mr Blackwood, 13th December 1893, Conrad, Heart of Darkness, p. 
201. 
402 Extracts from Correspondence, letter to Mr Blackwood, 8th Feburary 1899, Conrad, Heart of Darkness, p. 
207. 
403 Fredric Jameson, The Political Unconscious (Abingdon: Routledge, 2002), pp. 90, 194. 
  174 
 
with its stated aim (as proclaimed at the international conference in Brussels) being 
‘[t]o open to civilization the only area of our globe to which it has not yet penetrated, 
to pierce the gloom which hangs over entire races [...] a Crusade worthy of this 
century of progress’.404 What followed was a genocidal exploitation of the Congo’s 
resources. In 1885, the Congo Free State was ratified as the personal property of 
Leopold II by the 14-nation Berlin Conference convened by Bismarck to resolve the 
Congo question. By the 1900s, any moral pretensions had been superseded by a 
colonial agenda manifestly based on financial self-interest. In Heart of Darkness, 
Jameson located an awareness of wider economic factors in ‘Conrad’s 
unquestionable and acute sense of the nature and dynamics of imperialist 
penetration’, and argues that the ‘historical and economic type is “managed” in the 
text itself’.405 Jameson suggests that Conrad was aware of how literary institutions of 
'narrative transmission' had, by the turn of the century, been treated as yet another 
resource to be broken into constituent parts and reordered  to further progress, and 
that Conrad used narrative to 'invert' Leopold II's carefully crafted and distancing 
narratives surrounding the colonial activities, re-implicating Leopold II through 
characterisation.  
Conrad uses the very language of his administrator characters to echo the forms of 
cultural and material associations behind colonisation. The New York Methodist 
newspaper, the Christian Advocate, cited Henry Morton Stanley’s journey as an 
example to justify the abolition of slavery, yet the paper’s mild anti-slavery stance 
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(under the editorship of Abel Stevens) belies the hypocrisy and moral equivocation 
at the centre of its argument. The article asserted that while ‘no flag be excluded 
except the slaver’s flag’ over the Congo, the ‘people on its banks’ needed a 
missionary society to ‘Christianize and civilize’ them — indeed it was a ‘duty’. This 
very word is used by Kurtz himself in reference to his writing for newspapers: ‘for 
the furthering of my ideas. It’s a duty’.406 Here is truly an example in which the 
Congo serves (to borrow Achebe’s phrasing) as a ‘backdrop’ for Western 
preoccupations, revealing a cognitive dissonance — a case of ‘double think’ — in 
even the most well-intentioned advocates of the colonial project.
407
 In a footnote, 
Stanley, the explorer credited not only with finding Dr Livingstone but also mapping 
much of the Congo on behalf of King Leopold II, describes how the expedition ‘had 
given up all hopes of hearing from civilisation’.408 This remark is unqualified, and 
despite describing the people he encountered as having a system of exchange 
(‘Bribes were offered to us three times by Manyema chiefs to assist them in 
destroying their neighbours’), and inter-cultural awareness (‘Our refusal of ivory and 
slaves appeared to surprise the chiefs, and they expressed the opinion that we white 
men were not as good as the Arabs’), Stanley describes them (without irony) as 
being expansionist, ignorant, and colonial. Notably, Stanley does so in a manner 
which fails to recognise the existence of an established infrastructure of implicit 
agreements and trade between cultures, ‘for – though it was true we did not rob them 
of their wives, ravish and steal their daughters, enslave their sons, or despoil them of 
a single article – the Arabs would have assisted them.’409  
 
Stanley’s approach is more or less identical to that of Marlow’s in book two, where 
Marlow asserts that: ‘[o]ne really does not know whether to pity or to despise the 
native of Manyema. Many are amiable enough to deserve good and kind treatment, 
but others are hardly human.’410 Marlow may thus be read as a voice from his time, 
reflecting the conflicted imperial discourse of his contemporaries. Conrad’s 
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depiction of a conflicted and inconstant central narrator, who never fully condemns 
the abuses he sees around him, appears, when contrasted with Stanley’s accounts, 
less a purely artistic choice on Conrad’s part and more a matter of realism the 
requirement to accurately depict the contradictory nature of the accounts given by 
colonials themselves. Conrad’s treatment of the administrators of the colonial project 
(of which Stanley himself was exemplary), and the characters through which their 
ideologies are, to a degree, personified, may therefore be respected as equally 
‘realist’ in this respect: Conrad has his characters repeat the very phrases and terms 
of the sympathisers of colonialism and the colonial instigators themselves to 
emphasis the causal associations between the propaganda in Europe and atrocity in 
Africa.  
 
Marlow’s conflicted, layered narration provides this historical comment without 
surrendering the text’s deeper themes to mere analogy. The historical backdrop of 
the novella appears to act as an exposition for the impressionistic and 
chronologically-confused narration, anchoring the potentially confusing style with 
real historical foundations. Without knowledge of Leopold II’s biography, for 
example, the exact nature of the activities of Kurtz and the Company are, literally, 
obscene — in the sense that their activities are never clearly described, and only 
alluded to. Leopold II reigned as king of Belgium from 1865 until his death in 1909. 
A constitutional monarch, Leopold II relied upon popular support via a democratic 
government and was widely regarded as being a progressive influence within 
Belgium. In 1873, for example, Leopold II supported the Belgium workers’ right to 
strike, declaring in a speech that: 
The new administration will exercise the utmost economy in the 
use of governmental funds, at the same time taking great care not 
to disrupt the functioning of established public services. It will 
study the best way to make use of our increasing financial 
resources; it will extend public works programmes but at the same 
time will seek means to reduce taxes on basic food stuffs.
411
  
                                                          
411 Barabara Emerson, Leopold Il of the Belgians: King of Colonialism (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 
1997), p. 131. Note here the use of the term 'administration' as a blanket term alluding to ambitions for the 
  177 
 
 
Leopold II, infuriated by the lack of power that came with his throne, sought to 
establish himself a colonial ruler. In 1876, Leopold II adopted the language of the 
philanthropist and began networking in London, until he identified the basin of the 
Congo River as a territory which no European powers had intentions to occupy. In 
September 1876, Leopold II convened a ‘geographical conference’ in Brussels, 
attended by European dignitaries. Leopold II described the goal of the conference ‘to 
pierce the darkness which hangs over entire peoples’ via the establishment of the 
‘location of routes […] of hospitable, scientific, and pacification bases’.412 The 
language, a master class in euphemism, cast the establishment of a network of 
fortifications reminiscent of the Roman Empire’s fort system (‘Limes’) as rest stops 
for visiting missionaries, centres for research, and a means to ‘pacify’ the indigenous 
population. Leopold II further implied the forts would contain scientists, 
anthropologists and artisans, and would be stocked with the tools of exposition, such 
as maps and tools. In effect, Leopold II sold this enterprise as the natural extension 
of Livingstone’s exposition; he even had Pyotr Semenov, a Russian geographer, 
chair the conference. Naturally, the underlying context of empire, centralised state 
rule, and handpicked attendees resulted in the conference concluding that activities 
such as exploration, trade, and cultural exchange could not be expected to occur 
spontaneously. Subsequently, an administrative body, the International African 
Association, was founded, to be located in Brussels and chaired by Leopold II.
413
 
Under the cover of philanthropy and exploration, Leopold II employed explorers, 
among them H. M. Stanley, to purchase as much land as possible from the 
indigenous population, and thus establish Leopold II as the private owner of a private 
empire. This process was sold to the American government as an imitation of the 
treaties established with Native Americans in the 1600s, and (after extensive 
lobbying) the United States Secretary of State recognised King Leopold II’s claim to 
the Congo via the establishment of the titular free state Stanley referred to in the title 
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In 1884, Leopold II invited international lawyer Travers Twiss to draw up the 
‘constitution’ of the Congo Free State, thereby implicitly receiving legal approval for 
the practice of buying land from local tribal leaders.
415
 Leopold II came into personal 
possession of the Congo Free State (through internationally recognised decree by the 
Belgium parliament) from 1885 to 1908. Unlike the British, French and Spanish 
colonies, the Free State was Leopold II’s personal property. To maximise revenue, 
Leopold II implemented slave labour and a quota system. Leopold II’s employees 
did, indeed, employ a system of forts and blocks. Land blocks were leased (from 
interlocking directorates) by concession companies and shareholders, with fifty per 
cent of the shares returned to the Belgium state, and, through the state, Leopold II 
himself — the Belgium state effectively bestowing the patina of democratic approval 
over Leopold II’s activities. This system was enforced by the founding, in 1888, of 
the paramilitary Force Publique, Leopold II’s private militia, comprised of recruited 
Congolese and led by Belgian nationals. The militia put down local uprisings, 
‘enforced’ the land contracts made with local chiefs, and enforced the system of 
command labour. Each post held around twenty recruited soldiers (usually 
Congolese natives) and one or two European officers. The activities of this force 
were overseen by 14 administrative districts covering the Congo Basin. Just as 
Leopold II and his employees used the language of euphemism to initiate this 
venture, they employed the trappings of administration as a ‘system of euphemism’. 
By maintaining the pretence of consent and contract law, and the subsequent 
pretence of legal enforcement of these contracts, the Force Publique enslaved the 
local population.
416
 Further, the use of administrative measures, and the illusion of 
justice, authority, impartiality and the abnegation of personal responsibility seems to 
have given the individual colonials the personal licence to employ individual 
members of the local population, who, in turn, were recruited in the subjugation of 
the entire region. 
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Conrad’s original plan for Heart of Darkness, as described in correspondence with 
his editor Blackwood, was to address the ‘criminality and inefficiency and pure 
selfishness when tackling the civilising work in Africa’.417 This prognosis has been 
interpreted by Levenson as an indication that Heart of Darkness was intended to be a 
much shorter work, possibly only consisting of book one, focused upon the agents of 
the Company and the wastefulness of their Administration.
418
 However, the 
novella’s later focus upon Kurtz, the striking comparisons between Kurtz ‘the 
extremist’ and Leopold II ‘the civiliser’, and the emphasis placed in the novella’s 
later sections upon the problematic relationship between Kurtz and the Company, 
suggests that Conrad’s initial readership would have viewed Kurtz, the agents of the 
Administration, and the Company itself as expressions of historical realities with 
different emphasises but a shared root cause. Read as such, it appears that Conrad 
deliberately inverted the dynamic between Leopold II and the Congo (by placing 
Kurtz deep in the jungle and the ‘pale impression’ of the Company director in a 
European office), with each of the agents of the Company presented as hollow 
vessels through which the inefficiency and selfishness of the Administration and its 
‘real world’ parallels were represented.419 Leopold II was effectively two rulers, or, 
at least, presented his rule entirely differently in accordance with the institutional 
restrictions on his activities.  Leopold II was at once the progressive Belgian 
constitutional monarch and the tyrannical robber baron of the Free State – a possible 
parallel to the ways in which Kurtz is described as both an ‘exceptional man’ and 
one who had ‘nothing on earth to prevent him from killing whoever he jolly well 
pleased’.420  Leopold II’s deliberate use of financial rewards to encourage others to 
engage in cruelty and exploitation is captured within the narrative of Heart of 
Darkness. By making the narration unreliable and subjective, the reader’s 
interpretation gains the quality of an experience, and thus the reader is allowed to 
uncover the barbaric truth behind the Company’s layers of administration. 
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Despite causal chains having the ability to be characterised so precisely, and (in 
theory) identified to exacting position, there remains an inherent ambiguity to the 
causal chain. In every causal chain there is the possibility that one, or multiple, 
causes may be overlooked or unaccounted for. Further, while the composite aspects 
of a causal chain may be identifiable, the composite outcome almost always gains a 
subjective and experiential quality which remains undeniably a point in the causal 
chain, as in how the vibration of air may result in music. Conrad’s characterisation of 
administrator figures within Heart of Darkness serve to tie the narrative explorations 
of causality, the symptomatic, and the ineffable together, allowing Marlow to 
interact with aspects of each theme simultaneously. Marlow descries the Company’s 
chief accountant as ‘a sort of vision’ in ‘starched collar, white cuffs, a light alpaca 
jacket, snowy trousers, a clean necktie, and varnished boots’. He is a ‘white man’ in 
both senses of the term, and ‘in the great demoralisation of the land he kept up his 
appearance’. This allusion to a surface appearance of purity (which depends upon the 
work of a Congolese woman, whom he ‘taught’) suggests the chief accountant 
embodies the superficial purity of the quest for profit as revealed through the ‘apple 
pie’ records he keeps.421 It is the accountant who first tells Marlow about Kurtz, who 
‘will be somebody in the Administration before long’.422 Conrad’s punctuation links 
the accountant’s description of Kurtz with the Administration, and both the 
Administration and Kurtz with a trench outside the office, which is filled with dying 
Congolese. Conrad achieves this link with his pointed use of the semi-colon, which 
(in this case literally) indicates the subject matter’s interdependence: 
 
‘In the steady buzz of flies the homeward bound agent was lying 
flushed and insensible, the other bent over his books was making 
correct entries of perfectly correct transitions; and fifty feet below 
the doorstep I could see the still tree-tops of the grove of death.’423 
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Here the semi-colon (first noted and interpreted by the critic Anthony Fothergill as 
being representative of Conrad’s ‘semi-colonialism’)424 illustrates the causal chain 
linking the accountant with the dying Congolese, with Kurtz, and, ultimately, the 
Company. The interdependence becomes, as it were, a unifying spirit (or ‘flabby 
devil’) to which the accountant is perhaps (as with previous Company agents) 
wilfully blind. 
 
The next agent of the Company that Marlow encounters is the general manager, the 
first indication that Marlow is in some sense escalating towards those most culpable 
for the collective project of colonialism. The manager is ‘a common trader’ who 
‘inspired neither love nor fear, nor even respect... uneasiness – that was it’.425 The 
general manager, as with all the Administration’s agents, reveals yet more about the 
nature of the Company and the colonial project within the novella, and — by 
implication — the activities of colonial Europe. The manager has ‘no learning, no 
intelligence’, ‘no genius for organising, for initiative, or for order’ and appears to 
owe his station to the fact that ‘he was never ill’.426 The simplicity of this attribute, 
which the manager himself describes as a virtue (‘Men who come out here should 
have no entrails’), reflects the practicalities of what it took to function within the 
Congo, as shown in Conrad’s own Congo Diary,427 as well as suggesting that the 
only attribute required for a collective entity, such as the Company or a government, 
is the ability to survive and thrive. There is also a suggestion in this metaphor that 
the manager lacks basic human qualities and, in this sense, he is very different from 
Marlow and even Kurtz: where Kurtz is stripped bare and skeletal, the manager is 
hollowed out; where Kurtz represents the colonial project in the raw, the manager is 
its paper-thin veil of civility. This contrast appears to touch upon a deeper truism, as 
an Administration or corporate endeavour need not function efficiently, it merely 
needs to avoid becoming bankrupt or being disbanded, while a public administrative 
body (a notion famously suggested by Machiavelli and of which there is an implicit 
undercurrent in More’s Utopia) need only maintain power in order to wield power. It 
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is within the context of these references to fortitude, and how it trumps both 
efficiency and virtue, that Marlow learns that Kurtz himself is ill. The manager’s 
description of Kurtz (‘an exceptional man, of the greatest importance to the 
Company’) reveals, as with the chief accountant, that the frame of reference within 
which Kurtz may be considered ‘exceptional’ and ‘satisfactory’ is that of the 
Company’s desire for survival and profit — rather than any qualities traditionally 
regarded as virtuous. Thus, it is these musings by the manager regarding what is 
desirable which lead Marlow to describe him (in an explicit reference to Faust) as a 
‘papier-mâché Mephistopheles’.428 In these two encounters, Conrad draws together 
elements of earlier works which employ administrator characters to critically 
comment upon ideas and ideologies concerning control, knowledge and power — 
unifying them into a single assault upon the very concept of colonialism.   
 
The ‘first class agent’ Marlow next describes, an individual believed by Marlow to 
be the ‘Manager’s spy’, has been officially tasked with ‘the making of bricks’ (a task 
he cannot fulfil due to an absence of raw materials) but really appears to have been 
ordered to ‘pump’ Marlow for information regarding the inner workings of the 
Administration in Europe.
429
 That this officer, the ‘spy’, has been tasked with official 
duties he cannot possibly perform doesn’t strike Marlow as ‘uncongenial’, and the 
officer himself, as with all the junior Company agents, only really desires to ‘get 
appointed to a trading-post where ivory was to be had, so that they could earn 
percentages’.430 It is within the context of Marlow’s close encounter with the base 
financial incentives upon which the Administration is built that he encounters the 
painting made by Kurtz: 
 
...a woman draped and blindfolded carrying a lighted torch. The 
background was sombre – almost black. The movement of the 
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This sense of a willing blindness — here, embodied in the blindfolded subject of the 
painting — is evoked again in the purposelessness of the official duties of the ‘spy’ 
(who has effectively been given alternative tasks designed to further the interests of 
his superior, which he accepts in so far as they further his own desire for promotion) 
and introduces an alternative interpretation to that traditional image of a blindfolded 
woman as representing ‘blind justice’. The construction of this passage links the 
description of the painting with Marlow’s own reactions to the ‘spy’, blending the 
imagery of the painting with Marlow’s emotive internal dialogue and economic 
insights into the realities of corporate endeavours. In this way Conrad implicates 
every Company employee, and every individual expounding the Administration’s 
ideology, so that they, as with the accountant and the grove of death, are treated as 
ultimately interdependent. This perception is enhanced, rather than weakened, by 
being placed into conflict with the perception of the ‘spy’ that Kurtz is ‘an emissary 
of pity, and science and progress, and the devil knows what else’.432 It seems evident 
that Conrad’s intention is to promote an awareness in the reader of how Marlow is 
internally conflating the Administration with the futility and complicit blindness 
depicted in the painting, and, subsequently, the reader is guided towards the same 
view. Furthermore, Marlow’s belief that this conflation is an insight shared with 
Kurtz leads the reader to (falsely) presume that Kurtz will, indeed, offer salvation, or 
at least a coherent explanation and exposition as to the cause of this willing blindness 
and the pitiless folly of colonialism.  
 
This impression, that Kurtz offers some form of beneficent knowledge, is implied 
throughout book one. Marlow’s journey begins with self-conscious allusions to the 
heroic quest: 
 
to understand the effect of it on me you ought to know how I got out 
there, what I saw, how I went up that river to the place where I first 
met the poor chap. It was the furthest point of navigation and the 
culminating point of my experience. It seemed somehow to throw a 
kind of light on everything about me...
433
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It appears to be no accident that, prior to this statement, Marlow has been described 
as having the ‘pose of a Buddha’.434 What the reader may reasonably expect, 
therefore, is a tale which echoes the classical mythic themes of a quest towards 
enlightenment, or even an apotheosis. The first time Marlow hears of Kurtz (from 
the accountant) he is told Kurtz is a ‘very remarkable person’.435 The second time 
Marlow hears of Kurtz is from the manager, who tells him Kurtz is ill, but it is not 
until the manager’s ‘spy’ reveals that it was Kurtz who painted the image of the 
blindfolded lamp bearer that Marlow’s interest is piqued: ‘who is this Mr. Kurtz?’436 
Such is Marlow’s dislike of the manager and his spy, that Kurtz seems to present a 
point of favourable comparison and even an authority figure to be invoked (as when 
speaking to the assistant-manager, Marlow states that ‘When Mr. Kurtz [...] is 
General Manager, you won’t have the opportunity’437 although at that time Marlow 
admits he ‘did not see the man in the name any more than you do’.438 It is, ironically, 
Marlow’s revulsion for the assistant-manager which leads him to adopt this man’s 
opinion of Kurtz as being a ‘universal genius’,439 and to impose upon Kurtz the same 
standards Marlow himself held: ‘rivets were what really Mr. Kurtz wanted – if he 
had only known it.’440 What Marlow has clearly done is taken the reports of Kurtz’s 
efficiency at delivering ivory and equated them to moral, intellectual and cultural 
superiority, in the same manner that his aunt had done with the Company itself. 
Here, in effect, Conrad is echoing the broader relationship arch of European culture 
with the exploits of King Leopold II’s Congo within Marlow’s relationship arch with 
Kurtz, and Marlow, despite himself, falls back on colonial propaganda. To Marlow’s 
credit, however, he does not take this as a given, and instead resolves to seek out 
Kurtz, a decision being the sentence which closes book one, when Marlow states 
how he ‘was curious to see whether this man who had come out equipped with moral 
ideas [...] would climb to the top after all and how he would set about his work’.441 It 
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is not until book two that Marlow encounters evidence to cause both him and the 
reader to reassess the initial impression that Heart of Darkness is a refashioning of 
the quest.  
  
Although some considerable ‘actual’ time is implied as elapsing (at least three weeks 
and four days are explicitly referred to), Marlow’s first meeting with Kurtz is 
presented in the text almost immediately after his meeting with the general manager. 
Marlow’s descriptions of Kurtz, leading up to his description of his first actual 
encounter, blend his expectations of the man with his retrospective assessment, but it 
is clear that Marlow has — at least initially — separated the Company and Kurtz in 
his own mind: 
 
Not of course that I did not connect him with some sort of action. 
Hadn’t I been told [...] that he had collected, bartered, swindled, or 
stolen more ivory than all the other agents together. That was not 




Marlow’s description of Kurtz’s supposed gift — his ability ‘to talk’ as if ‘from the 
heart of an impenetrable darkness’ — appears, at this moment, wishful thinking. 
Marlow, at the time he reports having this thought, has yet to hear or read Kurtz. 
Furthermore, these musings are formed whilst worrying the knot of a dead man’s 
shoes. Marlow, at this point in the narrative, has previously been described as 
travelling down the Congo in a steamer, and his helmsman, who has been stabbed by 
a spear, bursts into the cabin and collapses at Marlow’s feet, covering his shoes in 
blood. Marlow’s narration leaps ahead chronologically mid passage to describe 
Kurtz. The latter is depicted as being, in person, the ‘spoiled and pampered 
favourite’ of the wilderness, and it is indicated that ‘Europe contributed to the 
making of Kurtz’. This is also the first time it is mentioned that the ‘International 
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It gave me the notion of an exotic Immensity ruled by an august 
Benevolence [...] There were no practical hints to interrupt the 
magic current of phrases, unless a kind of note at the foot of the 
last page [...] may be regarded as the exposition of a method... 




After this description — which links Kurtz’s speech, his apparent relationship with 
the jungle, and his influence upon colonial ideology — Marlow immediate returns to 
a chronological account. After the aforementioned description of Kurtz, Marlow 
describes how his ‘subtle bond’ with the helmsman — ‘a claim of distant kinship’ — 
was built upon the fact the helmsman was ‘a help – an instrument’. Marlow then 
compares the helmsman and Kurtz, concluding that Kurtz was not ‘exactly worth the 
life [of the helmsman] we lost in getting him’.445 Marlow’s description of this 
supposed bond, which (Marlow acknowledges) is founded upon practical and mutual 
benefit, is worth more to Marlow than Kurtz’s life. This suggests that Marlow’s 
narration is designed by Conrad to reveal the imposition of Marlow’s retrospective 
moral judgments — judgements he has reached after the events he is recounting. It 
also reveals that Marlow’s account of his journey is given by a narrator who regards 
relationships as analogous to causal chains, and, in this way, Conrad appears to 
encourage the reader to view Marlow’s account as being one of the causal chains 
which links Kurtz’s atrocities with the offices of the Administration, and with the 
wilful blindness of those who support it, such as Marlow’s own aunt or the clerk 
working in the Administration’s office. For Marlow, his relationship with the 
helmsman appears to exist outside of the relationships influenced or proscribed by 
the Administration, and in this instance, Marlow implicitly draws a contrast been the 
relationships influenced by the Company and this shared bond. This point in the 
novella appears to begin a trend in Marlow’s narration which aligns those 
relationships linked to Kurtz, and those which are linked explicitly to Company. 
Thus, through Marlow’s narrative emphasis upon occupational and causal 
relationships, Kurtz and the Company become linked as if by their natures — by dint 
of their both being symptomatic, composite entities subject to multiple 
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interpretations. In this way, Conrad subtly ‘swaps’ the abstract Company for an 
individual, Kurtz. The reader is then able to judge the consequential outcomes of the 
Company’s actions as they would the actions of one man: Kurtz. Kurtz and the 
Company become effectively the same — they are both processes of systemic 
corruption. Kurtz appears, in this light, to be proffered by Conrad as a convenient 
focal point of moral judgement through which the reader is able to frame his or her 
attitude towards the activities of the Company as a whole.  
 
Marlow learns of Kurtz’s activities via his encounter with the young man who 
reminds Marlow of a harlequin.
446
 The harlequin describes how Kurtz led the local 
tribe on raids in the forest, and suggests Kurtz has become something akin to a 
divine figure to them. The harlequin is also the first character apart from Marlow to 
indicate that Kurtz was no longer behaving in a manner consistent with traditional 
Western morality (nor even in a ‘satisfactory’ manner). It is the harlequin who first 
describes how Kurtz has come to believe that ‘there was nothing on earth to prevent 
him killing whom he jolly well pleased’.447 Here Kurtz is clearly depicted as 
somehow surpassing or going beyond the role of a Company agent — the ‘civilising’ 
claims made on Kurtz’s behalf outdo even the Company’s apparent goal of ‘weaning 
those ignorant millions of their horrid ways’.448 The general manager similarly 
declares that Kurtz has employed an ‘unsound method’. Marlow’s immediate 
questioning of this claim suggests that he considers Kurtz’s methods to be, in fact, 
the logical conclusion of the colonial project: the elimination of the current 
population as part of the continuing exploitation of the environment. In fact, Conrad 
appears to intend that the reader consider the manager to be more out of step with the 
Administration’s goals than Kurtz, as it has previously been made clear that, from 
the chief accountant’s perspective at least, Kurtz’s methods are ‘very satisfactory’.449  
 
Conrad uses Marlow’s narration to foreshadow his eventual revelations, instilling in 
the reader a sense of acquiring ‘first hand’ experience, after Marlow’s foreshadowing 
has, already, effectively directed the reader as to how to interpret it. One such 
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instance of the use of this technique is when Marlow examines Kurtz’s hut from a 
distance and mistakes posts surrounding the hut for the remains of a fence. Upon 
examination with his telescope, Marlow sees (in a passage which extends to cover a 
page): 
 
...food for thought and also for vultures if there had been any 
looking down from the sky, but at all events for such ants as were 
industrious enough to ascend the pole. They would have been more 
impressive had they not been turned to the house. Only one, the 
first I had made out was facing my way. I was not so shocked as 
you may think.... I had expected to see a knob of wood there, you 
know... it was black, dried, sunken, with closed eyelids – a head 




The effect of having Marlow shift from describing what he is viewing (‘such ants as 
were industrious enough to ascend the pole’) to what he is experiencing (‘I was not 
so shocked as you may think’) is that there is no one affirmable point at which the 
reader really ‘knows’ what is at the top of the post until Marlow states it clearly. But 
the slow ‘reveal’ allows the reader to experience a slow dawning of realisation 
similar to what Marlow describes himself as having felt. This passage seems to 
encapsulate the process of realisation Marlow has experienced, the seeds of which 
can be found in every encounter Marlow had along the Congo, and in particular 
within those interactions he has had with the Company’s agents. Marlow concludes 
this description with the assertion, ‘I am not disclosing any trade secrets’ (which 
affirms a reading in which Kurtz acts as a personification of the Company itself by 
echoing Marlow's memory of the contract of employment he signed with the 
Company).
451
 The subsequent statement that ‘there was nothing exactly profitable in 
these heads’ suggests, then, that behind the apparent differences between Kurtz’s 
actions and the profit motive of the Company, they are, in fact, casually related: that 
the former was, in a very real sense, the inevitable outcome of the latter.  
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The paucity of direct descriptions of Kurtz by Marlow leave the reader depending 
upon a myriad of different impressions and accounts. Kurtz is described as being a 
diminished and unimposing figure, ‘like an ivory ball’ the wilderness appears to 
have ‘embraced him, got into his veins, consumed his flesh, and sealed his soul to its 
own’,452 with ‘a cage of ribs’ and ‘bones’ of arms, an ‘image of death carved out of 
old ivory’ with a ‘deep voice’,453 a ‘vision of greyness without form filled with 
physical pain and a careless contempt for the evanescence of all things’.454 This 
absence of clear description serves to grant Kurtz the attributes of a communal 
experience, revealed to Marlow in the same manner as his experiences of the many 
facets of the Company. What the Company is — as a composite of its practical 
impact and its constituent members — remains dependent upon the individual 
descriptions and actions of its agents, who themselves provide Marlow with an 
assortment of impressions of the Company itself. The emphasis of the narrative 
seems to shift slowly from a question of whether Kurtz is to be regarded as an iconic 
manifestation of the Company, to one of whether Kurtz is an unintended by-product 
of the Company, to a guided conclusion that Kurtz is at one end of a causal chain and 
the Company is at the other, and both parties are defined by this relationship. It is in 
this way, we might say, that Conrad makes explicit the peculiar relationship between 
agent and institution (albeit at a much greater scale) that the texts examined in the 
earlier chapters in this thesis address implicitly. 
 
Kurtz’s impact upon the Congo is presented by Marlow as being more significant 
than is indicated in the details disclosed by the personal witnesses Marlow interacts 
with. The ‘actual’ extent of Kurtz’s influence on the Congo is most clearly hinted at 
in Marlow’s reaction to the ‘wild and gorgeous apparition of a woman’.455 The 
precise nature of the relationship between Kurtz and this woman remains ambiguous, 
although she is described by the Russian harlequin as being able to enter his cabin 
freely, and as having talked ‘like fury to Kurtz for an hour’.456 Perhaps ironically, it 
is through these accounts that the extent to which the Europeans are blind to the 
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culture of the Congolese is also revealed, as Kurtz is depicted as engaging in more of 
a dialogue with the Congolese woman than Marlow, or any individual Marlow 
describes, ever has. Furthermore, the harlequin describes how this woman had 
‘kicked up a fuss’ about his use of the ‘miserable rags’ to patch his clothes. Yet 
Marlow has already described these patches as anything but ‘miserable rags’: indeed, 
Marlow describes them as ‘blue, red, and yellow [...] scarlet edging [...] gay and 
wonderfully neat’.457   
This appears like it might be a reference to colonial treaties struck by Stanley. From 
1888 onwards, Stanley abandoned his former patrons, the British, in favour of a 
commission by King Leopold II. Leopold II (in return for 50,000 francs a year in 
payment) commissioned Stanley to return to the Congo (nominally) on behalf of 
international scientific philanthropy, namely as an agent of Leopold II’s 
subsequently financed International African Society. Stanley was, in actuality, 
ordered to negotiate with the local tribes to secure contracts (known colloquially 
among the colonials as ‘cloth and trinket’ contracts) with Congolese tribal leaders. 
These contracts were exchanged for land, conscripts and legal authorities.
458
 Over 
the following five years, Stanley concluded some four hundred ‘cloth and trinket’ 
treaties with Congolese leaders. The Congolese appeared to believe (or were mis-
sold) these contracts as friendship pacts, but they were, in fact, trading their land (at 
least, in the eyes of Western international trade agreements). For example, on 1 April 
1884, leaders of the Ngombi and Mafela traded ‘one piece of cloth per month [...] for 
themselves and their heirs and successors for ever [...] all sovereign and governing 
rights to all their territories’.459 The irony is that the Russian youth (the harlequin) 
owes his current situation to the social and economic interactions and relationships 
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forged around these pieces of cloth, yet is himself entirely ignorant of their meaning, 
with ‘no more idea of what would happen to him than a baby’.460 As Stanley 
reported directly to Leopold II, and Leopold II worked hard to keep his investments 
in the Congo and subsequent profits secret, Stanley’s actions must have seemed 
outlandish to non-Belgium Europeans, who were themselves recruited and deployed 
under cover of Leopold II’s publicised goals of civilisation and progress. The image 
of a colonial administrator, ravaged by fever, who is a ‘carrier’ of ‘the colonial 
disease’ is therefore both an image of a victim and of the causal agent of the disease 
of colonialism. Conrad's use of this and other narrative associative forms allow the 
author to indicate a sense of the ineffable, a quality to the human experience under 
such conditions too great to be conveyed with words which Conrad, though his strict 
and disciplined use of location and journey, manages to politicize. Conrad seems, 
perhaps, to hint that such experiences are ineffable as the language and narrative 
forms required are themselves repressed or even countered by the colonial project.  
Conrad’s description of Kurtz (such as his motives, his influences, or how he was 
before his decline) can be read as fulfilling a similar function to the depiction of 
those characters studied in earlier chapters — allowing the author to make certain 
claims or observations without the requirement to provide a detailed account of 
infrastructure in the process. Conrad’s innovation, however, lies in his use of 
metaphor, inference, characterisation and analogy, through which  Kurtz provides a 
focal point within the narrative, for the novella’s wider concerns: the Company and 
the colonial disease. Thus, figuratively speaking, Kurtz may be seen as a compilation 
of each of the individual administrator characters within the novella, or even as a 
depiction of these same individual characters in an alternative occupation and 




Conrad wrote during a time when the line between state activity and corporate 
enterprise was blurred by international changes in finance, law and governance — 
and, as Marlow’s use of them suggests, the terms ‘Administration’ and ‘the 
Company’ were in the context of colonialism often effectively synonyms. In this 
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sense, Heart of Darkness may be read as one of the earliest interrogations of an 
emergent monopoly capitalism. Soon after Leopold II’s reign ended, the United 
Mines of Upper Katanga (UMHK) was created, an organisation which eventually 
‘controlled about 70 percent of the economy of the Belgian Congo [...] and 
controlled the exploitation of cobalt, copper, tin uranium and zinc in mines which 
were among the richest in the world’.461 Conrad’s representation and use of 
administrator characters achieves the same combination of representing and 
interrogating this new form of institutional power as Machiavelli and More did with 
the nascent nation state, Shakespeare with the constitutional monarch, Goethe with 
the entrepreneur and industrial planning, and Dostoevsky with Tsarism and early 
socialism. Conrad also reflects the historical emergence of new power structures, and 
the historical periods in which these institutions, in response to social change, were 
required to alter the means through which they exercised power from mass physical 
cohesion to the use of symbols and systematised knowledge. 
 
The presence of the ineffable in Heart of Darkness, explored through the prism of 
the administrator character, suggests it is intended as a direct comment upon the 
fallacious appeals to and on behalf of knowledge by colonial institutions.  Even 
before the establishment of the Congo Free State, scientific ideals were cited as 
justification for colonial activities. When Leopold II convened the1876 Geographical 
Conference in Brussels, which lead to the establishment of the International African 
Association, it was he who delivered the impassioned welcoming speech. Leopold II 
proclaimed that ‘to pierce the darkness which hangs over entire peoples’ was ‘a 
crusade worthy of this century of progress’.462 The Conference agreed to the 
establishment in the Congo of ‘hospitable, scientific and pacification bases to be set 
up as a means of abolishing the slave trade, establishing peace among the chiefs, and 
procuring them just and impartial arbitration’.463 The extent to which this idea of a 
continent under ‘darkness’ is present within Heart of Darkness is self-evident, but 
the specific connotations from which this idea of ‘darkness’ originates pertain to 
‘darkness’ being, in the historical context of its usage in reference to Africa, related 
to a perceived absence of knowledge and understanding. It appears that Conrad 
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sought to utilise the novella form to illustrate the complexity of the interactions 
occurring within and beyond the Congo, and thereby flag inherent flaws in any grand 
administrative endeavour. As colonial administration made clear, the still-emerging 
disciplines of anthropology and economics, and even practical considerations such as 
logistics, inevitably involve complex systems where experiments are costly, rare and 
limited in their ability to isolate objective, simple and controllable causal relations. 
Because of the complexity of the social, physical and cultural environment of the 
Congo, Conrad’s literary arsenal of metaphor, narrative, plot and character have 
proved a more striking and enduring account of the exploitation of the Congo than 
could be found in any of the physical experiments conducted within the IAA bases.  
 
Conrad’s use of the administrator character is deeply woven into the novella, and 
character is, indeed, represented as symptomatic rather than essential. Conrad uses 
characterisation as one of the many elements of each of Marlow’s encounters. 
Indeed, it might be suggested that, in Heart of Darkness, characterisation does not 
stop with the physical limits of the individual characters, but that their 
characterisation incorporates their surroundings, their location within Marlow’s 
internal and external journey, their station in relation to the Company, and their 
impact upon Marlow’s internal narrative. For instance, the character of the 
Company’s director is conveyed expressly through his position at the beginning of 
the complex chain of interactions of which Kurtz lies at the end (he has his ‘grip on 
the handle-end of ever so many millions’).464 Everything about the director is 
uncertain, ‘an impression’, from his height (‘five feet six, I should judge’), to his 
actual movements (he ‘shook hands, I fancy’ and ‘murmured vaguely’).465 There is 
no ‘essence’ to this director — one gets the sense that, within Marlow’s subjective 
experience, anyone could be the director, without practical consequence. In actuality, 
no character in Heart of Darkness is presented separate to the influences of the 
Colonial project and the Company, and each character is, as such, symptomatic of the 
economic, cultural and international forces which have situated them in Marlow’s 
path.  
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The impetus behind this thesis has been to trace and analyse a major aspect of 
characterisation that has seldom been made explicit in literary studies: the 
importance of the role that characterisation plays in the text’s relationship with 
systematised power. The thesis aims to clarify and explore this connection by 
examining those characters within the primary texts who administrate on behalf of 
changing historical systems from the period of the early Renaissance through to the 
beginning of the twentieth century.
466
 
More and Machiavelli influenced the premises of the cultural debate concerning the 
power dynamics of Europe’s developing institutions of modernity. This 'template' 
subsequently permeates the work of future authors and forms the foundations for 
future depictions of administrator characters. As critical scholarly consensus 
suggests, each was personally interested in the concept of ‘humanism’, by which was 
meant the renewed interest in the political systems and cultural practices of the 
ancient world, particularly Athens and Rome. Both More and Machiavelli used 
literary forms, in this way, as a medium through which to engage in a conceptual 
exploration of alternative modes of systematised power, employing classical 
societies as inspiration. Rhetoric permeated these systems and practices, and gained 
a renewed currency within Europe’s elite as a representation of learning, authority, 
and culture. Utopia and The Prince are, I argue, each rhetorical exercises which thus 
address the specific relationship between the individual and the state. In this fashion, 
Early Modern European adaptations of classical rhetoric played a central role in an 
emergent literary examination of administrative systems — imaginative and 
intellectual accounts which provided a conceptual framework within which to 
perceive and respond to them.  
                                                          
466 The ‘Renaissance’ is, it should be recalled, understood within this thesis to refer, loosely, to the widespread 
cultural phenomenon which spread across much of Europe between the fourteenth and seventeenth centuries, and 
which is typified by a renewed interest in and attempted adoption of classical social systems and culture. 
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Both More and Machiavelli operate, effectively, within the strict boundaries of an 
ideal of the perfected province — modelled on the ancient polis or republic — each 
arguing in favour of their proposition of what form such a state should take. By 
setting strict parameters, Machiavelli and More use their respective subject matter as 
testing grounds for extended metaphors to explore their own readings and 
interpretations of classical social and political arrangements, cognisant of the 
possibility of influencing their (potentially politically powerful) readership. In 
particular, both authors emphasised those aspects of the classics which pertained to 
governance and administration. In The Prince and Utopia, it is thus possible to 
perceive the first literary representations of the manifestation of a specifically 
modern form of systematised power, articulated in historical societies in which, 
however, the interlocking systems of governance, united by a common set of 
practices and references (today commonly described as ‘state apparatuses’), were not 
yet in place, nor had been fully conceived. As such, my argument has sought to 
demonstrate that both texts are orientated around the goal of representing an 
argument (rather than a fully existing reality), and that, in order to maintain their 
argument’s integrity, the authors used the techniques of rhetoric to imply abilities 
and processes on the part of ‘authority’ (be that the state, the Church, or a Prince) 
that were largely speculative in form. In this way, Machiavelli and More created the 
impression of a machinery of state capable of imposing central control, and so 
portrayed the character of the administrator as a conduit to unspecified, and never 
explicitly defined, forces. These implied abilities accorded to authority were, given 
the contemporary state infrastructure, highly improbable and, indeed, in some 
respects impossible. Consequently, the rhetorical liberties taken by these two authors 
appear to have shaped subsequent literary representations of the ‘role’ of power and 
of its administrators, to the point of altering public debates concerning the nature of 
governance itself, and altering perceptions around the capacity and potential of state 
influence. The political ‘Platonic ideals’, which provided the battleground over 
which Machiavelli and More jousted, constituted, effectively, a shared conception of 
knowledge and its relationship with power. And both Machiavelli and More, despite 
their use of rhetorical flourishes and poetic licence, appear to have believed that 
there was, ultimately, an ideal system and the possibility of its ideal application 
(unique and transitory though this may have been).  
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In The Imperial Archive: Knowledge and Fantasy of Empire, a study of the Victorian 
construction of new modes of power and knowledge in the administration of Empire, 
Richards notes that in the modern era ‘we routinely assume that no power can 
possibly exist without its underlay of documents, memoranda, licenses, and files’.467 
In this sense, Shakespeare’s works appear to prefigure those Victorian conceptions 
of the relationship between power and knowledge examined by Richards, albeit 
expressed in accordance, of course, with the means by which it was encountered in 
the sixteenth century. Shakespeare’s fascination with the relationship between the 
verbal contract and the social compact represents, within his plays, the systems 
through which power manifests. Thus, Shakespeare depicts the forging and 
redefining of verbal contracts as a source of dramatic tension, as with the marriage or 
love vow in The Taming of the Shrew or Romeo and Juliet, the promise in Hamlet, 
Lear or Macbeth, and the social compact, such as the deal in The Merchant of 
Venice, the conspiracy in A Midsummer Night’s Dream, and the role that both social 
compact and conspiracy play in The Tempest. The social compact, as with verbal 
contacts, is depicted as contestable, and, as a result, a central theme in Shakespeare’s 
plays concerns the tension between family obligations, duty, social obligation, and 
personal morality. Shakespeare’s use of administrator characters in the plays A 
Midsummer’s Night Dream, The Tempest, and The Merchant of Venice presented, in 
particular, a conception of power as synonymous with, and sustained by, rhetoric, 
pomp, and courtly protocol, which serve in these plays as a shared ‘language’, of 
sorts. As with Machiavelli and More, the idea of an investment of power in systems 
(as embodied in the characters of Ariel, Puck, and Balthazar) is often presented in 
the form of that power’s emissaries, and this relationship (between power and 
systems) appears often to be characterised as a patron bestowing power upon his or 
her benefactor. However, in Shakespeare, these characters are both more and less 
than emissaries. The manner in which these characters are presented appears, as 
such, to be fed by existing concepts of classical patronage and contemporary 
concepts of the court favourite, but also, significantly, in the case of The Merchant of 
Venice in particular, by the emergence of ‘new professional’ administrators, such as 
the advocate, the accountant, and the private secretary. The interests and motivations 
of these characters, while aligned with those of their patrons, remain distinct and 
                                                          
467 Richards, Knowledge and the Fantasy of Empire, p. 8. 
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separately delineated. In each case, these characters display the ability to interpret 
their instructions in the manner which they think best, and which, the plays imply, 
their patrons would almost certainly curtail or redirect were they privy to such 
liberties.  
Reading Shakespeare with attention to his portrayal of administrators suggests, then, 
a new approach to the representation of power as being something which is not 
wholly owned even by those in which it is officially invested, but as a product of the 
interactions and customs by which it is exercised. Furthermore, Shakespeare’s plays 
are one of the first instances in which the entropy of information is suggested. In 
societies in which invested power was such an important principle (prior, of course, 
to more mechanised methods of communication), the inherent danger of 
misunderstanding and cross communication was a frequent source of inspiration for 
the action of the plays themselves, as, for example, in the case of Romeo and Juliet, 
A Comedy of Errors, Twelfth Night or Macbeth. In the plays examined, it is the 
administrator characters who convey the ways in which power is structured, 
arbitrated, interpreted, and executed. These characters also convey the ways in which 
power has ramifications for such underlying principles as the importance of correct 
speech (rhetoric), social norms (courtly protocol), and the formalised, socially 
recognised process of investment (patronage). Moreover, it is arguably this aspect of 
the plays that marks them as potentially subversive with regard to existing 
understandings of the (divine or hereditary) sources of political power.  
Shakespeare’s mode of administrative characterisation is a key component in the 
underlying conceptual framework of his texts, whilst simultaneously driving the plot 
forward. In my chapter on Shakespeare, I thus examined three of the characters 
Shakespeare uses to mediate systematised power in the text (Puck, Ariel and 
Balthazar) and examined how Shakespeare incorporates the external (and often 
unseen) influences of such power into the fabric of the play. Shakespeare’s 
employment of administrating characters continues those techniques developed by 
earlier Renaissance authors (as exemplified in the works of Machiavelli and More), 
while also innovating upon them. In particular, Shakespeare expanded the range of 
the administrator character by representing these characters as overt, and arch, 
products of power relations, while also questioning the authenticity and potency of 
these characters in relation to the systems of power they uncritically purport to 
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represent. Within each of the examined plays, the depiction of the administrator 
character thereby suggests a provocative undercurrent of subjugation and 
inauthenticity, which appears to lie at the root of some of the future administrator 
character’s darker representations.  
Written some two hundred years after Shakespeare’s plays, Goethe’s Faust 
incorporates a series of impressions of new systems of power, including emergent 
organisational structures and institutions of industrialisation, during the period of the 
Enlightenment and a developing capitalism. It is in the characterisation of 
Mephistopheles as an administrator, in particular, that Faust itself depicts a shift in 
systematised power from the classical and Renaissance humanist methods seen in the 
play’s early scenes, to the later methods of industrialisation, labour and force 
employed in the play’s latter scenes. The means by which Faust primarily undertakes 
his quest of ‘endless striving’ is Mephistopheles. At the same time, Mephistopheles’ 
‘impression of worldly-mindedness’, to use Carlyle’s phrase, allows him to become 
a characterised conduit for the mundane processes whilst still conveying the uncanny 
and almost mystical quality of bureaucratic and administrative processes to effect the 
world, thus allowing Faust, by contrast, to represent the aesthetic quest for ‘Inquiry 
and Endeavour’.468 Faust’s eventual triumph over Mephistopheles, without whom he 
could have achieved nothing, represents, in this way, a further layer within the play’s 
thematic concerns: in order to continually achieve and strive, as the underlying 
dynamics of modernity demand, mankind must learn to interact with the very 
systems and methods it creates to achieve its ends. 
If it is true that artists respond to new forms of organisation by developing new 
forms of art (such as with the novel in the eighteenth century),
469
 such new artistic 
forms also appear to reflect social changes in both technology and social 
organisation, and the subtle, even ephemeral, changes characteristic of modern 
experience itself. This argument extends to new modes of systematised power as 
well. Faust suggests a web of impressions of a transitional period in Europe. These 
changes echo many of the changes (to social structure, the means of production and 
international relations) that the literature of Renaissance humanism earlier attempted 
                                                          
468 The Carlyle Anthology, ed. by Barrett.  
469 See, for example, the classic account of the (English) novel’s modernity in Ian Watt, The Rise of the Novel 
(Harmondsworth: Pelican, 1972).  
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to address. Much of the literature associated with Renaissance humanism may be 
seen as a reaction to such sweeping historical changes, as the past was re-approached 
in an attempt to regulate the present and control the future. Goethe’s Faust may be 
read as an exemplary text which emerged from a period of similar turmoil (albeit, on 
a smaller, but, in some senses, more dramatic scale). Part One of Faust was 
completed in 1806 — the tail end of the Weimar Classicist attempt to revive 
humanism through a cultural return to romantic, classical and enlightenment ideals, 
of which The Sorrows of Young Werther was hailed as an emblem. Part Two of 
Faust was completed in 1831, a year from Goethe’s death at the age of 82. Between 
the completion of Part One and Part Two, Goethe was writing within a context of a 
multitude of influences, including the end of the Holy Roman Empire; the 
Napoleonic Wars; the rise of the modern Prussian administrative state; the British 
Industrial Revolution; the Congress of Vienna and the German Confederation; and a 
ground swell of German nationalism which would culminate in the Hambach 
Festival.
470
 Consequently, I am not the first to suggest that Faust may be read as 
containing a number of meditations upon the relationship between the individual 
(often perceived to be idealised in the Weimar Classicist interpretations of the 
Renaissance) and the collective, mass, historical phenomena apparent in new 
emerging industrial and market forces. In this respect, the character of Faust may be 
understood as reflecting aspects of a broader transition from Weimar Classicist 
ideals of the individual to the ‘modern’ individual who is idealised in the 
entrepreneur and the philanthropist. Whereas Goethe’s earlier writing advocated a 
philosophy of Strum und Drang, in Faust, the play rapidly moves away from the 
‘storm and urge’ of Faust’s thirst for knowledge and longing for romance, towards 
the quest for self-determinism and, in so doing, introduces new, more properly 
modern concepts of eternal or endless striving.
471
 Through comparison with the 
Mephisto of Marlowe’s Doctor Faustus, it becomes clear that Goethe’s 
characterisation of Mephistopheles represents more than diabolic urges. 
Mephistopheles appears to vocalise both Faust’s inner turmoil and to represent those 
external forces which threaten Faust’s goals of lasting achievement (such as, 
mundanely, easy gratification and even procedural frustration). It is thus 
                                                          
470 See R. R. Palmer and Joel Colton, A History of the Modern World, 8 (New York: AA Knopf 
1964). 
471 Chesterton, Chaucer, pp. 158-9.  
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Mephistopheles who provides both Faust and the audience with, to use Carlyle’s 
phrase, an ‘impression of worldly-mindedness’, by allowing Mephistopheles to 
become a character embodying the mundane processes of the world, and by contrast 
allow Faust to represent the aesthetic quest for ‘Inquiry and Endeavour’.472 
Faust is a text which has, at its core, a central driving conceit of the legal contract 
between Faust and Mephistopheles. Thus, it is that those artistic techniques deployed 
in earlier works, which had been used to engage with concepts of natural order 
(which still resonated during the early nineteenth century as in residual conceptions 
of the natural superiority of nobility), give way to techniques which express a 
growing awareness of the importance of social order (such as economic and class 
factors) which are conveyed in literature through language, character motivations 
and plot devices. In Faust, the relationship between knowledge and power explicitly 
transforms in the course of the play from one in which power is achieved through 
knowledge, to one in which power is the product of social relationships, institutions, 
norms, contracts and happenstance. That is to say: Faust begins by entertaining the 
Platonic ideals of knowledge and power, which informed so much of the work of 
Machiavelli, More, and Shakespeare, and ends with a new reverence for the level of 
complexity required to systemise power in the new century. 
In ‘The Grand Inquisitor’, Dostoevsky incorporates a presentation of institutions 
(such as the Orthodox Church) as well as contemporary debates around how best to 
order an increasingly complex and extended modern society, through his portrayal of 
the Inquisitor. As I argued throughout the chapter, Dostoevsky’s specific intention 
here seems to be to engage with the socialist doctrines emerging in certain strands of 
contemporary Russian politics, whilst incorporating the influences of a wider 
European intellectual culture, such as the Scottish Enlightenment. In this way, 
Dostoevsky effectively equates ideology with institution in the same manner as, at an 
earlier moment, Machiavelli equated practical power with the perception of power. 
Moreover, as with all the texts examined within this thesis, Dostoevsky appears to 
examine this relationship primarily through character, rather than through either 
mythic language or treatise. Whereas an authentic relationship may be formed 
between monarchy and subject in More’s Utopia, however, Dostoevsky innovatively 
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uses an administrator character to propose that there is an inherent inauthenticity 
which results from the interactions between individuals and institutions. Systems of 
power are not presented as ‘naturally emerging’ or as conforming to predetermined 
principles in Dostoevsky’s novels; rather, they are human conceptions and products 
of human desires. The Inquisitor’s ‘Platonic ideal’ of the Church, for example, is a 
grotesque distortion of traditional Christian values (a marked contrast to More). 
Dostoevsky’s presentation of the Inquisitor is nonetheless a continuation of the 
tendency to use characterisation as one means by which to incorporate external 
concepts of power into the narrative by depicting the impact such wider concepts, 
and their manifestation in material institutions, have upon the personality, 
interactions and philosophy of a given individual.  
Of the many characters in Heart of Darkness who may be read as administrator 
characters, Kurtz, the Company men, and ‘the Administration’ — significantly 
Marlow uses the terms ‘Administration’ and ‘the Company’ interchangeably — act 
within Conrad’s text as manifestations of a kind of ‘unifying principle’, in a manner 
akin to the ways in which Shakespeare used a set of communal reference points 
associated with power in Elizabethan England (a composite characterisation apparent 
in the aggregate that emerges through the depictions of multiple minor characters 
and symbolic events). Collectively, Conrad's characters recast the noble claims made 
by various individual figures within the text in defence of colonialism, portraying 
them as disingenuous and corrupt (the individual characters may genuinely believe 
their various claims, but as a collective they are portrayed as wrong). These 
‘manifestations’ are indicative of the forms of organisation and exploitation 
underlying colonialism, as perhaps the administrative problem of European power in 
the late nineteenth century, and are presented symbolically rather than 
journalistically (which is to say, formally). Significantly, all attempts to express this 
‘unifying principle’ in Heart of Darkness are never shown to be fully satisfactory, 
putting in question what ultimately may be expressed of a progressively complex 
and abstract form of systematised power, and asking whether some aspects of such 
power are inevitably ineffable or beyond narrative explanation. 
It is broadly accepted that Conrad was required to move beyond traditional literary 
techniques to satisfactorily depict a story that incorporated his own experiences in 
the Congo. In Heart of Darkness, this is most obviously apparent, arguably, in 
  202 
 
Conrad’s attempts to represent the phenomenon of the ‘agent’ (that an individual 
may, in some sense, be merely a product of an underlying system, and 
simultaneously embody that system); abstraction (that established symbols, even 
symbols of power such as brutality or wealth, dissipate when forced out of their 
specific setting); and ineffability (that some forces, by definition, defy formal 
description). Hence, linear narrative is replaced by weaving, non-linear recollections. 
The narration is highly subjective; individual events are presented, and overtly 
acknowledged as having symbolic importance; and highly symbolic items and 
descriptions have multiple possible interpretations. In the case of Heart of Darkness, 
the apparent link between administrator characterisation, systems of power, and 
perceptions and expectations of knowledge can be read as exemplified in Conrad’s 
depiction of the company’s agents as being ‘symptomatic’ of European moral 
decadence — an effect achieved in particular through the incorporation of the 
imagery of plague and ‘feverish’ narration. The colonial administrator character in 
Heart of Darkness may be approached, in this sense, as just one of the many 
symptoms of such wide spanning phenomena (such as the rise of global commerce) 
which defy formal explanation, and cannot (currently) be captured through anything 
other than abstraction. As these underlying causes are effectively ineffable, Conrad’s 
administrator characters suggest, rather than attempt to encapsulate, the products of 
the failing attempts by colonials to apply systems of power out of their specific 
context — a failure so challenging as to raise fundamental questions for European 
hierarchy, practices, and social norms in general.  
II 
This thesis demonstrates, through the readings of its chosen texts, the influence of 
the administrator character trope as a kind of pre-history of our contemporary power 
relations (both in artistic representation and in our own relationships with 
systematised power). By tracing the roots of this trope back to their earliest 
appearances in the literary canon of the Early Modern period, this thesis thus seeks 
to contribute to a greater understanding of both the historical production and forms 
of subjectivity incorporated into a given text. As social and cultural constructs, texts 
may accurately reflect, subvert, and perhaps inspire, the development of 
systematised power. Europe, between the eras of ‘the Renaissance’ and a fully-
developed capitalist ‘modernity’, saw great changes in the means of coordinating and 
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systematising collective human action. These means included (in no particular order) 
the constitutional monarchy, the corporation, the nation state, the guild, the political 
party, and new financial institutions. All of these systems may be viewed, on the 
most basic level, as ways of organising power in its various forms — or systematised 
power, if you will. Such changes were as much cultural as they were political or 
economic, and were reflected, and reflected upon, within literature. And as such 
systems grew in size and number, experiences of institutional malaise, abstraction 
and alienation became common enough to influence a range of cultural movements 
from the nineteenth century onwards.  
In this sense, my thesis may also be read, among other things, as offering something 
like a prehistory of the more familiar figure of the administrator as he appears, most 
famously, in Kafka’s modernist nightmares written during the 1910s and 1920s; 
texts which are populated by characters who appear to respond to forces outside the 
immediate narrative, as in The Trial and The Castle. While this sense of external 
machination was a particular preoccupation in Kafka’s literature, a feeling of 
alienation from, and persecution by, some ‘outside’ and even ‘unknowable’ force are 
common themes within various forms of literature from the latter half of the 
nineteenth through to the early twentieth century, embracing, for example, parts of 
Balzac’s Human Comedy (particularly in 'House of the Tennis Playing Cat'), 
Dickens’s Bleak House and Musil’s The Man Without Qualities, as well as the 
dystopian administrations of Zamatyin’s We and Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four. 
Indeed, more often than not, the administrator character came to be the primary 
means by which this theme was invoked.  
‘Tributaries’ of different modes of characterisation which were employed to reflect 
contemporary issues and concerns appear to have coalesced, at least within western 
European literature, in the works of authors such as More, Machiavelli and 
Shakespeare. These methods of characterisation were utilised as a means to 
incorporate, and even to address, issues arising from changes in existing forms of 
social organisation. These techniques of literary representation were continued into 
the core functionality and dramatic resonance of the twentieth-century administrator 
type. The ‘types’ of administrator characterisation seem to, in this sense, ‘fan out’ in 
the writing of later authors, apparently informed by the characterisation which 
appears in earlier works. Within some texts over the course of the twentieth century, 
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the administrator character develops as such into a mere cipher which, introduced at 
the right time and with the right symbolism, functions simply to indicate to the 
reader layers of machination behind all prior events, and all events to follow. At the 
same time, the administrator is increasingly presented as the focal point for a satirical 
comment upon political systems, and later, removed from its initial historical and 
cultural context in humanist rhetoric, re-appears in a progressively stereotyped form 
in late twentieth-century popular culture, where he or she has been embraced as a 
means to insert sweeping narrative shifts without disrupting the verisimilitude of the 
world depicted.  
Such diversity and continuity appears to be present in the works of Kafka. In The 
Trial, the parable of the door keeper is used to illustrate to K. why he is ‘deluding’ 
himself by believing the Priest, and by implication anyone implicated within the 
administrative systems of the law. Thus, within the context of The Trial, the 
‘character’ of the door keeper appears to be used by Kafka to serve the function of an 
administrator character for the Priest. Thus, in a similar fashion to Dostoevsky’s 
Inquisitor story, this parable becomes a kind of ‘quintessence’ for the main body of 
the text. As a major theme of The Trial is the relationship between the individual and 
collective systems of organisation, Kafka portrays each individual within the novel 
as implicated in ‘the law’, with the ‘administrator character’ of the main body of the 
novel being the illusion of progress, described by K as being, within the world of the 
novel, the ‘lie fundamental to world order’.473 Within The Castle, Kafka incorporates 
a similarly pervasive characterisation of administration as — this time through the 
continual inclusion of the trappings of communication — the fact that it lacks any 
actual meaningful exchanges of information (both in material terms, as with the 
phone in the inn which only emits ‘the buzzing of countless children's voices’,474 for 
example, or in terms of plot as with the continual quest by K. for an appointment 
with one functionary to arrange an appointment with another functionary).  
The Castle portrays how administration is both dualistic and vague, and illustrates 
the effect of administration upon the individual. Administration is dualistic as it 
promises order, control and predictability, yet in practice tends to generate further 
                                                          
473 Franz Kafka, The Trial trans. by Idris Parry (London: Penguin Books, 2000), p. 172. 
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confusion. Administration is also vague in that no one individual or process is 
decisive or conclusive, but is part of a wider network of interactions and 
infrastructure.  
The vagueness of administration is incorporated into the very geography of The 
Castle - K. is himself a Land Surveyor, and 'anyone living or spending the night here 
[the inn] is in a sense living or spending the night in the castle'.
475
 The artefacts of 
administration are ever-present, as with the Mayor's cupboard 'completely stuffed 
with documents' which 'covered half the floor', and these artefacts appear as if 
bursting into the world.
476
  
The individual artefacts which comprise the physical infrastructure of administration 
in The Castle also incorporate vagueness, duality and the impact upon the individual: 
The earpiece emitted a buzzing sound unlike anything K. had heard before ... 
as if out of the buzzing of countless children's voices - but again, this was no 
buzzing, this was the song of distant, utterly distant voices - as if out of this 
buzzing there emerged in a quite impossible fashion a single high-pitched yet 




The telephone itself is a part of a wider infrastructure, and while a distinct object it is 
dependent upon being part of a network in order to be, in a practical sense, a 
'telephone'. Kafka describes the buzzing as a simulacrum of an administration -- 
countless voices merging into one powerful voice. This effect is presented as being 
fully consciously experienced by K., and yet there is also an acknowledgment that K. 
knows this voice is, in some sense, an illusion.  
Far more dystopian, perhaps, is Kafka's description of the administrative process 
describing the practical outcomes of administration's inherent vagueness:  
When a matter has been under consideration for a very long time, it can 
happen, even without the considerations having been completed, that suddenly, 
with the speed of lighting, at an unforeseeable and subsequently also 
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untraceable point a settlement emerges that concludes the affair usually quite 
properly, I grant you, but none the less arbitrarily for that.
478
 
This description of the castle's administrational system seems intended to be a 
comment on the act of administration itself as ultimately unaccountable, 
unpredictable, and uncontrollable --  effectively, chaotic: 
[A]s if the official machinery ... had taken the decision spontaneously without 
the aid of the officials ...  it's not possible ... even from the top, to find out 
which official decided in this case and on what grounds.
479
  
In The Castle every aspect of the matter of the novel, including K. himself, is 
subsumed into the administrative fabric of the castle. Just as collected infrastructures 
(such as economies, or political factions) are not, in some sense, 'real', K. seems to 
know that the sense of an overarching super structure is, in the same way, not 'real', 
but its effects are no less palpable. In The Castle this administration acts as a parable 
indicating deeper and broader questions about the nature of being an individual 
entity in an integrated world. 
Later works in which the administrator character appears may, perhaps, be viewed as 
expressing, above all, a certain anxiety that we as a species lack a language 
compatible with the sheer complexity of life viewed in the context of globalisation 
and the rise of the ‘information age’. More recently in 'pop culture' the character of 
Number 2 in the series The Prisoner, The X-Files character the Cancer Man, the 
Half-Life game series character of G-Man, and many more — to the point of 
ubiquity — are all examples of characterisation and methods of presentation of 
themes and concerns which appear to ultimately derive from a canonical character 
trope rooted in the European Renaissance which evolved through adaptation over the 
course of modernity’s development: the administrator character. In his book The 
Imperial Archive, Thomas Richards suggests that ‘the thought of Bentham, and Mill 
with the thought of Russell and Keynes and C.P. Snow, was the idea that knowledge 
is inconceivable without the state’; this is already implicit in Hegel.480 If this is 
correct, such a conception of knowledge, a notion that a mode of information which 
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depends upon central administrative control, would certainly have influenced the 
trend — at least up until the 1970s — for state intervention in economics (beyond 
those roles of provision of non-market viable services and redistribution), education, 
health, and beyond state borders in the form of military action and financial aid. If 
the work of Keynes is generally taken to exemplify the theoretical underpinnings of 
such a trend in western Europe, its opposite pole is to be found in someone like 
Hayek’s writings, which, from the publication of The Road to Serfdom in 1944, 
advocated a conception of knowledge as a shared phenomena, through which 
information may be dispersed without central control, and which suggested that any 
economy and, by extrapolation, any manifestation of systematised power, is ‘a 
system in which the knowledge of the relevant facts is dispersed among many 
people’.481 Just as Richard can marshal, then, ample evidence to support a dominant 
conception of knowledge as ‘inconceivable without the state’ in twentieth-century 
Britain and Europe, there was, during the same time, an intellectual movement which 
contradicted the consensus, and which would, in the last decades of the century, 
increasingly come to predominate.  
The same appears to be true of all of the periods of time associated with the primary 
texts studied within this thesis, and, even more interestingly, appear to be held within 
many of the primary texts. Machiavelli and More are the most immediate examples 
of such a dichotomy. In Utopia, the characterised More defends Plato’s assertions 
that philosophers might guide society towards equity, happiness and peace, while 
Hythloday dismisses such claims as fanciful in the face of collective ignorance: 
‘People who have made up their minds [...] are never pleased with the man [...] who 
[...] tells them they are [...] wrong’.482 Machiavelli describes how a Prince may unite 
a state in The Prince, yet his advocacy of such a position at all points seems intended 
to pander to the intended reader (‘the magnificent Lorenzo de’ Medici’, ‘under your 
banner our country may become noble again’).483 In his Discourses on Livy, 
Machiavelli describes a Prince as only one of many stages along the path to his 
favoured mode of governance, a Republic (indeed, the title of Chapter 58 is ‘the 
                                                          
481 Friedrich A. Hayek, 'The Use of Knowledge in Society', American Economic Review, XXXV.4 (1945), pp. 
519-30. 
482 More, Utopia, p. 26. 
483 Machiavelli, The Prince, p. 3 and 72. 
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multitude is wiser and more constant than Princes’; a direct contraction of 
Hythloday’s assertion).484 Shakespeare’s treatment of Shylock, the outsider to 
Venice and to the Court, is at times both condemnatory and sympathetic, and Portia, 
despite her cleverness, is depicted as being cruel and shallow through her treatment 
of the suitors. Indeed, none of the characters in The Merchant of Venice are entirely 
sympathetic or without blame, and consequently the underlying plot — that of the 
successful appeal to outside authority to settle a private contractual dispute — is far 
from advocating top-down governance. The other plays examined in this thesis are 
equally ambivalent regarding a preference for either emergent or imposed systems of 
power, and, collectively, appear to wish a ‘pox on both houses’. Dostoevsky’s ‘The 
Grand Inquisitor’, and the novel of which it is part (The Brothers Karamazov), could 
hardly be more conflicted regarding the role of institutions in relation to individuals. 
A more subtle distinction appears between the early Goethe and the later Goethe, in 
that Faust’s worth is revealed not through his individual actions (many of which are 
reprehensible), but as an emergent outcome of the totality of his motivation for 
betterment, ‘eternal striving’. Heart of Darkness is such a complex, diffuse and 
elusive text, it seems as if Conrad’s intention was for it to provide the reader with the 
experience of a collection of scenarios and interconnected relationships which defy 
the impulse to impose a cohesive narrative — itself a possible 'metaphor' for the 
more grandiose goals of Imperialism. While Dostoevsky and Conrad appear to be the 
most antagonistic to appeals to administrative control (that is, systematised power), 
all the authors appear primarily to distrust disingenuous appeals to authority, be 
those appeals to divine right; moral, racial and intellectual superiority; purported 
consensus; or simple force of arms.  
The central argument of this thesis has been that an administrator character of a text 
may act as a prism through which to analyse the depiction of systematised power, 
and the tensions or contradictions inherent within it, from which wider conclusions 
about the text's original climate may be drawn. Just as representations of power and 
knowledge appear to have influenced the very manner in which power and 
knowledge are manifested and performed, it appears that it may even be possible to 
suggest that administrative systems and individual administrative agents have been 
changed by the manner of their representation.  
                                                          
484 Machiavelli, Discourses on the First Decade of Titus Livius, p. 140. 
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